On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 2:37 PM, Kerim Aydin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Fri, 24 Oct 2008, Ian Kelly wrote: >> On Fri, Oct 24, 2008 at 12:54 PM, Ed Murphy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>> Logical: "This statement is true." On the basis of logic alone, >>> either TRUE or FALSE is self-consistent. >>> >>> Legal: "Goethe was a player at <appropriate time c. December >>> 2006>". According to one legal interpretation, TRUE is consistent >>> and FALSE is not; according to another, FALSE is consistent and >>> TRUE is not. >> >> I don't recall the details of Goethe's paradox; I think I was >> deregistered at the time. But in general, if something is purely a >> matter of legal interpretation, then neither UNDECIDABLE nor FLOYD >> would be appropriate. It's the judge's job in such a case to pick a >> legal interpretation and judge TRUE or FALSE based upon it. That's >> the whole purpose of the judicial system to begin with. > > It was geniunely one of those UNDECIDABLE ones. > > Murphy assigned a CFJ on whether or not I was a player to myself, then > immediately afterwards to Sherlock (only valid if I wasn't a player). > > I judged I was not a player, therefore my judgement was invalid > and Sherlock's assignment worked. > > Sherlock judged that I was a player therefore eir judgement > was invalid and my assignment worked. > > The important thing was that objectively, there were quite reasonable > arguments on both sides for whether I was a player or not (it was > debated before the assignments).
That doesn't sound like a paradox at all. Judgements do not change gamestate; they only narrow down the axioms we employ in determining gamestate. So there was no causal loop of the judgements invalidating themselves; there was just uncertainty as to which one had actually happened, dependent wholly upon legal interpretation. The appropriate thing to do would have been to solicit a new, unambiguous judgement to resolve the issue. -root
