On 1/12/2025 4:15 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 11:02 AM Brent Meeker <meekerbr...@gmail.com> wrote:

    On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:

        On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote:
        That's something you keep assuming. I’m not here to defend
        Many-Worlds or any particular ontology. I defend nothing.
        Rather, I’m struck by the curious fact that insisting on
        “nothing extra” in quantum mechanics—like ordering one’s
        bourbon neat—can mean quietly negating a host of other
        flavors that were right there on the menu. Yes, the Born
        rule is a triumph, and I fully recognize its power for
        quantum computing, materials science, lasers, and more.
        Still, there’s a subtlety: that “neat” approach—while
        perfectly valid pragmatically—relegates all those
        wavefunction branches to the realm of “not real.” It looks
        minimal but actually demands a long list of invisible
        exclusions.
        In fact infinitely many that have already been preemptorily
        ruled out because they don't satisfy Schroedinger's
        equation.  The reason this is called the "Everything List" is
        because the originators wanted to discuss theories like Max
        Tegmark's and Bruno Marchal's that */everything/*, in some
        sense happens and each of us is only a thread of it.  Both
        have argued that this is "simpler" because no additional
        assumptions are needed to exclude all the things we don't
        see, they are just on different threads.


    You can convince yourself of explaining the list's raison d'etre
    to me if it makes you feel better with the straw man
    because Many-Worlds never says “all conceivable worlds exist.” It
    says, rather, that all the outcomes allowed by the wavefunction’s
    unitary evolution (i.e., by Schrödinger’s equation) are realized
    in some branch.
    Exactly.  My point is you're reverting back from the original
    list's founders to a "Few Worlds" and calling it "Many Worlds"
    because you've rejected the more comprehensive idea.  If you
    believed the arguments you make for MWI as simpler you would apply
    them consistently and arrive at Wei Dai and Bruno's ideas.  That's
    where they came from.


I have always thought that the argument from simplicity was deeply flawed. What is simple for one person is probably a Rube Goldber contraption for someone else.

Bruce

I think of it as just a rule of thumb about which of two theories to pursue given they both work the same.  Of course it two people don't agree on what "simpler" means they will pursue different theories. It's not about which is "true" because they are metaphysics. Philosophy at best can just guide research; in this case into how to reconcile general relativity and quantum mechanics.


Brent

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