As far as I’m concerned – no need: P384 (or no ECC at all, aka – no hybrid) 
would suffice.

TNX
--
V/R,
Uri

There are two ways to design a system. One is to make it so simple there are 
obviously no deficiencies.
The other is to make it so complex there are no obvious deficiencies.
                                                                                
                                                        C. A. R. Hoare

I was a shepherd to fools
Causelessly bold or afraid.
They would not abide by my rules.
Yet they escaped. For I stayed.
                                    R. Kipling “Epitaphs of the War. Convoy 
Escort”


From: Bas Westerbaan <bas=40cloudflare....@dmarc.ietf.org>
Date: Monday, September 9, 2024 at 09:12
To: Alicja Kario <hka...@redhat.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: [EXT] [TLS] Re: draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem and P-384
Did anyone ask for X448? On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 3: 00 PM Alicja Kario <hkario@ 
redhat. com> wrote: On Monday, 9 September 2024 02: 04: 48 CEST, kris wrote: > 
Hello, > > I'm sorry, possibly I've missed some emails. > If there
ZjQcmQRYFpfptBannerStart
This Message Is From an External Sender
This message came from outside the Laboratory.

ZjQcmQRYFpfptBannerEnd
Did anyone ask for X448?

On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 3:00 PM Alicja Kario 
<hka...@redhat.com<mailto:hka...@redhat.com>> wrote:
On Monday, 9 September 2024 02:04:48 CEST, kris wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I'm sorry, possibly I've missed some emails.
> If there is an interest I propose we add it to existing draft,
> publish version -03 and request a code point.
> The repo is here:
> https://github.com/post-quantum-cryptography/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem
>
> Feel free to open PR

done:
https://github.com/post-quantum-cryptography/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem/pull/22

> Cheers,
> Kris
> From: Alicja Kario <hka...@redhat.com<mailto:hka...@redhat.com>>
> Sent: Saturday, September 7, 2024 12:39:30 AM
> To: kris; tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>
> Subject: draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem and P-384
>
> Hello,
>
> What's the situation with other groups for TLS 1.3?
> Specifically, are there any plans to specify SecP384r1MLKEM1024?
>
> As mentioned in multiple emails already, high security system
> already have a strict requirement to use P-384 curve exclusively.
> Similarly, for post-quantum resistance they will be required
> to use ML-KEM-1024.
>
> Will you add it to the draft, or should we start work on a
> separate one that defines those hybrid algorithms?

--
Regards,
Alicja (nee Hubert) Kario
Principal Quality Engineer, RHEL Crypto team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com<http://www.cz.redhat.com>
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00, Brno, Czech Republic

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