On Tuesday, February 4, 2014, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 4 February 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou > <[email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > > wrote: > > > Why? You agree that there is still one way causal link. That is >> > consciousness is a necessary side, and real, effect of the brain >> activity. >> > So why a body could not refer to it meaningfully? >> >> It's not that which would be meaningless: it would be meaningless to >> ask how a body could refer to an epiphenomenon, David's initial >> question. > > > It is not yet clear to me why you consider such a question meaningless. I > thought we had established that you really meant to say that consciousness > could be regarded as an emergent phenomenon, like temperature. Temperature > can be measured (i.e. detected) quite straightforwardly by reference to > some physical variable, such as the change in the height of a column of > mercury. Hence if consciousness is some such phenomenon we should in > principle be able to measure and detect it extrinsically in an analogous > way. Are you suggesting then that we are able to refer to our own emergent > conscious phenomena because our bodies, in effect, are monitoring some such > physical variable? > > David > We can refer to our conscious states because the base phenomena on which our conscious states supervene cause our vocal cords to move in a particular way. But it is wrong to say, except in a loose way of speaking, that our conscious states cause our vocal cords to move. The supervenient phenomenon follows in a straightforward way (by virtue of being supervenient) without the need for downward causation. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
