On 5 February 2014 06:31, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
Of course I know I am conscious. I could say, what a silly question! > > If I declare that I am conscious this action is entirely explainable > in physical terms. I am also actually conscious, but that's not why > I'm saying it, since consciousness doesn't move vocal cords or > anything else. > Hmm... I guess, as a first approximation, I can interpret what you're saying as a weak form of the proposition that consciousness is an indubitable truth in some sense, and that it just so happens that physical causation supports that truth. Comp then strengthens that proposition by putting the relation between the two on a rigorous footing with respect to a specific level of explanation in which it can make sense to say that conscious phenomena bear a causal relation to the ensuing behaviour. One could perhaps think of this relation as a kind of compatibilism akin with free-will. If so, the POPJ can only arise by appealing to the wrong level of explanation for the relevant context (again, akin to similar paradoxes of free-will). ISTM that this can also draw the teeth of the p-zombie argument, by using it against itself as a reductio. IOW, if there doesn't exist a level of explanation at which it is true that I am conscious, then I must be a p-zombie and it would then be untrue that I am conscious.. But since it is indubitably true that I am conscious it is absurd to conclude that I am a p-zombie, therefore such a level of explanation must exist. Of course, we still need to identify an adequate level of explanation and it is here that comp recommends itself. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
