Goethe wrote:
> On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ed Murphy wrote:
>> comex wrote:
>>
>>> (Then again, rarely do we encounter a paradox as beautiful
>>> as that one.)
>> I forget which of us actually came up with the idea.
>
> Naw, that one was all you from what I remember.
>
> You assigned it to me out of m
On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, comex wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 10:16 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>> No, it doesn't. If the outside case is judged true, it implies that A
>>> is the judge of X, and therefore A judged X incorrectly while B judged
>>> it correctly (but invalidly).
>
>
On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ed Murphy wrote:
> comex wrote:
>
>> (Then again, rarely do we encounter a paradox as beautiful
>> as that one.)
>
> I forget which of us actually came up with the idea.
Naw, that one was all you from what I remember.
You assigned it to me out of mischief, perhaps. I posted
comex wrote:
> (Then again, rarely do we encounter a paradox as beautiful
> as that one.)
I forget which of us actually came up with the idea.
Proto-proto: Patent Title of Medalist, to be awarded by a person
who won within the past week to one or more other persons whose
cooperation was instrum
"Tweak veracity a lot", adoption index 1.7:
{Amend Rule 591 (Inquiry Cases) by replacing the paragraph beginning
with "An inquiry case has a judicial question on veracity," with
this text:
{An inquiry case has a judicial question on veracity, which is always
applicable. The valid judgements for
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 10:16 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> No, it doesn't. If the outside case is judged true, it implies that A
>> is the judge of X, and therefore A judged X incorrectly while B judged
>> it correctly (but invalidly). A might later be vindicated by further
>> de
On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ian Kelly wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 6:25 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Yes it does. Before one of the cases is appealed, an outside case
>> that says "A is the judge of case X" can't be judged true (for it
>> implies e isn't) and can't be judged false (
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 6:25 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Yes it does. Before one of the cases is appealed, an outside case
> that says "A is the judge of case X" can't be judged true (for it
> implies e isn't) and can't be judged false (for it implies e is).
No, it doesn't. If t
On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ian Kelly wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 5:02 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> The paradox was the question of "who judged CFJ 1594". This was before
>> judgement-questions were specifically excluded from paradox. -Goethe
>
> I realize that. The fact that you
On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ed Murphy wrote:
> Goethe wrote:
>> The paradox was the question of "who judged CFJ 1594". This was before
>> judgement-questions were specifically excluded from paradox. -Goethe
>
> Before what, now? Self-referential questions (e.g. "This statement is
> false") are specifi
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 5:32 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> If the rules are ambiguous wrt interpretation, then FLOYD is not
> appropriate.
Why not, exactly? If the rules are ambiguous, then indeed the
statement logically could have been described as either true or false,
depending on
Goethe wrote:
> On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ian Kelly wrote:
>> That doesn't sound like a paradox at all. Judgements do not change
>> gamestate; they only narrow down the axioms we employ in determining
>> gamestate. So there was no causal loop of the judgements invalidating
>> themselves; there was ju
warrigal wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 9:47 PM, Pavitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> On Thursday 23 October 2008 04:10:14 pm Elliott Hird wrote:
>>>* FLOYD, appropriate if the statement was logically capable
>>> of being described as either true or false with equal accuracy
>> Accuracy
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 5:02 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The paradox was the question of "who judged CFJ 1594". This was before
> judgement-questions were specifically excluded from paradox. -Goethe
I realize that. The fact that you consulted two potential oracles and
both said
On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ian Kelly wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 2:57 PM, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> That doesn't sound like a paradox at all. Judgements do not change
>> gamestate; they only narrow down the axioms we employ in determining
>> gamestate. So there was no causal loop of
On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ian Kelly wrote:
> That doesn't sound like a paradox at all. Judgements do not change
> gamestate; they only narrow down the axioms we employ in determining
> gamestate. So there was no causal loop of the judgements invalidating
> themselves; there was just uncertainty as to
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 3:49 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> "This sentence is false" would be the canonical UNDECIDABLE. Gnarly
> type paradoxes should also be UNDECIDABLE, I think.
Should be, but I can see no reason why FLOYD would not be equally
appropriate for a gnarly paradox.
