@Terren. How can qualia have epistemological status when it exists ? Exists = ontologic. You seem very confused regarding the meaning of words.
Also, "most people" have IQ below 100. This is close to monkey-level. How is that a criteria on which to decide truth ? Also, define "energy"! Define "matter"! On Tuesday, 7 January 2025 at 17:48:01 UTC+2 Terren Suydam wrote: > In your theory, the quale has ontological status, ok. In physicalism (what > most people assume), qualia have epistemological status. IOW, qualia is a > form of information about something that exists independently of our > individual consciousness. > > In your theory, consciousness is the fundamental ontology. In physicalism, > matter & energy is the fundamental ontology. > > Deciding what is the fundamental ontology is a metaphysical decision. It's > an assumption or belief from which other things follow. But the truth of > what is the fundamental ontology cannot be proven. > > On Tue, Jan 7, 2025 at 5:00 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < > everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote: > >> @Terren. Yes. What do you mean by "thing" ? The chair that you see in >> front of you ? But that is just a quale in consciousness. So what do you >> mean by "thing" ? >> >> On Tuesday, 7 January 2025 at 02:28:05 UTC+2 Terren Suydam wrote: >> >>> 🙄 >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 6, 2025 at 7:19 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List < >>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>> >>>> @Terren. What thing ? >>>> >>>> On Tuesday, 7 January 2025 at 00:33:55 UTC+2 Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>>> I would venture that the common sense notion of existence means that a >>>>> thing that exists has been instantiated. >>>>> >>>>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d0ad42e4-836f-47b2-9738-a045aa971470n%40googlegroups.com.
