On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 12:17:46 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 4 February 2014 09:29, David Nyman <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > >> > Does it? You still haven't explained why bodies emit utterances that > >> > appear > >> > to refer to this putative epiphenomenon. Or are you saying that > they're > >> > not > >> > really emitting such utterances or making such references? They're > just > >> > physical systems going about their lawful physical business, but > somehow > >> > that evokes a physically-undetectable extra something-or-other. And > it's > >> > only in terms of this extra something-or-other that utterances seem > to > >> > exist > >> > that, in turn, only seem so to refer. Is that what it boils down to? > >> > >> It's because you're stuck on the idea that consciousness is something > >> extra and optional. > > > > > > Those weren't rhetorical questions. I was asking you for your views. I > don't > > think I'm stuck on any idea in particular. I'm more interested in trying > to > > discern precisely what is entailed by framing a problem in a particular > way. > > My view is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal it's meaningless to > ask why bodies emit utterances referring to the epiphenomenon. > > >> If you could see that it was logically entailed by > >> certain physical phenomena or computations you wouldn't have a > >> problem. > > > > > > How right you are. Do you see this? If you do, perhaps you could explain > to > > me how it is so entailed. > > I think this paper by David Chalmers shows just that: > > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html > > It shows that it is impossible to make a functional brain replacement > that does not also replicate any associated consciousness. >
Which only means that is it impossible to make a brain replacement that is 100% functional. We can list endless examples of functions which can be simulated without their being viable replacements. A picture of fire simulates the visual presence of the function that is fire but not the thermal presence. Likewise, a human presence can be simulated by a 4D interactive picture without there being any replacement of the presence itself. If you could make a fully functional replacement of a human experience, then you would have to include subjective qualities as functions, in which case it is tautological to say that a functional replacement of consciousness would have to be function consciously. Consciousness doesn't have to be function though, even though *human* qualities of consciousness depend on functions to persist. Functions are an appearance within consciousness. Every function can have a level beneath them which is sensory-motive rather than mechanical. Craig > >> It would be like agonising over why an object in which every > >> point on its perimeter is equidistant from the centre has the quality > >> of roundness rather than squareness or nothingness; and how it could > >> be that roundness has no separate causal efficacy over and above what > >> can be explained in terms of the physicality of the object possessing > >> this property. > > > > > > Yes, that would certainly follow if all the relevant phenomena could be > > exhaustively explained by the correct level of physical emergence. Do > you > > presently have a view as to what that might be, or is this a case of > "shut > > up and wait"? > > It might never be adequately explained yet still be true. I understand > the proof showing that sqrt(2) is irrational even though I can't say I > understand irrational numbers in the same way as I understand integers > and fractions. > > >> > By the way, I'm not really sure what the term epiphenomenon is > supposed > >> > to > >> > convey in this context. Is it indeed supposed to be a sort of one-way > >> > dualism in which, as I suggest above, a genuinely novel > >> > something-or-other > >> > is evoked by physical behaviour but cannot reciprocally affect it > (and > >> > so > >> > cannot be detectable by it). Or is it really a form of cryptic > >> > eliminativism > >> > in which, in the final analysis, there is no additional > >> > something-or-other > >> > at all? > >> > >> I don't think these terms make any substantive difference. Whether my > >> consciousness can be replicated by a computer, for example, is an > >> important question and it is not dependent on whether under some use > >> of the English language it is correct to say that consciousness can be > >> eliminated. > > > > > > Absolutely. If indeed my consciousness had been satisfactorily > replicated by > > a computational prosthetic it would be very foolish of me to complain > that > > it had been eliminated. > > > > Anyway, it would appear, that like Brent, you were using the term > > epiphenomenon to mean some emergent phenomenon that is fully entailed by > > canonical physical causation, like temperature. If that's the case, I > agree > > with Brent that there would be no remaining motive to differentiate it > > categorically from any other such canonical phenomenon of emergence. > > Yes > > > By the way, if you think that consciousness may be that kind of > phenomenon, > > does that imply that you reject any categorical 3p/1p distinction? I ask > > because I tend to agree with Bruno (and Brent, if I've understood his > most > > recent comment) that the prize at the end of this road is a completed > theory > > of the physical correlates of self-reported conscious phenomena. But > many > > people take the view that after this prize is attained, there is still a > > "remainder problem" that doesn't seem so problematical with temperature > or > > other emergent phenomena of the canonical kind. On the other hand, if > one > > wishes to deny that anything remains to be accounted for after the > physical > > correlates are explained it would be reasonable to describe one's > position > > as eliminative with respect to any such remainder. > > I still think it is valid to make the 1p/3p distinction. The emergent > phenomenon of consciousness has an aspect that you only get if you are > it. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
