On 1/8/2025 9:42 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Brent,

The issue I see with a single-world framework is the reliance on possibilities that have no existence or causal link to the realized world. In this view, possibilities are entirely notional, they don’t exist ontologically, and they have no impact on the single realized history. This makes their invocation seem unnecessary, even absurd, because they don’t contribute to the reality we observe in any meaningful way.
But they do.  They reduce its probability of occurence.

If the only thing that exists is the realized world, why appeal to a theoretical ensemble of possibilities?
Because that's what the equations of quantum mechanics produces. We're not "appealing to them" where taking them into account as things that might occur.  That's why the Born rule assigns probabilities less than one to them.

It’s as if the single-world view borrows the language and tools of probability to describe outcomes but discards the explanatory depth provided by an actual ensemble.
I'd say that's looking at it exactly backwards, as though the "tools of probability" on applied to cases that were really deterministic (had explanatory depth) and what work is done by the word "actual" in "actual ensemble".  Usually it is an ensemble of possibilities. When you're dealt a bridge hand no one supposes that all other possible hands are dealt somewhere else; it is enough that they merely possible.  During the Viet Nam was I calculated the probability of dropping a bridge with a Walleye, I calculated the probability of a missile failure causing it to hit the launching aircraft, I calculated the probability of a wayward missile going out of the range safety boundaries, and dozens of other probabilities.  I was always considering a range of instances and their contrary; but I never needed to suppose the instances were actually anything more than possibilities.  They didn't have to happen anywhere in any world.

Without the existence of unrealized possibilities, the concept of "randomness" seems like a placeholder for "it just happened this way," offering no real insight into why this one history unfolded.
No, it's a "placeholder" for it could have happened these other ways but didn't.

In contrast, in a multiverse framework, the ensemble is not merely theoretical, it has ontological status.
Yes, it's like a bridge tournament in which all possible hands are dealt at different tables and then you pick one to sit */at random/*.  But wait, that's absurd, we must sit down at every table.  And then we must play every possible card in every possible order.  Otherwise we cannot speak of the probability of making our bid.
The possibilities exist and have causal relationships within the broader structure. This provides coherence to the use of probability, as it describes the distribution of outcomes across the ensemble, not just within a single, isolated history.

The single-world framework effectively asks us to accept a universe where unrealized possibilities are invoked to explain outcomes, yet they have no actual role in shaping reality.
Sure they do.  If they are things that might possibily happen then they reduce the probability of something else happening.

Brent

This reliance on something that neither exists nor affects the realized world strikes me as deeply incoherent.

Quentin

Le jeu. 9 janv. 2025, 03:14, Brent Meeker <meekerbr...@gmail.com> a écrit :




    On 1/8/2025 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
    Brent,

    The core of my argument is that in a single-world framework, the
    ensemble of possibilities described by Schrödinger’s equation is
    only conceptual. If only one history is realized, then those
    "possibilities" don’t exist in any meaningful way—they’re
    theoretical abstractions. In the absence of an actual ensemble
    from which a selection occurs, the notion of randomness is a
    metaphor, not a mechanism.

    In the many-worlds framework, every possibility is realized, so
    the "selection" is an emergent phenomenon from within the
    structure of the totality. In the single-world view, however,
    there’s no actual ensemble. Probabilities merely describe the
    likelihood of the one realized outcome, but there’s no underlying
    framework where those possibilities are instantiated. Randomness
    then becomes a label for the lack of explanation rather than a
    true process.

    To say "the single history simply is" and call that random
    doesn’t resolve the issue—it just restates it. Without an
    ensemble that exists ontologically (even probabilistically), the
    idea of selection collapses because there’s nothing to select
    from. The photon emission you mentioned is described by
    probabilities in QM, but those probabilities don’t correspond to
    real, alternate outcomes in a single-world framework. The
    realized outcome is the only one that exists, and all other
    "possibilities" are simply unrealized ideas.

    In contrast, in the many-worlds interpretation, the photon’s
    emission in one state is one thread of the total structure, and
    alternate emissions exist along other threads. This gives
    explanatory power to the probabilities, as they correspond to
    real structures within the ensemble.
    But small probabilities explain why things */don't/* exist.

    Regarding your point that probabilities lose meaning in MWI
    because all possibilities are realized—that’s not the case.
    Probabilities in MWI are understood as the measure of the
    branching structure relative to the observer's perspective. They
    still hold meaning because they reflect the structure of the
    multiverse, not a singular outcome.
    What about the one's for which P=0, you could as well say that
    reflect the structure of the multiverse.  Will you make an
    ensemble of them?

    The single-world view still strikes me as incoherent because it
    leans on the language of probability and possibility but denies
    their actual realization. Without an ensemble, it’s hard to see
    what randomness truly means.
    In every other application of probability theory (and for years I
    headed the Reliability Division at Pt. Mugu) the ensemble is only
    notional.  It is a the set of possibilities without assuming that
    they exist, in which case they would be actualities.  With an
    ensemble of which every member exists, randomness becomes incoherent.

    Brent
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