On Sunday, May 19, 2019, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:40:04 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation >>>>> running in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html : >>>> >>>> >>>> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of >>>> biochemical makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer >>>> could never have experiences, no matter what its causal organization * >>>> >>>> >>>> *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical >>>> system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On >>>> this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are >>>> not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may >>>> be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract >>>> causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many >>>> different physical substrates.* >>>> >>>> *In this paper I defend this view.* >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. >>>> >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends >>> this view.) >>> >>> In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the >>> existence of God*. >>> >>> >> A scientist should be thrilled to find something which might show the >> ideas he or she holds to be wrong, as it offers a chance to adopt a more >> correct view. Recently I have seen a lot of people on this list telling >> others their idea is wrong, but not giving any reason or reasoning to >> justify that assertion. >> >> This doesn't helping anyone. Telling someone else they are wrong without >> providing a reason won't get them to change their mind, if anything failing >> to provide a reason is just as likely to reinforce their belief. If you see >> or intuit something that someone else does not, I think it is best to >> either point out what it is they are missing or remain silent. >> >> Jason >> > > > Philip, I commend you for providing your reasons below. Thank you. > > We know our brains, which we examine in science to be made of a complex > configuration of cells, neurons and glial, with complex neurochemistry*, > produces consciousness. That is the fact we know to be the case. > Yes, I agree. > > So it seems reasonable, from both a scientific and engineering stance, > that a synthetic intelligence approach - one that combines > synthetic-biological assembly with AI information processing to produce > outputs that are actually living things - is the road to (synthetic) > consciousness. > > *The belief that a conventional computer made of a zillion Intel Core > chips with the right programming can be conscious is a religious belief, > not a a scientific belief.* > > You could say it is a hypothesis for which we currently have no direct evidence for. Is there anything you would consider evidence? If a synthetic Android claimed to be conscious would this be evidence that would convince you? If not, what evidence could convince you? > The burden of proof is on those with that belief to prove it, just as the > burden of proof is on those with the belief that God exists to prove that. > > I think the burden rests equally on those holding either that "synthetic brains cannot be conscious" as "synthetic brains can be conscious". The reason I lean towards the second camp, is that the former leads to very strange situations: pzombies that complain about pain, Androids who argue that they're conscious, planets with zombies (of a different neuro chemistry) who nonetheless write books on consciousness, fading qualia, and qualia that "dance" (disappear and reappear) due to presence or absence of a few synthetic neurons. I am not aware of anything quite so strange resulting from a belief in synthetic consciousness. Sure it is strange that a billion Intel chips could be conscious, but no more strange than the idea that a heap of oil droplets squirting ions back and forth could be conscious. Anyway that's how I got to where I am. Jason > > * neurochemistry like the recently reported role of SATB2-expressing > neurons in the processing of taste. > > SATB2: "SATB2 is a 733 amino-acid homeodomain-containing human protein > with a molecular weight of 82.5 kDa encoded by the SATB2 gene on 2q33." > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > msgid/everything-list/e735ca2d-82a7-4b50-a474-c8e6827c950c%40googlegroups. > com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e735ca2d-82a7-4b50-a474-c8e6827c950c%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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