ecific features partially.
I am not sure that Agile and bake-offs will work well together -- are
you proposing some change to the WG Charter to require that ?
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purcha
have a draft charter here:
>https://notes.ietf.org/YGynIPpYS7yqg5G7ZeSQeA
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase aBenjamin
little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Sa
ly better" then of course everyone writing the code
will seize upon it immediately !
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin
That is, once the
word-smithing of a charter is completed (and it seems to be permissible
not to have milestones for that).
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
ay-care local policy).
It's unlikely that forwarding such email outside of the receiving
organisation is going to succeed because the trust will evaporate.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a
gt;they are changed due to reencoding at times (not seldom).
my message was as plain as they come ...
Message-ID:
Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2024 01:42:10 +
To: ietf-dkim@ietf.org
From: Richard Clayton
Subject: Re: [Ietf-dkim] Re: PROPOSAL: reopen this working group and work on
DKIM2
References:
e properly -- and it might be
that a DSN was speciously generated (depending on the exact chain of
custody)
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liber
L2YT3lTgo_qmIpVGE
>
>which seems 7-bit plain (one had to ask him how he sent it)
there's an X-Mailer to tell you that .. and a Wikipedia entry
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a litt
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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In message <5d91cde1-6f5b-5403-1ed6-d90f3cf92...@crash.com>, Steven M
Jones writes
>
>On 11/20/24 12:03, Richard Clayton wrote:
>> it means that if the message, for whatever reason, reaches another DKIM2
>> system it is po
nteroperability.
/interoperability/interoperability and efficiency, especially at scale/
Remember that an engineer is someone who do for sixpence what any fool
can do for a shilling.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty
cant
clarity and reassurance -- so I don't know why you are arguing it should
not be present in the design -- and I am even less clear what it has to
do with the proposed charter for a Working Group
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who wo
t, so far as I can see, address the "backscatter" problem or
provide any assistance to the ESPs who wish to handle delivery issues on
behalf of their customers
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, t
for
some people's $DAYJOB$s ... what tends to be off-limits is any labelling
of the Y-axis (though you can assume that for many people interested in
this work it comes in many many billions)
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up
t for many people interested in
>> this work it comes in many many billions)
>
>Which existing draft?
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gondwana-dkim2-motivation/
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safet
be
accepting DKIM2 as early adopters (because of the gains it gives them)
it would make sense (and save power) to skip the DKIM1 signature on a
per recipient basis.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase
ple than a flag
for DNSSEC usage --- taking that approach would allow senders to
understand caching issues DNS outages, not just DNS poisoning attacks
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a littl
low accept and reject
strategies that are not currently practicable).
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
m, BTW, a big fan of the NSA's definition of "trust" ... that
"a trusted component is one that "f***s" your security policy when it
fails" and hence trust is always a bad thing to have in your system.
- --
richard
ons scale and
should, in my view, continue to do so.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. Benjamin Franklin
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iQA/AwUBZznU
mentions
these then a DKIMbis will most likely not be suitable
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
-
people use greylisting for just
this purpose -- which is wasteful of resources and can result in very
extended delivery times... viz making greylisting unnecessary would be a
good outcome for the WG
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would giv
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In message <02500ef2-7a55-44e8-b796-365baf523...@bluepopcorn.net>, Jim
Fenton writes
>On 20 Jan 2025, at 16:49, Richard Clayton wrote:
>
>> not really ... the issue that had been overlooked relates to a good
>> sender who hir
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
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iQA/AwUBZ
nce and the way they use DKIM
this is Not True ... there are some limitations (annotating the Y axis
for example -- as I think I mentioned before)
what do you perceive that you are unaware of ?
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would gi
s to implement the latter ?? (and please remind
me which software component you maintain).
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin
rs is exotic ... the notion
that allowing a choice of relaxed or simple for bodies means that people
have to engineer for both -- that's exotic
as you have already noted l= seemed like a good idea at the time, but is
now associated with serious security concerns ...
- --
richard
r
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
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i
of information -- and you might also
like to look at this (albeit it is not from a mailbox provider)
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/5023652/United-
Kingdom-Government-Active-Cyber-Defense.pdf>
- --
richard Richard
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In message <2b015fac-a6ca-49ff-bf61-82cbc42cb...@mtcc.com>, Michael
Thomas writes
>On 1/27/25 3:44 PM, Richard Clayton wrote:
>> In message , Michael
>> Thomas writes
>>
>> > Papers, reports, really anything
the problems they
consider to be important to them -- and those problems include code
complexity, latency and energy budgets.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve
lel if you wish (and SPF will
continue to be "a thing" whilst there is continued toleration of dumb
devices such as security cameras sending direct to a destination
mailbox).
