On Mon, Jan 20, 2025 at 1:48 PM PGC wrote:
* >>** They have provided definitive proof that like it or not mind is a
> "mere" mechanism, and that mind is what a brain does.*
>
>
> *> Then make an accurate prediction of the content of my next post. Use
> all the AI you want. *
>
*I could predict w
On Monday, January 20, 2025 at 4:12:10 PM UTC+1 John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jan 20, 2025 at 7:46 AM PGC wrote:
*> In truth, the “weakness” you ascribe to simpler formal systems—such as
first-order logic without heavy axioms, or minimal forms of arithmetic—can
lead to fascinating nonstandard mo
On Mon, Jan 20, 2025 at 7:46 AM PGC wrote:
*> In truth, the “weakness” you ascribe to simpler formal systems—such as
> first-order logic without heavy axioms, or minimal forms of arithmetic—can
> lead to fascinating nonstandard models and subtle phenomena that arguably
> eclipse the raw computati
It’s noteworthy how this conversation—centered on Busy Beaver numbers,
Turing machines, and the difference between finite and infinite time
steps—remains tightly focused on the immediate computational (or at times
proof-theoretic capabilities). In doing so, the you guys bypass the
metaphysica
On Sun, Jan 19, 2025 at 4:16 PM John Clark wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 19, 2025 at 11:18 AM Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> *>> I think Alan Turing's Proof that there is no general solution to the
>>> halting problem and it's corollary that some things are true but
>>> uncomputable, is more relevant than Godel'
On Sun, Jan 19, 2025 at 11:18 AM Jesse Mazer wrote:
*>> I think Alan Turing's Proof that there is no general solution to the
>> halting problem and it's corollary that some things are true but
>> uncomputable, is more relevant than Godel's theorem. In general there is no
>> way to determine if a
Concision can mask ambiguity more than elaborating as you, one of the most
frequent posters of this list, appear to know well.
But to bask in a list that was based on the discussion of ToE, when it's
now closer to the Meeker Instrumental-list, that wonders why the world
votes self-dealing billi
On Sun, Jan 19, 2025 at 9:14 AM John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 18, 2025 at 2:45 PM Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> *> my central point that Godel's theorem places no limitations on our
>> ability to understand/predict dynamics over finite time periods, and that
>> this is the sort of question physicist
On Sat, Jan 18, 2025 at 2:45 PM Jesse Mazer wrote:
*> my central point that Godel's theorem places no limitations on our
> ability to understand/predict dynamics over finite time periods, and that
> this is the sort of question physicists are almost always concerned with in
> practice*
*That's
On 1/18/2025 4:44 PM, PGC wrote:
On Saturday, January 18, 2025 at 10:52:49 PM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/18/2025 2:29 AM, PGC wrote:
First I'll address the rest of your post as there's not really
much to talk about: Uncomputable inference rules (like the ω-rule)
aren
On Saturday, January 18, 2025 at 10:52:49 PM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/18/2025 2:29 AM, PGC wrote:
First I'll address the rest of your post as there's not really much to talk
about: Uncomputable inference rules (like the ω-rule) aren’t used in
standard physical theories much, so invo
On 1/14/2025 1:56 AM, PGC wrote:
On Monday, January 13, 2025 at 11:58:38 PM UTC+1 Jesse Mazer wrote:
Doesn't Godel's theorem only apply to systems whose output can be
mapped to judgments about the truth-value of propositions in
first-order arithmetic? A cellular automaton would
On 1/18/2025 2:29 AM, PGC wrote:
First I'll address the rest of your post as there's not really much to
talk about: Uncomputable inference rules (like the ω-rule) aren’t used
in standard physical theories much, so invoking them misses the core
point about Gödel’s incompleteness unless you h
On Sat, Jan 18, 2025 at 1:51 PM PGC wrote:
> I see you continuously blending computation (the mechanical enumeration of
> finite steps) with provability (what a formal theory can or cannot prove in
> principle, given its axioms) all the time. Everybody with an eye for it
> can. You want an exampl
I see you continuously blending computation (the mechanical enumeration of
finite steps) with provability (what a formal theory can or cannot prove in
principle, given its axioms) all the time. Everybody with an eye for it
can. You want an example: reread yourself. As long as you keep conflating
On Sat, Jan 18, 2025 at 5:29 AM PGC wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, January 14, 2025 at 9:06:29 PM UTC+1 Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jan 14, 2025 at 4:56 AM PGC wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2025 at 11:58:38 PM UTC+1 Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
> Doesn't Godel's theorem only apply to systems whos
On Tuesday, January 14, 2025 at 9:06:29 PM UTC+1 Jesse Mazer wrote:
On Tue, Jan 14, 2025 at 4:56 AM PGC wrote:
On Monday, January 13, 2025 at 11:58:38 PM UTC+1 Jesse Mazer wrote:
Doesn't Godel's theorem only apply to systems whose output can be mapped to
judgments about the truth-value of
It's not only systems in first order logic that are Goedel complete.
