On 4 February 2014 09:29, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: >> > Does it? You still haven't explained why bodies emit utterances that >> > appear >> > to refer to this putative epiphenomenon. Or are you saying that they're >> > not >> > really emitting such utterances or making such references? They're just >> > physical systems going about their lawful physical business, but somehow >> > that evokes a physically-undetectable extra something-or-other. And it's >> > only in terms of this extra something-or-other that utterances seem to >> > exist >> > that, in turn, only seem so to refer. Is that what it boils down to? >> >> It's because you're stuck on the idea that consciousness is something >> extra and optional. > > > Those weren't rhetorical questions. I was asking you for your views. I don't > think I'm stuck on any idea in particular. I'm more interested in trying to > discern precisely what is entailed by framing a problem in a particular way.
My view is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal it's meaningless to ask why bodies emit utterances referring to the epiphenomenon. >> If you could see that it was logically entailed by >> certain physical phenomena or computations you wouldn't have a >> problem. > > > How right you are. Do you see this? If you do, perhaps you could explain to > me how it is so entailed. I think this paper by David Chalmers shows just that: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html It shows that it is impossible to make a functional brain replacement that does not also replicate any associated consciousness. >> It would be like agonising over why an object in which every >> point on its perimeter is equidistant from the centre has the quality >> of roundness rather than squareness or nothingness; and how it could >> be that roundness has no separate causal efficacy over and above what >> can be explained in terms of the physicality of the object possessing >> this property. > > > Yes, that would certainly follow if all the relevant phenomena could be > exhaustively explained by the correct level of physical emergence. Do you > presently have a view as to what that might be, or is this a case of "shut > up and wait"? It might never be adequately explained yet still be true. I understand the proof showing that sqrt(2) is irrational even though I can't say I understand irrational numbers in the same way as I understand integers and fractions. >> > By the way, I'm not really sure what the term epiphenomenon is supposed >> > to >> > convey in this context. Is it indeed supposed to be a sort of one-way >> > dualism in which, as I suggest above, a genuinely novel >> > something-or-other >> > is evoked by physical behaviour but cannot reciprocally affect it (and >> > so >> > cannot be detectable by it). Or is it really a form of cryptic >> > eliminativism >> > in which, in the final analysis, there is no additional >> > something-or-other >> > at all? >> >> I don't think these terms make any substantive difference. Whether my >> consciousness can be replicated by a computer, for example, is an >> important question and it is not dependent on whether under some use >> of the English language it is correct to say that consciousness can be >> eliminated. > > > Absolutely. If indeed my consciousness had been satisfactorily replicated by > a computational prosthetic it would be very foolish of me to complain that > it had been eliminated. > > Anyway, it would appear, that like Brent, you were using the term > epiphenomenon to mean some emergent phenomenon that is fully entailed by > canonical physical causation, like temperature. If that's the case, I agree > with Brent that there would be no remaining motive to differentiate it > categorically from any other such canonical phenomenon of emergence. Yes > By the way, if you think that consciousness may be that kind of phenomenon, > does that imply that you reject any categorical 3p/1p distinction? I ask > because I tend to agree with Bruno (and Brent, if I've understood his most > recent comment) that the prize at the end of this road is a completed theory > of the physical correlates of self-reported conscious phenomena. But many > people take the view that after this prize is attained, there is still a > "remainder problem" that doesn't seem so problematical with temperature or > other emergent phenomena of the canonical kind. On the other hand, if one > wishes to deny that anything remains to be accounted for after the physical > correlates are explained it would be reasonable to describe one's position > as eliminative with respect to any such remainder. I still think it is valid to make the 1p/3p distinction. The emergent phenomenon of consciousness has an aspect that you only get if you are it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