In the fullness of time, I doubt that larger mailbox providers will care
much about the DKIM1 signature and it may
along but this one (with
it's early milestone) seems more likely to change than the others and
perhaps the text here should call that out.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little tempora
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In message <452d9a13-61d6-42aa-b4fe-27046948a...@mtcc.com>, Michael
Thomas writes
>There are those who have read Fred Brooks, and there are those who
>haven't. I guess that point was missed. If you haven't read him, I
>encourage it.
But a ship on
e chances of email being automatically classified as
spam increases with the number of recipients ... it doubles by the time
the number of recipients reaches 10.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase
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In message <1ab921c3-9ebd-4e81-8d19-c3772b02d...@dcrocker.net>, Dave
Crocker writes
>On 3/6/2025 5:07 AM, Richard Clayton wrote:
>> Yesterday (Wednesday) at $DAYJOB the percentage of mail delivered to a
>> single recipient (
mate" in a protocol ... what DKIM2 does is
allow you, having determined that badness has occurred, to be sure which
entity was responsible for that badness and set a reputation (or a
block) accordingly
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who
eiver is likely to care about.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
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In message , Murray S. Kucherawy writes
>On Mon, Mar 24, 2025 at 12:24PM Richard Clayton
>wrote:
>
>> you cannot determine "legitimate" in a protocol ... what DKIM2 does is
>> allow you, having determined that b
equires the rt= to be limited
>to just one address.
simplicity ... at the point at which an email is being signed it is not
possible to know how many recipients the receiving MTA will accept after
each MAIL FROM
- --
richard Richard Clayton
;>> It intend each of the recipients, after all. I
>>> don't get what the supposed security property is of limiting it to a
>>> single rcpt-to. Is there one?
>> yes
>
>Sorry this is not helpful at all. Being dismissive is not a good way to get
>consensus at I
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In message <7d8f6d49-b974-4392-a7ad-eb23e6d99...@wizmail.org>, Jeremy
Harris writes
>On 3/17/25 12:34 AM, Richard Clayton wrote:
>>> PPS: I'm don't understand why this requires the rt= to be limited
>>>
, the final recipient cannot
>determine which one of the signed recipients is the culprit.
also if it forwarded by a DKIM2 aware system then the recipient of that
forwarded email has rather more work to do in order to avoid replay.
- --
richard
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In message , Alessandro
Vesely writes
>On Mon 24/Mar/2025 20:19:29 +0100 Richard Clayton wrote:
>> In message , Alessandro Vesely
> writes
>>
>>>BTW, is dkim2=fail different from "failing DKIM2 signatures from a 10
ance to "ESPs" and
indeed to mailbox providers.
I have not seen any discussion of this -- maybe it's straightforward
enough to merit no further commentary.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, t
ou think MTAs have eschewed libraries for inline
code ?
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
-BEGIN
In message , Michael
Thomas writes
>
>On 3/16/25 5:34 PM, Richard Clayton wrote:
>> > PPS: I'm don't understand why this requires the rt= to be limited
>> > to just one address.
>>
>> simplicity ... at the point at which an email is being
cedural equivalent.
As people are doubtless aware I am an author of #1 and #3 (and I am the
"Richard" you can find in the Bangkok minutes).
- --
richard Richard Clayton
They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
who is ultimately at fault ... I find myself at a
loss to understand how this part of the review I am responding to is
actionable in any way other than saying "replay is entirely the fault of
the signer" within one or more documents -- which I don't think is in
any way productive, and it
he ability to specify a return (ie,
> handling notification) address that differs from the author has been
> an important bit of flexibility for email.*
I do not believe that anything in our DKIM2 design changes that
- --
richard Ric
rust
the gateway (and the DKIM2 signature it applies) rather than messing
around with "undoing" the changes. Such trust, since the security
gateway would be at the organisations border (and the trusting systems
would be inside that border) does not seem hard to achieve.
>Please revis
in -02 and where some of the material has
been kept it has been substantially rewritten
viz: we did read this review at the time and took note -- and of course
others commented to us as well on and off list. However, we didn't reply
on the list, a lacuna which I am now addressing.
- --
r
, is solving a non-existent problem.
We've explained what issue it addresses.
It also reduces the size of every (cautious) email by 383 bytes (766 if
the oversigning is not default) ... and there's a carbon footprint issue
here that we should not ignore without careful consideration
This a
on.
