On 04 Feb 2014, at 12:46, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 4 February 2014 22:32, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

My view is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal it's meaningless to
ask why bodies emit utterances referring to the epiphenomenon.



Why? You agree that there is still one way causal link. That is
consciousness is a necessary side, and real, effect of the brain activity.
So why a body could not refer to it meaningfully?

It's not that which would be meaningless: it would be meaningless to
ask how a body could refer to an epiphenomenon, David's initial
question.

Not sure if a body can refer to anything (but we can say that, as an abuse of language to be short).

The question, it seems to me, remains: why a person (using her body) could not refer to an epiphenomenon? Why would that be meaningless? Why asking those question would be meaningless?

If I tell you "I feel myself conscious right now"? Is that meaningless?
It is meaningless that I hope you find that plausible?

And is it meaningless to ask such question?

May be, that's possible, but I need some justification. Without it, it looks just like "don't try to understand, don't search, don't ask".

I do think that the modal logic will provide a *very* powerful tool to see many nuances and possibilities in this context.




Ah, but then it looks like if there is a two way road, and consciousness is only a phenomenon. A quite peculiar one, as it relates 3p and 1p, but still a phenomenon, and it this leads to make physics also a 1p phenomenon, why
not?

Why do you think we gain by making consciousness into an epiphenomenon?

We don't have to explain why it apparently has no effect on matter yet
we can still refer to it.

May be we cannot [explain why it apparently has no effect on matter yet we can still refer to it].

But if that is the case, the question remains: why? And here, comp, and the arithmetization of metarithmetic, can explain, for similar questions, why we cannot explain some truth.

I think we can't decide that something does not need to be explained, above the more elementary assumptions. I think that is Craig's fuel, and no comp fuel, to take sense has fundamental. Epiphenomenalism has also that air of "let us not try to understand".

You confirm my feeling that "epiphenomenalism" is used by admitting or introducing a bet on an explanation gap. Some explanation gap is there indeed, but I think we can entirely explain it. This leads to a sort of miracle: consciousness has a role, even in the physical events. Mind can "act" on matter. (cf atomic bombs and computers), and this without violating the physical laws. But eventually it makes the physical laws emerging on something non physical (which comp allows to limit on arithmetical truth or combinators truth, ...).

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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