For example Euclidean geometry is Goedel complete even though it
includes universally quantized propositions like "All triangles have
interior angles that sum to a straight angle."
Brent
On 1/14/2025 5:33 AM, John Clark wr
On Tue, Jan 14, 2025 at 4:56 AM PGC wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2025 at 11:58:38 PM UTC+1 Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
> Doesn't Godel's theorem only apply to systems whose output can be mapped
> to judgments about the truth-value of propositions in first-order
> arithmetic? A cellular automato
On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 5:58 PM Jesse Mazer wrote:
*> Doesn't Godel's theorem only apply to systems whose output can be mapped
> to judgments about the truth-value of propositions in first-order
> arithmetic?*
*That's Godel's Completeness Theorem which concerns First Order Logic
(FOL), not to b
On Monday, January 13, 2025 at 11:58:38 PM UTC+1 Jesse Mazer wrote:
Doesn't Godel's theorem only apply to systems whose output can be mapped to
judgments about the truth-value of propositions in first-order arithmetic?
A cellular automaton would seem to have "evolving quantities and/or
quali
On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 2:28 PM PGC wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, January 13, 2025 at 1:02:09 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 1/12/2025 7:17 AM, PGC wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
>
>
> You can convince
On 1/13/2025 4:44 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jan 11, 2025 at 11:10 PM Brent Meeker
wrote:
//
/> In fact infinitely many/[wavefunction branches]/have already
been /preemptorily/ruled out because they don't satisfy
Schroedinger's equation. /
*Schrodinger's Equation desc
On Monday, January 13, 2025 at 1:02:09 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/12/2025 7:17 AM, PGC wrote:
On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
You can convince yourself of explaining the list's raison d'etre to me if
it makes
On Sat, Jan 11, 2025 at 11:10 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
* > In fact infinitely many* [wavefunction branches] *have already been *
> preemptorily* ruled out because they don't satisfy Schroedinger's
> equation. *
>
*Schrodinger's Equation describes a quantum wave function and it says
absolutely noth
On 1/12/2025 4:15 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 11:02 AM Brent Meeker
wrote:
On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
That's something you keep assuming. I’m not here to defend
Many
On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 11:02 AM Brent Meeker wrote:
> On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
>
> That's something you keep assuming. I’m not here to defend Many-Worlds or
> any particular ontology. I defend nothing. Rather, I’m st
On 1/12/2025 7:17 AM, PGC wrote:
On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
That's something you keep assuming. I’m not here to defend
Many-Worlds or any particular ontology. I defend nothing. Rather,
I’m struck by
On Sun, Jan 12, 2025 at 1:48 PM Jesse Mazer wrote:
*> every possible finite computation would presumably be performed
> somewhere in the Everett multiverse*
>
*If our universe is infinitely large, and not just very very big, then
every possible finite computation would be performed somewhere in
On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 7:48:01 PM UTC+1 Jesse Mazer wrote:
On Sun, Jan 12, 2025 at 10:17 AM PGC wrote:
Tegmark remains unclear on many issues that Bruno's approach addresses.
Particularly on the questions of multiplicities of perspectives. And in his
PhD, he tackles the question o
On Sun, Jan 12, 2025 at 10:17 AM PGC wrote:
>
>
> On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
> On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
>
> That's something you keep assuming. I’m not here to defend Many-Worlds or
> any particular ontology. I defend nothing. Rather, I’m struc
On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
That's something you keep assuming. I’m not here to defend Many-Worlds or
any particular ontology. I defend nothing. Rather, I’m struck by the
curious fact that insisting on “nothing extra” i
On Sat, Jan 11, 2025 at 11:03 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
*>> And if Many Worlds is correct then every time a horizontally polarized
>> photon is rotated by 90° the universe splits, in one of them the photon is
>> polarized up and in the other it is polarized down.*
>
>
> *> I don't think you've grasp
Lol.
