Not explicitly, but it is definied in other protocols, like CMS where it
was asked for explicitly.
I can remove it, but I think that omiting it will make the document
appear more biased towards NIST curves than Edwards ones...
On Monday, 9 September 2024 15:09:45 CEST, Bas Westerbaan wrote:
Did anyone ask for X448?
On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 3:00 PM Alicja Kario <hka...@redhat.com> wrote:
On Monday, 9 September 2024 02:04:48 CEST, kris wrote:
Hello,
I'm sorry, possibly I've missed some emails.
If there is an interest I propose we add it to existing draft,
publish version -03 and request a code point.
The repo is here:
https://github.com/post-quantum-cryptography/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem
Feel free to open PR
done:
https://github.com/post-quantum-cryptography/draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem/pull/22
Cheers,
Kris
From: Alicja Kario <hka...@redhat.com>
Sent: Saturday, September 7, 2024 12:39:30 AM
To: kris; tls@ietf.org
Subject: draft-kwiatkowski-tls-ecdhe-mlkem and P-384
Hello,
What's the situation with other groups for TLS 1.3?
Specifically, are there any plans to specify SecP384r1MLKEM1024?
As mentioned in multiple emails already, high security system
already have a strict requirement to use P-384 curve exclusively.
Similarly, for post-quantum resistance they will be required
to use ML-KEM-1024.
Will you add it to the draft, or should we start work on a
separate one that defines those hybrid algorithms?
--
Regards,
Alicja (nee Hubert) Kario
Principal Quality Engineer, RHEL Crypto team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 115, 612 00, Brno, Czech Republic
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