On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: > > > > On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running >> in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious. >> >> >> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem. >> >> >> > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html : > > > *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical > makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never > have experiences, no matter what its causal organization * > > > *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical > system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On > this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are > not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may > be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract > causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many > different physical substrates.* > > *In this paper I defend this view.* > > > > That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. > > > Brent >
That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends this view.) In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the existence of God*. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bb9a7586-8bd6-4fb9-9027-c0daedd3760d%40googlegroups.com.
