On Monday, January 13, 2025 at 1:02:09 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:




On 1/12/2025 7:17 AM, PGC wrote:



On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:


On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:


You can convince yourself of explaining the list's raison d'etre to me if 
it makes you feel better with the straw man because Many-Worlds never says 
“all conceivable worlds exist.” It says, rather, that all the outcomes 
allowed by the wavefunction’s unitary evolution (i.e., by Schrödinger’s 
equation) are realized in some branch. 

Exactly.  My point is you're reverting back from the original list's 
founders to a "Few Worlds" and calling it "Many Worlds" because you've 
rejected the more comprehensive idea.  If you believed the arguments you 
make for MWI as simpler you would apply them consistently and arrive at Wei 
Dai and Bruno's ideas.  That's where they came from.


Read again. I am not "making arguments for MWI" and I don't see Bruno's 
contributions on the matter as problematic. That would be you, John, Bruce, 
and at times even Russell.
 



If you have a hypothetical “world” that doesn’t satisfy the equation, it’s 
simply not in the solution space that Many-Worlds applies to in the first 
place. Any scenario that fails to satisfy Schrödinger’s equation is not 
part of the legitimate solution space of quantum mechanics; such a “world” 
is never admitted in the first place, so it’s not something that gets 
“ruled out” by Many-Worlds mid-stream. It just doesn’t belong to the set of 
physically allowed states. Thus, the notion that “infinitely many invalid 
worlds must exist” misstates the core idea. Many-Worlds covers all valid 
solutions but does not grant reality to “worlds” inconsistent with the 
theory’s mathematical structure. So there’s no conflict in discarding any 
scenario that violates Schrödinger’s equation—those were never “on the 
table” to begin with.


Tegmark remains unclear on many issues that Bruno's approach addresses. 
Particularly on the questions of multiplicities of perspectives. And in his 
PhD, he tackles the question of different flavors of UD, with some being 
more efficient than others and avoiding redundancy of computations; 
therefore being more effective, if you will. And if it's those theories 
we're discussing on this list, then we should discuss them and not split 
hairs on collapse vs non-collapse, as that horse is long dead; baring some 
resuscitation or contradiction novelty. That's almost off-topic, if we mean 
ensemble theories like Bruno's, that make no-ontological commitments, while 
everybody here is trying to peddle the truth of their own. 

Do you think metaphysics can be show true or false?


I reserve some topics for publication with my clear name and don't parade 
them around b4 primetime. Even then, I'm not much for parading as I have a 
tiny amount of faith in my propositions between the salt.
 



I stand by my conviction that the list in unmoderated form is losing value. 
Folks pushing delusions of grandeur, pretense towards sophistication, gift 
horses, aimless politics, and just plain old cherry picking + taking cheap 
shots out of context without specifying clearly the approach that we're 
leaning towards is *everything but* the original intention you reference.

Instrumentalism and over-focusing on domain-specific discussions is crude. 
Divorcing physics from metaphysics, as is sad common practice here these 
days by many posters, leads trivially to a collective psychology that 
prioritizes building the most advanced weapons for the richest 
opportunists, while being confused on fundamental questions surrounding our 
nature and the limits of the knowable. Your logic course must've missed 
Gödel.  

I actually took a full semester in graduate school on Goedel's theories of 
mathematics and provability.  I've never found him very useful on physics  
He discovered a solution of Einstein's equations that described a rotating 
universe that allowed closed time-like loops.


So your physics doesn't exploit/assume evolving quantities and/or qualities 
through numerical or some other equivalent formalism's means. Magical 
stuff, no doubt.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2fff7a46-d22e-4b39-b901-cc5574964f9an%40googlegroups.com.

Reply via email to