On 4 February 2014 16:32, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
>> >> If you could see that it was logically entailed by >> >> certain physical phenomena or computations you wouldn't have a >> >> problem. >> > >> > >> > How right you are. Do you see this? If you do, perhaps you could explain >> > to >> > me how it is so entailed. >> >> I think this paper by David Chalmers shows just that: >> >> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html >> >> It shows that it is impossible to make a functional brain replacement >> that does not also replicate any associated consciousness. > > > Which only means that is it impossible to make a brain replacement that is > 100% functional. We can list endless examples of functions which can be > simulated without their being viable replacements. A picture of fire > simulates the visual presence of the function that is fire but not the > thermal presence. Likewise, a human presence can be simulated by a 4D > interactive picture without there being any replacement of the presence > itself. If you could make a fully functional replacement of a human > experience, then you would have to include subjective qualities as > functions, in which case it is tautological to say that a functional > replacement of consciousness would have to be function consciously. Which just shows that you misunderstand what is meant in this context by the word "functional". There is no attempt to replicate subjectivity, just the observable behaviour of the brain, which manifests mostly via skeletal muscle movement. It is shown that this will necessarily lead to subjectivity, for if the muscle-moving artificial neurons lack this quality it would lead to absurdity. In the paper cited, and in most of these discussions, it is assumed that the function of the neurons is replicated by computer chips. However, it is not necessary to invoke computers or mechanical devices at all. The thought experiment works just as well if we say that the artificial neuron is a magical device which displays all the observable behaviour of a neuron. Such a magical device cannot be made without also replicating consciousness as a byproduct. > Consciousness doesn't have to be function though, even though *human* > qualities of consciousness depend on functions to persist. Functions are an > appearance within consciousness. Every function can have a level beneath > them which is sensory-motive rather than mechanical. Again, for the purpose of this discussion functions are purely third person observable phenomena. The argument is that the first person phenomena necessarily follow. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
