Not explicitly, but it is definied in other protocols, like CMS where it
was asked for explicitly.
I can remove it, but I think that omiting it will make the document
appear more biased towards NIST curves than Edwards ones...
On Monday, 9 September 2024 15:09:45 CEST, Bas Westerbaan wrote:
> Did anyone ask for X448?
>
> On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 3:00 PM Alicja Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Monday, 9 September 2024 02:04:48 CEST, kris wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> I'm sorry, possibly I've missed some emails.
>> If there is an interest I propose we add it to existing draft,
>> publish version -03 and request a code point.
>> The repo is here:
>>
https://github.com/post-quantum-cryptography/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem
>>
>> Feel free to open PR
>
> done:
>
https://github.com/post-quantum-cryptography/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem/pull/22
>
>> Cheers,
>> Kris
>> From: Alicja Kario <hka...@redhat.com>
>> Sent: Saturday, September 7, 2024 12:39:30 AM
>> To: kris; tls@ietf.org
>> Subject: draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem and P-384
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> What's the situation with other groups for TLS 1.3?
>> Specifically, are there any plans to specify SecP384r1MLKEM1024?
>>
>> As mentioned in multiple emails already, high security system
>> already have a strict requirement to use P-384 curve exclusively.
>> Similarly, for post-quantum resistance they will be required
>> to use ML-KEM-1024.
>>
>> Will you add it to the draft, or should we start work on a
>> separate one that defines those hybrid algorithms?
>
--
Regards,
Alicja (nee Hubert) Kario
Principal Quality Engineer, RHEL Crypto team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com <http://www.cz.redhat.com>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00, Brno, Czech Republic
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