On 4 February 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
> Why? You agree that there is still one way causal link. That is > > consciousness is a necessary side, and real, effect of the brain > activity. > > So why a body could not refer to it meaningfully? > > It's not that which would be meaningless: it would be meaningless to > ask how a body could refer to an epiphenomenon, David's initial > question. It is not yet clear to me why you consider such a question meaningless. I thought we had established that you really meant to say that consciousness could be regarded as an emergent phenomenon, like temperature. Temperature can be measured (i.e. detected) quite straightforwardly by reference to some physical variable, such as the change in the height of a column of mercury. Hence if consciousness is some such phenomenon we should in principle be able to measure and detect it extrinsically in an analogous way. Are you suggesting then that we are able to refer to our own emergent conscious phenomena because our bodies, in effect, are monitoring some such physical variable? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
