On 04 Feb 2014, at 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 February 2014 09:29, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote:
Does it? You still haven't explained why bodies emit utterances
that
appear
to refer to this putative epiphenomenon. Or are you saying that
they're
not
really emitting such utterances or making such references?
They're just
physical systems going about their lawful physical business, but
somehow
that evokes a physically-undetectable extra something-or-other.
And it's
only in terms of this extra something-or-other that utterances
seem to
exist
that, in turn, only seem so to refer. Is that what it boils down
to?
It's because you're stuck on the idea that consciousness is
something
extra and optional.
Those weren't rhetorical questions. I was asking you for your
views. I don't
think I'm stuck on any idea in particular. I'm more interested in
trying to
discern precisely what is entailed by framing a problem in a
particular way.
My view is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal it's meaningless to
ask why bodies emit utterances referring to the epiphenomenon.
Why? You agree that there is still one way causal link. That is
consciousness is a necessary side, and real, effect of the brain
activity. So why a body could not refer to it meaningfully?
Ah, but then it looks like if there is a two way road, and
consciousness is only a phenomenon. A quite peculiar one, as it
relates 3p and 1p, but still a phenomenon, and it this leads to make
physics also a 1p phenomenon, why not?
Why do you think we gain by making consciousness into an epiphenomenon?
Bruno
If you could see that it was logically entailed by
certain physical phenomena or computations you wouldn't have a
problem.
How right you are. Do you see this? If you do, perhaps you could
explain to
me how it is so entailed.
I think this paper by David Chalmers shows just that:
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html
It shows that it is impossible to make a functional brain replacement
that does not also replicate any associated consciousness.
It would be like agonising over why an object in which every
point on its perimeter is equidistant from the centre has the
quality
of roundness rather than squareness or nothingness; and how it could
be that roundness has no separate causal efficacy over and above
what
can be explained in terms of the physicality of the object
possessing
this property.
Yes, that would certainly follow if all the relevant phenomena
could be
exhaustively explained by the correct level of physical emergence.
Do you
presently have a view as to what that might be, or is this a case
of "shut
up and wait"?
It might never be adequately explained yet still be true. I understand
the proof showing that sqrt(2) is irrational even though I can't say I
understand irrational numbers in the same way as I understand integers
and fractions.
By the way, I'm not really sure what the term epiphenomenon is
supposed
to
convey in this context. Is it indeed supposed to be a sort of one-
way
dualism in which, as I suggest above, a genuinely novel
something-or-other
is evoked by physical behaviour but cannot reciprocally affect it
(and
so
cannot be detectable by it). Or is it really a form of cryptic
eliminativism
in which, in the final analysis, there is no additional
something-or-other
at all?
I don't think these terms make any substantive difference. Whether
my
consciousness can be replicated by a computer, for example, is an
important question and it is not dependent on whether under some use
of the English language it is correct to say that consciousness
can be
eliminated.
Absolutely. If indeed my consciousness had been satisfactorily
replicated by
a computational prosthetic it would be very foolish of me to
complain that
it had been eliminated.
Anyway, it would appear, that like Brent, you were using the term
epiphenomenon to mean some emergent phenomenon that is fully
entailed by
canonical physical causation, like temperature. If that's the case,
I agree
with Brent that there would be no remaining motive to differentiate
it
categorically from any other such canonical phenomenon of emergence.
Yes
By the way, if you think that consciousness may be that kind of
phenomenon,
does that imply that you reject any categorical 3p/1p distinction?
I ask
because I tend to agree with Bruno (and Brent, if I've understood
his most
recent comment) that the prize at the end of this road is a
completed theory
of the physical correlates of self-reported conscious phenomena.
But many
people take the view that after this prize is attained, there is
still a
"remainder problem" that doesn't seem so problematical with
temperature or
other emergent phenomena of the canonical kind. On the other hand,
if one
wishes to deny that anything remains to be accounted for after the
physical
correlates are explained it would be reasonable to describe one's
position
as eliminative with respect to any such remainder.
I still think it is valid to make the 1p/3p distinction. The emergent
phenomenon of consciousness has an aspect that you only get if you are
it.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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