-r
root wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 2:57 PM, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> That doesn't sound like a paradox at all. Judgements do not change
>> gamestate; they only narrow down the axioms we employ in determining
>> gamestate. So there was no causal loop of the judgements invalidati
root wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 12:54 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Logical: "This statement is true." On the basis of logic alone,
>> either TRUE or FALSE is self-consistent.
>>
>> Legal: "Goethe was a player at > 2006>". According to one legal interpretation, TRUE is cons
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 2:57 PM, Ian Kelly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> That doesn't sound like a paradox at all. Judgements do not change
> gamestate; they only narrow down the axioms we employ in determining
> gamestate. So there was no causal loop of the judgements invalidating
> themselves; t
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 2:37 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ian Kelly wrote:
>> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 12:54 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>> Logical: "This statement is true." On the basis of logic alone,
>>> either TRUE or FALSE is self-consiste
On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ian Kelly wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 12:54 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Logical: "This statement is true." On the basis of logic alone,
>> either TRUE or FALSE is self-consistent.
>>
>> Legal: "Goethe was a player at > 2006>". According to one legal in
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 12:54 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Logical: "This statement is true." On the basis of logic alone,
> either TRUE or FALSE is self-consistent.
>
> Legal: "Goethe was a player at 2006>". According to one legal interpretation, TRUE is consistent
> and FALSE i
On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ed Murphy wrote:
> Logical: "This statement is true." On the basis of logic alone,
> either TRUE or FALSE is self-consistent.
>
> Legal: "Goethe was a player at 2006>". According to one legal interpretation, TRUE is consistent
> and FALSE is not; according to another, FAL
root wrote:
>> FLOYD is specifically limited to logical interpretation, not legal
>> interpretation. In particular, the paradox that led to my win in
>> December 2006 depended on two equally-plausible legal interpretations,
>> of which one was eventually discarded for entirely practical reasons
>
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 10:22 AM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> root wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 8:16 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>> * UNDECIDABLE, appropriate if the statement was logically
>>>undecidable or otherwise not capable of being accurately
>>>
root wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 8:16 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> * UNDECIDABLE, appropriate if the statement was logically
>>undecidable or otherwise not capable of being accurately
>>described as either true or false
>>
>> * FLOYD, appropriate if th
On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 1:45 AM, Alex Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Such a statement is a Henkin statement, if I remember correctly.
Henkin sentence. Close enough.
-root
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 8:16 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> * UNDECIDABLE, appropriate if the statement was logically
>undecidable or otherwise not capable of being accurately
>described as either true or false
>
> * FLOYD, appropriate if the statement logicall
On Thu, 2008-10-23 at 22:49 -0400, Geoffrey Spear wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 10:17 PM, Pavitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Er, right.
> > What's the word for the truth-value of "this statement is true"? I
> > can't find it on Wikipedia.
> >
> > Indeterminate?
> >
> > Floyd?
>
> I don't kn
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 8:17 PM, Pavitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Thursday 23 October 2008 09:09:23 pm Geoffrey Spear wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 9:47 PM, Pavitra
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> > which I think is what this is trying to get at, the concept of
>> > logical tautology.
>>
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 10:17 PM, Pavitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Er, right.
> What's the word for the truth-value of "this statement is true"? I
> can't find it on Wikipedia.
>
> Indeterminate?
>
> Floyd?
I don't know that there is a generally-accepted term; I don't think
'circular' is often
On Thursday 23 October 2008 09:09:23 pm Geoffrey Spear wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 9:47 PM, Pavitra
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > which I think is what this is trying to get at, the concept of
> > logical tautology.
>
> A statement that could possibly be false is not a tautology.
Er, right.
On Thu, Oct 23, 2008 at 9:47 PM, Pavitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> which I think is what this is trying to get at, the concept of logical
> tautology.
A statement that could possibly be false is not a tautology.
On Thursday 23 October 2008 04:10:14 pm Elliott Hird wrote:
>* FLOYD, appropriate if the statement was logically capable
> of being described as either true or false with equal accuracy
Accuracy may be equally "not much" (.01==.01). Probably better to say
something like:
* FLOYD, ap
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