[TLS] Re: [EXT] Re: draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem and P-384

[Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL]

If we do hybrid at all - it makes perfect sense then to specify ECDHE over P-384 and ML-KEM-1024.  Thx — Regards, Uri Secure Resilient Systems and Technologies MIT Lincoln Laboratory On Sep 8, 2024, at 20:06, kris <k...@amongbytes.com> wrote:  Hello, I'm sorry, possibly I've missed some emails. If there is an interest I propose we add it to existing draft, publish version -03 and request a code point. The repo is here: https: //github. com/post-quantum-cryptography/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem ZjQcmQRYFpfptBannerStart This Message Is From an External Sender This message came from outside the Laboratory.   ZjQcmQRYFpfptBannerEnd Hello, I'm sorry, possibly I've missed some emails. If there is an interest I propose we add it to existing draft, publish version -03 and request a code point. The repo is here: https://github.com/post-quantum-cryptography/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem Feel free to open PR Cheers, Kris From: Alicja Kario <hka...@redhat.com> Sent: Saturday, September 7, 2024 12:39:30 AM To: kris; tls@ietf.org Subject: draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem and P-384   Hello, What's the situation with other groups for TLS 1.3? Specifically, are there any plans to specify SecP384r1MLKEM1024? As mentioned in multiple emails already, high security system already have a strict requirement to use P-384 curve exclusively. Similarly, for post-quantum resistance they will be required to use ML-KEM-1024. Will you add it to the draft, or should we start work on a separate one that defines those hybrid algorithms? -- Regards, Alicja (nee Hubert) Kario Principal Quality Engineer, RHEL Crypto team Web: www.cz.redhat.com Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00, Brno, Czech Republic _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to tls-le...@ietf.org

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