On Sunday, 12 January 2025 at 07:56:04 UTC+2 Terren Suydam wrote:
> Oh, I can show you flibber.
>
> On Sat, Jan 11, 2025 at 6:52 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> @Terren. The very fact that you just make it a word game proves that you
>> ar
Oh, I can show you flibber.
On Sat, Jan 11, 2025 at 6:52 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> @Terren. The very fact that you just make it a word game proves that you
> are not conscious of consciousness. I can show you qualia, but you cannot
> show m
On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
That's something you keep assuming. I’m not here to defend Many-Worlds
or any particular ontology. I defend nothing. Rather, I’m struck by
the curious fact that insisting on “nothing extra” in quantum
mechanics—like ordering one’s bourbon neat—can mean quietl
On 1/11/2025 4:59 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 8:31 PM Brent Meeker
wrote:
*>> By adding that one unnecessary rule you've implicitly
added an astronomical number, and possibly an infinite number,
of assumptions;*
/
/
/> It's not an assu
@Alan. Is like the characters that you play in dreams. They exist there,
then when you wake up they are gone. But the Self continues since it is
eternal. Only the ego is a temporary quale.
On Saturday, 11 January 2025 at 21:01:15 UTC+2 Alan Grayson wrote:
> On Saturday, January 11, 2025 at 11:5
On Saturday, January 11, 2025 at 11:58:18 AM UTC-7 Cosmin Visan wrote:
@Alan. Of course. Finally you understand.
LOL. AG
On Saturday, 11 January 2025 at 15:04:35 UTC+2 Alan Grayson wrote:
On Saturday, January 11, 2025 at 4:53:33 AM UTC-7 Cosmin Visan wrote:
@Bren. Water doesn't exist. "Wa
@Alan. Of course. Finally you understand.
On Saturday, 11 January 2025 at 15:04:35 UTC+2 Alan Grayson wrote:
> On Saturday, January 11, 2025 at 4:53:33 AM UTC-7 Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> @Bren. Water doesn't exist. "Water" is just an idea in consciousness. The
> idea of "water" has form.
> Space d
That's something you keep assuming. I’m not here to defend Many-Worlds or
any particular ontology. I defend nothing. Rather, I’m struck by the
curious fact that insisting on “nothing extra” in quantum mechanics—like
ordering one’s bourbon neat—can mean quietly negating a host of other
flavors t
On Saturday, January 11, 2025 at 4:53:33 AM UTC-7 Cosmin Visan wrote:
@Bren. Water doesn't exist. "Water" is just an idea in consciousness. The
idea of "water" has form.
Space doesn't exist. "Space" is just an idea in consciousness. The idea of
"space" has form.
Height doesn't exist. "Height"
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 8:31 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
*>> By adding that one unnecessary rule you've implicitly added an
>> astronomical number, and possibly an infinite number, of assumptions;*
>
>
> * > It's not an assumption. It's a consistently observed fact,*
>
*It's a consistently observe
@Bren. Water doesn't exist. "Water" is just an idea in consciousness. The
idea of "water" has form.
Space doesn't exist. "Space" is just an idea in consciousness. The idea of
"space" has form.
Height doesn't exist. "Height" is just an idea in consciousness. The idea
of "height" has form.
Dista
@Terren. The very fact that you just make it a word game proves that you
are not conscious of consciousness. I can show you qualia, but you cannot
show me flibber. Try again!
On Saturday, 11 January 2025 at 01:21:46 UTC+2 Terren Suydam wrote:
> I'll counter that with *my* proof that *flibber is
On 1/10/2025 2:52 PM, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:
@Terren. Is not a matter of proving. Is a matter of you becoming
conscious of consciousness.
As of yet, you have no idea what the word "qualia" means. If you would
have known, you would have known that qualia = form = meaning
On 1/10/2025 10:23 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 10:04 AM Alan Grayson
wrote:
*>> If Quantum Mechanics is correct, and I think it's a pretty
damn good assumption that it is, then in the Schrodinger cat
experiment you've got a superposition of 2 quantu
I'll counter that with *my* proof that *flibber is the only thing that
exists*:
1. Flibber = Blammo = Existence
2. To Exist means to have Blammo (you are not aware of this)
3. A Blammo is a Flibber (obviously)
4. So how can something Exist if doesn't have any Blammo?
5. And what is a Blammo if not
@Terren. Is not a matter of proving. Is a matter of you becoming conscious
of consciousness. As of yet, you have no idea what the word "qualia" means.