>
>The current scheme is much more complicated and does not seem to provide an
>improvement.
>
>How is i= relevant to this?
later (in time, and higher i= values) of DKIM2 header field
>What does it mean to be a 'higher number' i=
>record? The text here appear
> take responsibility for the event and not bother the person who sent
>> a message to the list.
>
>Solving a non-problem.
>
>A mailing list is generating a new message posting. It can choose the SMTP
>Mail
>From to be anything it wants, including itself, and t
has always been a value-add feature for all
>of
>these mechanisms, and outside of their scope.
>
> *Trust is an entirely separate and challenging line of reputation,
> etc. (research) work.*
These points appear to be commentary on the task being taken on, rather
than on the do
different customers) then if the email does not say that it has been
>> duplicated then signatures can be assumed to be unique and hence
>> simple caching (or Bloom filters) will identify replays. If the
>> email has been duplicated then recipients can assign a reputat
>> hop for a reasonable time.
>
>Asserting to whom? Why?
asserting to the device to which the email is being passed
and why -- because one of our aims was to enable intermediate entities
(such as mailing lists and ESPs) to become aware of delivery failures.
- --
richard
rive at the current machine
>How is it specified?
in the DKIM2 headers
>What does it me to
>'establish the veracity' of it?
is there a correlation between RCPT-TO: and MAIL-FROM: ?
note that systems which know there is not a correlation can generate a
DKIM2 header to show t
KIM signatures. If more than are received
then further copies are rejected. The difficulty is of course
determining a suitable value of ... and that is currently done by a
mixture of heuristics and manual overrides.
having the expansion event documented informs those heuristics
>> It wil
productive.
I am not replying to the rest of these points since they are overtaken
by events.
Our latest thoughts are in the header-00 document, but there is still
more work to be done (and documented) here.
- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
and that was the end of Dave Crocker's original em
-+
>
>what will be done with different values?
can I point you at draft-gondwana-dkim2-modification-alegbra
>While the choices seem intuitively reasonable, there is a long history of
>definitions seeming that, but lacking concrete specificatio
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In message <20250411205917.169acc3d1...@ary.qy>, John Levine
writes
>It appears that Richard Clayton said:
>>>> ++-+
>>>> | ds=
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In message <412a4ad9-b08f-4189-8d6f-fb7e5a974...@dcrocker.net>, Dave
Crocker writes
>On 4/21/2025 11:51 PM, Richard Clayton wrote:
>> I think you may have overlooked some aspects of what is needed to make a
>> difference to
it was 28921 bytes long.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
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In message , Jim
Fenton writes
>On 11 Apr 2025, at 13:00, Richard Clayton wrote:
>
>> The list of header fields is currently
>>
>> Author
>> Bcc
>
>Bcc header field? Doesn’t that contradict the
hange -- and an appropriate reputation can be
assigned to that intermediary and not to the original sender.
There's no way of determining that a change is or is not evil within the
DKIM2 protocol, nor can there be. However, you do know where the
evilness came from.
- --
richard
so requires trust, but you get to verify as well.
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
-BEGIN PGP
;quite sure that the details will be somewhere between deficient and terrible.
>Please adjust comments and suggestions accordingly, with attempts to avoid
>declaring the mere fact of either condition being appreciated.
I trust your wish has been honoured
- --
richard
o signatures and in some cases it can be dozens. This is expensive for
recipients who need to check all the signatures to assess which are
valid (and then they must reason about reputation in complex ways)
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who
eir email address
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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t;but also
> | mf=| RFC5321.mail-from
this information is recorded in other header fields already -- in what
scenario does a single header field escape ??
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to pur
reason than at present to consider it worthwhile to accept a
message whose authentication fails ... I think that is contributory to
what Todd is getting at...
- --
richard Richard Clayton
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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I thought it might be useful to set out the issues around "algorithmic
dexterity" that our DKIM2 design sets out to tackle.
The first thing to say is being able to move to new crypto algorithms is
a difficult practical problem and it's not just a case
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In message , Wei Chuang writes
>I'm announcing the Internet-Draft for the "Domain Name specification for
>DKIM2".
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-chuang-dkim2-dns/02/
>
>DKIM2 intends to be compatible with the existing DKIM installed base of
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In message , Barry Leiba writes
>> I think what we want is:
>>
>> The verifier MUST support at least one of the signature algorithms.
>> The verifier MUST check all the algorithms it supports.
>> The signature MUST be valid for all signatures.
>
>I t
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