On Thursday, February 6, 2014 11:00:27 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 05 Feb 2014, at 19:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 12:39:47 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 05 Feb 2014, at 14:28, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > <snip> > > Why would I share an elementary belief that I understand to be false? > > > Nobody ask you this. On the contrary, the idea is to start from what we > can agree on. > > Given the complexity of the problem we talk about, we might even ask if we > agree on the logical rules. > > > Yes, we should. > > > Ah? OK. > > > I begin from the assumption that logical rules are abstracted from > comparisons across sensory experiences, and therefore have no independent > existence of their own or casual effect. > > > That is not assumption. It might be part of a theory about the relations > between minds and logic. >
Why isn't is an assumption? I'm assuming that the ontology of logic is such that it supervenes on sense experience (minds are not necessarily involved)/ > > What I meant by agreeing on logical rules was agreeing that if we prove in > our theory some proposition A and if we prove in that theory some > proposition B, we allow saying that we have prove the new proposition > asserting that A and B. > > This is often written in some way, like A, B / (A & B), or > > * A B * > (A & B) > > > An important rule is the modus ponens, for example; A, A -> B / B > Who are "we"? What is "allow"? What is "prove"? What is a "proposition"? I'm not trying to learn logic, I'm trying to show that logic cannot be used to take us all the way to understanding consciousness - and therefore logic cannot be used to understand why it cannot be used either. > > > > > > > > > > > > > So my question is what does need to be explained in the axioms of > arithmetic that I have given? For most people a first order logic axiom like > > 0 ≠ s(x) (for all x) is simpler to understand that any statement > involving terms like "sense" or "aesthetic". > > > It's not simpler for me, or someone who doesn't know the language of > mathematical notation. > > > It is conceptually simpler. I could have written instead: > > "0 is not equal to the successor of any number". > > > What are "not" and "equal" and "successor" if not aesthetic qualities in > our imagination? > > > > They are simple 3p concept shared by all scientists. > "simple 3p concepts shared by all scientists" refers to consensual abstractions that are subject to revision. > "aesthetic qualities in our imagination" refers to 1p. > Yes. Just like everything we that we can experience is the 1p of our skin, eyes, tongue, brain, molecules... > > it might be that they live through us in the form of "aesthetic qualities > in our imagination". > We know that they do. What we do not know is that they live anywhere else. Once you take the omnipotence and omniscience that you lend to numbers, and translate them into sensory-motive capabilities, then you have the much more reasonable, non-magical property of permeability of nested aesthetic acquaintance. > That is even plausible with comp, and we can talk about that in some > possible thread. nevertheless, the meaning of "aesthetic qualities in our > imagination" is far more complex that the meaning of "not", "equal" and > "successor", when applied to natural numbers. > You're doing exactly what you accuse me of doing in judging a book by its local cover. Not, equal, and successor are simple to *you*, but what those concepts point to is a theoretical understanding which is not shared by infants. Infants would not understand the terms "aesthetic..." but they are experiencing them directly and understand that they are. > > > > > > > > > Or write a longer sentence. It is intuitively trivial with the intended > standard intuitive notion of numbers: 0, 1, 2, 3, ... > > > Whatever you are thinking is intuitively trivial is probably exactly where > I am saying that everything meaningful to consciousness must be. > > > You talk again like the universal soul (S4Grz). Yes, from its point of > view, consciousness is trivial. Indeed. But that's a "fact of reality", not > a theory capable of explaining that fact. > Not sure what you mean. I'm not saying that consciousness is trivial, I am saying that the aspects which I am saying are critical are those which you view as trivial. The fact of reality is where we should start all explanation from. > > If only I could find a way to motivate you to do the "hard work". > What if understanding consciousness requires "easy play" instead?...or even "absurd inevitable idling"? > > > > > > > > > > I have to figure out what is meant by s(x), which distracts me from the > question of whether s(x) is actually fictional and derived from a whole > history of philosophical formulation. > > > You confuse the intended notion with the relation between the humans and > that notion. We can always come back on this, but you should appeal to such > side notion only when you think that it invalidate the reasoning. If not > you do what we call in french "un procès d'intention", that is, you > attribute to your opponents statements that he never did. > > > > I wasn't trying to say anything intentional, but the framing of the > question in mathematical terms automatically buries the roots of > mathematics itself, > > > Not necessarily. > Because...? > And the way I proceed in the UDA guaranties that we don't lost the first > person, as the questions are all addressed to her. Then the same is done in > AUDA, except we need some help from the 3p (sharable notion) self of the > machine to define the first person (in the Theaetetus' way). > Sounds good, but I don't know what it means. > > > > > > > > which is what I am saying is already sense and consciousness (not human of > course). > > > > You are correct on this, for the 1p view. That is, crazily enough, a > theorem in arithmetic. > > But that truth is not communicable by the machine itself, it can even, in > some sense, become false if asserted. > > > > > > > > > Once you know how to read the language, the sense making that it took to > get there, such as all of the childhood wiring of tactile and visual > metaphors crafted by patient teachers, are elided into the sub-personal > awareness. > > > We do that all the time. Again, if you are willing to argue, you must > invoke the elision only if it invalidates the argument. > > > It does invalidate the argument. I'm explaining why it might seem to you, > and to many people, that mathematical abstractions could be primitive. I'm > saying that mathematical thoughts emerge from much simpler feelings and > expectations which are perceptual and tangible rather than conceptual. > > > Unfortunately that is refuted. > > > All you can do is to find some other universal Turing system who primitive > will look like being simpler than addition and multiplication, but you > cannot explain the natural numbers with anything less than a Turing > complete system. > Natural numbers are mereological qualities within sense. > > So if your theory *explains* the laws of addition and multiplication, it > has to be a Turing complete system, or more. Not less. > Sense is both more and less than Turing complete. It's Absolute. Arithmetic or laws are not absolute (which is what I think clearly Gödel is about). > > > > > > > > > > With the bulk of the iceberg of sense making metaphor safely under water, > yes the tip seems much simpler than talking about something for which a > formal language has yet to exist. > > > I discovered formal language in biology. As far as Nature exists, it > exploits arguably the formal and the multiplicable all the times. A formal > system, fundamentally, is just a system defined by its form. > > > I'm explaining why it seems simpler to talk about math (an established > formal language developed over thousands of years by billions of people) > than it is to talk about aesthetic phenomena (which has no formal language > except for the ad hoc one that I am trying to give it). I would say that > Nature only exploits the formal, as part of Nature, we exploit the informal > as well. > > > We exploit the informal, sure. But we communicate today, informally, but > in a way such that on complex technical matter, we can avoid the confusion, > and translate the relevant parts in accepted formal ways. > Beneath that formality is another level of informality though. To translate means to remove the formal semiotic casing and absorb it into the oceanic/para-monadic informality of our privacy. > > Now, in cognitive science, like in the foundation of math, we have > discovered the role of the informal, and with comp+Theaetetus we have a > done a tour-de-force; we listen to the machine, and she offers us a formal > theory of informal provability! (S4Grz). > I don't doubt that, but I think that the theory offered is a reflection of generic and impersonal pseudo-informality, not an intentionally informal personal presence. > > > > > > > > > > > > The axiom here says 0 is not a successor of any natural number. A FAQ is > "is not 0 the successor of -1 ?", and the anwer is that we just accept "0 ≠ > s(x)" to eliminate the negative numbers, in which we are not interested > because we want a very simple Turing universal base. We could use all > integers, as they are also Turing universal with addition and > multiplication, but we have chosen the natural numbers. > Beyond that type of explanation, at this stage, asking for more is > obfuscation. > > > It would be obfuscation if we were asking about computation or math, but > I'm only interested in the relationship of consciousness to physics and > information. > > > Then *you* should stay mute about comp. You can't say that comp is false > and computer science irrelevant for sense and consciousness, and make > negative statement like my sun is law (who get an artficial brain) is a > zombie, without us asking to justify your point, without appealing on > "real", "true", "feel", "obvious", etc. > > > I don't use 'zombie', your sun in law is a doll or puppet. > > > That is a 1004 precision in the insult. > Hah. I realized that yesterday that your view is really the more racist. You are judging the character of your sun in law by his behaviors - the color of his 4D skin as it were, not the content of his privacy. > > > I don't understand why I'm supposed to stay mute about comp. > > > Nobody asks you to stay mute. Simply don't pretend to have a refutation of > comp if you don't have one. > I have the only refutation of comp that comp can have. That's because comp is a closed circuit nilipsism. > > > > It sounds like 'Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain." to me. > > > It is the contrary. It is more "pay attention to the 1p person behind the > machine clothes. > He is invisible though. He is the Emperor's clothes. > > > > If I find, through the success of the sense-primitive model, that comp is > an impostor, why should I keep it a secret? > > > Of course. > > > > Why shouldn't I help explain the difference between a doll and a person? > > > Because the difference is straw man. > > You are the one confusing the doll (the machine body) and the person (a > person supported locally by a special type of computation executed by the > machine's body). > > <http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/mapterritory.jpg> I'm not confusing them, I am saying that the special type of computation is also a doll (albeit a 1+1D information-theoretic doll rather than a 3+1D form-functional doll). That's what I meant by those shadow projections. Whatever can be measured is always a N-1 dimensional silhouette of some N dimensional aspect of the N+1 dimensional Absolute aesthetic phenomenon Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