If you would have known, you would have known that qualia = form = meaning
= existence. You are not aware of the fact that to exist means to have
Try to keep up. You cannot prove that only qualia exists. All you've
offered so far is a tautology.
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 5:17 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
> @Terren. So you say that I cannot prove that only existence exists ? Then
> what else
@Terren. So you say that I cannot prove that only existence exists ? Then
what else exists ? Inexistence ?
On Friday, 10 January 2025 at 23:16:04 UTC+2 Terren Suydam wrote:
> I'm not asking you to explain existence. I'm saying you cannot prove your
> claim that the only thing that *can* exist i
On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 4:41 PM Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> Le jeu. 9 janv. 2025, 22:16, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 5:38 AM Quentin Anciaux
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Brent,
>>>
>>> The core disagreement here seems to rest on the role and status of
>>> possibilities. In a sin
I'm not asking you to explain existence. I'm saying you cannot prove your
claim that the only thing that *can* exist is qualia. And you cannot prove
that with a tautology. But you knew that, right?
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 3:33 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.co
@Terren. Not a truism. A tautology. 1=1. Of course. What else would you
want? How do you expect to explain existence using something outside of
itself ? Is illogical. Existence exists. 1=1.
Quality = form = meaning. Quality looks the way it does because of the
meaning that it does. And meaning
So in short, your proof is:
1. To exist means to have quality
2. Only qualia have quality
Got it. One problem though - you don't define "quality". So your proof is
just a truism: "Qualia are all that exist because only qualia exist".
You have to define "quality" in a way that does not invo
@Terren. Information doesn't exist. "Information" is just an idea in
consciousness.
Organ doesn't exist. "Organ" is just an idea in consciousness.
Brain doesn't exist. "Brain" is just an idea in consciousness.
Things don't exist. "Things" is just an idea in consciousness.
See my other topic about
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 10:04 AM Alan Grayson
wrote:
*>> If Quantum Mechanics is correct, and I think it's a pretty damn good
> assumption that it is, then in the Schrodinger cat experiment you've got a
> superposition of 2 quantum states, { [ ( a live cat) + (the environment
> with a live cat i
As John Clark (a physicalist true believer) puts it, the brute fact or
assumption is that consciousness is how it feels when data is processed. In
this account, consciousness is the experience of information - the
information from our sensory organs as it is processed in our brains. So if
one accep
On Friday, January 10, 2025 at 5:28:34 AM UTC-7 John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 11:57 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
*>It's just the Schroedinger equation plus the rule that once your world is
orthogonal to others, they vanish.*
*>> What a disappointment! By adding that one unnecessary ru
On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 11:57 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
*>It's just the Schroedinger equation plus the rule that once your world is
>>> orthogonal to others, they vanish.*
>>
>>
>
> *>> What a disappointment! By adding that one unnecessary rule you've
>> implicitly added an astronomical number, and p
We wonder who's the monkey 🤔
Le ven. 10 janv. 2025, 09:39, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
> @Terren. How can qualia have epistemological status when it exists ?
> Exists = ontologic. You seem very confused regarding the meaning of words.
>
> Also,
@Terren. How can qualia have epistemological status when it exists ? Exists
= ontologic. You seem very confused regarding the meaning of words.
Also, "most people" have IQ below 100. This is close to monkey-level. How
is that a criteria on which to decide truth ?
Also, define "energy"! Define "
Bruce,
Physics is indeed more than existential angst, but it is also more than
abstract formalism detached from reality. If probabilities are merely tools
to predict outcomes in a single-history universe, then they serve as
effective calculations but lack explanatory depth. My point is not about
w
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 6:13 PM Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le ven. 10 janv. 2025, 07:58, Bruce Kellett a
> écrit :
>
>> That is just patent nonsense. Formal tools are quite capable of giving
>> the right answer for the realized world; (and the right answer is what
>> actually happens.)
