-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In message <cal0qlwau6epeswxyb9xruxrbucspbae1npkibdy7ppymx3+...@mail.gma il.com>, Murray S. Kucherawy <superu...@gmail.com> writes
> Bron (or anyone involved), do we have any initial documents to > propose formally in the charter? RSN I shall have a version of RFC6376 that I have hacked around to document what DKIM2 looks like (sufficient -- I intend -- for people to implement against). I had not been prioritising making this available given your ban on discussing anything technical, but if you want it to hand in order to progress getting a charter in place so we can actually do some work here... > DKIM benefits from trust relationships, as does any other > authentication protocol, and is of limited use without them, but > pays very little attention to them in text because they are the > purview of an implementation's "special sauce". If there's a clear > intent to develop an interoperable notion of trust relationships > (i.e., reputation), we should say so explicitly, otherwise I > suggest that we should avoid the topic or, at a minimum, leave it > to a post-rechartering topic. At the risk of saying something technical ... DKIM2 identifies a number of places where signatures allow a reputation to be attached to intermediaries as well as to the original creator of a message Since nothing about "trust" is ever interoperable I don't see that one can do any more than draw attention to these places... I am, BTW, a big fan of the NSA's definition of "trust" ... that "a trusted component is one that "f***s" your security policy when it fails" and hence trust is always a bad thing to have in your system. - -- richard Richard Clayton Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBZ2F3K92nQQHFxEViEQKLLQCghxFp61ZqxtL3Z0IxoBF9CHISTF4AoMlz 2t4JNm+TFhaXfxBLe2/MUauB =NSVE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Ietf-dkim mailing list -- ietf-dkim@ietf.org To unsubscribe send an email to ietf-dkim-le...@ietf.org
