On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 2:28 PM PGC <multiplecit...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Monday, January 13, 2025 at 1:02:09 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > On 1/12/2025 7:17 AM, PGC wrote: > > > > On Sunday, January 12, 2025 at 5:10:53 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 1/11/2025 6:13 AM, PGC wrote: > > > You can convince yourself of explaining the list's raison d'etre to me if > it makes you feel better with the straw man because Many-Worlds never says > “all conceivable worlds exist.” It says, rather, that all the outcomes > allowed by the wavefunction’s unitary evolution (i.e., by Schrödinger’s > equation) are realized in some branch. > > Exactly. My point is you're reverting back from the original list's > founders to a "Few Worlds" and calling it "Many Worlds" because you've > rejected the more comprehensive idea. If you believed the arguments you > make for MWI as simpler you would apply them consistently and arrive at Wei > Dai and Bruno's ideas. That's where they came from. > > > Read again. I am not "making arguments for MWI" and I don't see Bruno's > contributions on the matter as problematic. That would be you, John, Bruce, > and at times even Russell. > > > > > If you have a hypothetical “world” that doesn’t satisfy the equation, it’s > simply not in the solution space that Many-Worlds applies to in the first > place. Any scenario that fails to satisfy Schrödinger’s equation is not > part of the legitimate solution space of quantum mechanics; such a “world” > is never admitted in the first place, so it’s not something that gets > “ruled out” by Many-Worlds mid-stream. It just doesn’t belong to the set of > physically allowed states. Thus, the notion that “infinitely many invalid > worlds must exist” misstates the core idea. Many-Worlds covers all valid > solutions but does not grant reality to “worlds” inconsistent with the > theory’s mathematical structure. So there’s no conflict in discarding any > scenario that violates Schrödinger’s equation—those were never “on the > table” to begin with. > > > Tegmark remains unclear on many issues that Bruno's approach addresses. > Particularly on the questions of multiplicities of perspectives. And in his > PhD, he tackles the question of different flavors of UD, with some being > more efficient than others and avoiding redundancy of computations; > therefore being more effective, if you will. And if it's those theories > we're discussing on this list, then we should discuss them and not split > hairs on collapse vs non-collapse, as that horse is long dead; baring some > resuscitation or contradiction novelty. That's almost off-topic, if we mean > ensemble theories like Bruno's, that make no-ontological commitments, while > everybody here is trying to peddle the truth of their own. > > Do you think metaphysics can be show true or false? > > > I reserve some topics for publication with my clear name and don't parade > them around b4 primetime. Even then, I'm not much for parading as I have a > tiny amount of faith in my propositions between the salt. > > > > > I stand by my conviction that the list in unmoderated form is losing > value. Folks pushing delusions of grandeur, pretense towards > sophistication, gift horses, aimless politics, and just plain old cherry > picking + taking cheap shots out of context without specifying clearly the > approach that we're leaning towards is *everything but* the original > intention you reference. > > Instrumentalism and over-focusing on domain-specific discussions is crude. > Divorcing physics from metaphysics, as is sad common practice here these > days by many posters, leads trivially to a collective psychology that > prioritizes building the most advanced weapons for the richest > opportunists, while being confused on fundamental questions surrounding our > nature and the limits of the knowable. Your logic course must've missed > Gödel. > > I actually took a full semester in graduate school on Goedel's theories of > mathematics and provability. I've never found him very useful on physics > He discovered a solution of Einstein's equations that described a rotating > universe that allowed closed time-like loops. > > > So your physics doesn't exploit/assume evolving quantities and/or > qualities through numerical or some other equivalent formalism's means. > Magical stuff, no doubt. > > Doesn't Godel's theorem only apply to systems whose output can be mapped to judgments about the truth-value of propositions in first-order arithmetic? A cellular automaton would seem to have "evolving quantities and/or qualities through numerical or some other equivalent formalism's means", but Godel's theorem places no limitations on our ability to compute the behavior of the cellular automaton for N time-increments, for any finite value of N, so I would think Godel's theorem would likewise place no limitations on our ability to compute the physical evolution of the universe's state for any finite time interval. For some cellular automata it may be possible to set up the initial state so that the question of whether some theorem is ever proved true or false by the Peano axioms (or other axioms for arithmetic) is equivalent to a question about whether the automaton ever arrives at a certain configuration of cells, so Godel's theorem may imply limits on our ability to answer such questions, but this is a question about whether something happens in an infinite time period. I assume there are similar limitations on our ability to determine whether certain physical states will ever occur in an infinite future (straightforwardly if we build a physical machine that derives theorems from the Peano axioms, or a machine that derives conclusions about whether various Turing programs halt), but most of what physicists do is concerned with predictions over finite time intervals, I don't see how Godel's theorem would pose any fundamental obstacles to doing that. 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