>>
>> I agr
Le ven. 10 janv. 2025, 07:58, Bruce Kellett a
écrit :
> On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 5:43 PM Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>
>> Le ven. 10 janv. 2025, 07:31, Bruce Kellett a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> When you roll a die, the probability of a four is 1/6. Do the other
>>> possibilities have to exist? Even if they
On 1/9/2025 10:42 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le ven. 10 janv. 2025, 07:31, Bruce Kellett a
écrit :
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 5:06 PM Quentin Anciaux
wrote:
Brent,
You’re using a mathematical tool to assign probabilities to
events, but in a single, eternal
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 5:43 PM Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le ven. 10 janv. 2025, 07:31, Bruce Kellett a
> écrit :
>
>> When you roll a die, the probability of a four is 1/6. Do the other
>> possibilities have to exist? Even if they do, they have no influence on the
>> outcome you actually observe
Le ven. 10 janv. 2025, 07:31, Bruce Kellett a
écrit :
> On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 5:06 PM Quentin Anciaux
> wrote:
>
>> Brent,
>>
>> You’re using a mathematical tool to assign probabilities to events, but
>> in a single, eternal history, those probabilities lose their connection to
>> reality. For
On Fri, Jan 10, 2025 at 5:06 PM Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Brent,
>
> You’re using a mathematical tool to assign probabilities to events, but in
> a single, eternal history, those probabilities lose their connection to
> reality. For example, if a specific bridge hand never occurs in this unique
>
Brent,
You’re using a mathematical tool to assign probabilities to events, but in
a single, eternal history, those probabilities lose their connection to
reality. For example, if a specific bridge hand never occurs in this unique
history, then its true probability wasn’t what was calculated—it was
Brent,
The crux of the matter lies in the role and status of the ensemble of
possibilities. In a single-world framework, the ensemble is not only
notional, but it has no causal or explanatory link to the realized world.
While mathematical tools like the Schrödinger equation or probability
theory a
On 1/9/2025 1:41 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le jeu. 9 janv. 2025, 22:16, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 5:38 AM Quentin Anciaux
wrote:
Brent,
The core disagreement here seems to rest on the role and
status of possibilities. In a single-wor
On 1/9/2025 1:15 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote:
On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 5:38 AM Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Brent,
The core disagreement here seems to rest on the role and status of
possibilities. In a single-world framework, the unrealized
possibilities you refer to have no actual exis
On 1/9/2025 5:01 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jan 8, 2025 at 9:06 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
/ I propose Meeker's equation, which is the same as
Schrodinger's equation except that the worlds orthogonal
to our own disappear when they become orthogonal.
On 1/9/2025 2:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Brent,
The core disagreement here seems to rest on the role and status of
possibilities. In a single-world framework, the unrealized
possibilities you refer to have no actual existence or causal link to
the realized world. They are simply concept
On 1/9/2025 2:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Seems to me a good summary 😉
Le jeu. 9 janv. 2025, 11:33, PGC a écrit :
This is getting circular. Brent’s single-world view treats the
wavefunction ∣Ψ⟩=∑iαi∣ϕi⟩ as purely instrumental: it calculates
probabilities for each outcome, b
Le jeu. 9 janv. 2025, 22:16, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 5:38 AM Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> Brent,
>>
>> The core disagreement here seems to rest on the role and status of
>> possibilities. In a single-world framework, the unrealized possibilities
>> you refer to have no
On Thu, Jan 9, 2025 at 5:38 AM Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Brent,
>
> The core disagreement here seems to rest on the role and status of
> possibilities. In a single-world framework, the unrealized possibilities
> you refer to have no actual existence or causal link to the realized world.
> They are
Brent,
How can you speak of "worlds vanishing" if, in the single-world framework,
those possibilities never truly existed? If they are purely conceptual and
lack ontological reality, nothing disappears because there was never
anything there to begin with. The "vanishing" is a metaphor, but one tha
On Wed, Jan 8, 2025 at 9:06 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>> * I propose Meeker's equation, which is the same as Schrodinger's
>>> equation except that the worlds orthogonal to our own disappear when they
>>> become orthogonal. Meeker's equation has also shown to be correct by all
>>> known test
On Wed, Jan 8, 2025 at 9:24 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
*>> In general I don't think ontological randomness is absurd because I
>> know of no law of logic that demands every event have a cause, BUT in
>> science it's not wise to invoke it if is not necessary to do so, and in
>> Many Worlds and Pilot W
Brent,
The core disagreement here seems to rest on the role and status of
possibilities. In a single-world framework, the unrealized possibilities
you refer to have no actual existence or causal link to the realized world.
They are simply conceptual tools to calculate probabilities. But this is
pr
Seems to me a good summary 😉
Le jeu. 9 janv. 2025, 11:33, PGC a écrit :
> This is getting circular. Brent’s single-world view treats the
> wavefunction ∣Ψ⟩=∑iαi∣ϕi⟩ as purely instrumental: it calculates
> probabilities for each outcome, but in the end only one outcome (∣ϕk⟩)
> “actually happ
This is getting circular. Brent’s single-world view treats the wavefunction
∣Ψ⟩=∑iαi∣ϕi⟩ as purely instrumental: it calculates probabilities for
each outcome, but in the end only one outcome (∣ϕk⟩) “actually happens.”
Everything else is declared “not real.” This works fine for making
predic
On 1/8/2025 9:42 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Brent,
The issue I see with a single-world framework is the reliance on
possibilities that have no existence or causal link to the realized
world. In this view, possibilities are entirely notional, they don’t
exist ontologically, and they have no
Brent,
The issue I see with a single-world framework is the reliance on
possibilities that have no existence or causal link to the realized world.
In this view, possibilities are entirely notional, they don’t exist
ontologically, and they have no impact on the single realized history. This
makes t
On Wed, Jan 08, 2025 at 06:15:04PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
> With an ensemble of which every member exists, randomness
> becomes incoherent.
>
Bruno's teleportation argument shows why the subjective experience of
randomness is essential once you have supervenience on branching
worlds. Even whe
On 1/8/2025 4:05 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jan 7, 2025 at 3:44 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
/>>> I propose Meeker's equation, which is the same as
Schrodinger's equation except that the worlds orthogonal to
our own disappear when they become orthogonal. Meeker's
On 1/8/2025 4:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Jan 7, 2025 at 5:40 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
/> If there were something to account for it, it wouldn't be random./
*Correct.*
/> It seems you only feel ignorance type randomness is not absurd.
/
*In general I don't think ontologic
On 1/8/2025 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Brent,
The core of my argument is that in a single-world framework, the
ensemble of possibilities described by Schrödinger’s equation is only
conceptual. If only one history is realized, then those
"possibilities" don’t exist in any meaningful wa
On Tue, Jan 7, 2025 at 5:40 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
* > If there were something to account for it, it wouldn't be random.*
>
*Correct. *
> * > It seems you only feel ignorance type randomness is not absurd.*
>
*In general I don't think ontological randomness is absurd because I know
of no law
Brent,
The core of my argument is that in a single-world framework, the ensemble
of possibilities described by Schrödinger’s equation is only conceptual. If
only one history is realized, then those "possibilities" don’t exist in any
meaningful way—they’re theoretical abstractions. In the absence o
On Tue, Jan 7, 2025 at 3:44 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> *>>> I propose Meeker's equation, which is the same as Schrodinger's
>> equation except that the worlds orthogonal to our own disappear when they
>> become orthogonal. Meeker's equation has also shown to be correct by all
>> known tests. *
On 1/7/2025 3:05 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
AG,
The issue isn’t just that true randomness is unintelligible; it’s that
in a single-world framework, there is no such thing as true
randomness. Randomness implies a selection from a set of
possibilities, but if only one world exists, there is
On Tuesday, January 7, 2025 at 4:05:29 PM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
AG,
The issue isn’t just that true randomness is unintelligible; it’s that in a
single-world framework, there is no such thing as true randomness.
Randomness implies a selection from a set of possibilities, but if only one
AG,
The issue isn’t just that true randomness is unintelligible; it’s that in a
single-world framework, there is no such thing as true randomness.
Randomness implies a selection from a set of possibilities, but if only one
world exists, there is no set—only the one outcome. Without an ensemble of
On Tuesday, January 7, 2025 at 3:47:24 PM UTC-7 Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le mar. 7 janv. 2025, 23:40, Brent Meeker a écrit :
On 1/7/2025 1:04 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le mar. 7 janv. 2025, 21:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :
On 1/7/2025 3:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le mar. 7 janv.
On Tue, Jan 7, 2025 at 4:05 PM Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/6/2025 7:47 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 6, 2025 at 2:50 AM Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/5/2025 9:46 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 5, 2025 at 11:41 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
Le mar. 7 janv. 2025, 23:40, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>
>
> On 1/7/2025 1:04 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le mar. 7 janv. 2025, 21:55, Brent Meeker a
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/7/2025 3:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le mar. 7 janv. 2025, 00:39, Brent Meeker a
>> écrit :
>>
>
On 1/7/2025 1:04 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le mar. 7 janv. 2025, 21:55, Brent Meeker a
écrit :
On 1/7/2025 3:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le mar. 7 janv. 2025, 00:39, Brent Meeker
a écrit :
On 1/6/2025 1:38 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
It's ju
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