Thanks for recommending these readings. I’ll see how much I can get through. Can’t promise too much at this point. Nowadays we all get too many items on our to-do list, just as you indicated below about your website situation.
Sent from my iPhone > On Aug 19, 2020, at 10:51, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >>> On 19 Aug 2020, at 05:39, Beixiao Liu <b.robert....@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> That’s a very thoughtful reply. I’m interested in learning about some of >>> these fields you mentioned. Right now, I don’t know enough about these >>> fields to give an informed reply. >> >> >> That is fair enough, and rathe normal, as I summed up many years of work, >> mainly based on the (many) incompleteness and undefinability theorems of the >> 1930s, and which were axiomatised in a modal logic of provability by Solovay >> in 1979, by the split logic G and G* (sometimes called GL and GLS, for >> Gödel, Löb and Solovay). >> >> We might have opportunity to discuss this more. Meanwhile I give you some >> references on my main papers where I have developed this. It is also in my >> Phd Thesis (short and long version, but they were written in French, and are >> easily available on my webpage (which I should update since 2007!). >> >> Your mentioning of Buddhism was quite appropriate, and I might make this >> clearer in some of the papers below. >> >> Here are some: >> >> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. Prog >> Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23567157 >> >> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in >> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 >> >> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International >> System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, >> Amsterdam, 2004. >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >> (sane04) >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html >> >> Plotinus PDF paper with the link: >> Marchal B. A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation >> of Plotinus’ Theory of Matter. In Barry Cooper S. Löwe B., Kent T. F. and >> Sorbi A., editors, Computation and Logic in the Real World, Third Conference >> on Computability in Europe June 18-23, pages 263–273. Universita degli studi >> di Sienna, Dipartimento di Roberto Magari, 2007. >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf >> >> Marchal B. The East, the West and the Universal Machine, Progress in >> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2017, Vol. 131, pp. 251-260. >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28919132 >> >> Marchal B. Religion, science and theology, similarity and differences, >> Dialogo Journal, 2018, Vol. 5, pp. 205-218. >> (available at http://www.dialogo-conf.com/archive/) >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>>> On Aug 18, 2020, at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 16 Aug 2020, at 15:24, Beixiao Robert Liu <b.robert....@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> In Buddhism teachings, a human has eight cognitions. >>> >>> Oh! Like the universal machine. You get the cognitions mode by taking into >>> account Gödel’s incompleteness. >>> >>> I abbreviate Gödel’s bewiesibar(‘p’) by []p, p is an arithmetical >>> restricted to the partial computable/decidable one, the so called sigma_1 >>> sentences: that’s the arithmetical version of the Digital Mechanist >>> Hypothesis). >>> <>p is an abbreviation of ~[]~p. “T” is for “0 = 0", f for “0 = 1”. >>> >>> In that case, it can be shown that p, []p, []p & p (theaetetus true >>> opinion), []p & <>t and []p & <>t & p, are equivalent, but very few of >>> those equivalence can be proved by the machine itself, making those five >>> modes obeying different logics and mathematics. >>> >>> p >>> []p >>> []p & p >>> >>> Correspond nicely to Plotinus three primary hypostases >>> >>> ONE >>> INTELLECT >>> SOUL >>> >>> Or, with less platonic vocabulary >>> >>> TRUE >>> BELIEVABLE >>> KNOWABLE >>> >>> >>> The modes >>> >>> []p & <>t >>> []p & <>t & p >>> >>> Can be motivated through through experiments and defines what is observable >>> by the universal machine. They can also be related to Plotinus platonic >>> reconstruction of Aristotle’s theory of matter, pointing on the presence of >>> non provability and non controllability. >>> >>> Those two modes gives the two “matters”: the intelligible matter (quanta, >>> first person plural), and the sensible matter (qualia). The “quantum >>> quanta” appears as special qualia (apparently). >>> >>> This gives five modes, but incompleteness splits again three of those >>> logics ([]p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p) in two, ((corresponding to >>> “provable” versus “true”, making eight "modes of cognition”, or eight ways >>> arithmetic can see itself through universal numbers). >>> >>> The logic of the modes with the occurence of “& p”, gives first person >>> modes, and describes entities which cannot be defined in any third person >>> description, something inherited by the qualia, consciousness, etc. >>> technically, they entail that the subject obeys some intuitionistic logic. >>> >>> The logic of the modes with “& <>t” gives the physical modes, and implies a >>> quantum logic and some measure, corresponding to the machine’s ignorance on >>> which computations support her (among an infinity). Recently, I realised >>> that the existence of this measure exists and can be proved in ZF + some >>> sufficiently large cardinal. >>> >>> The “& p” makes things non definable. >>> >>> The “<>t” makes things non provable, which allows the study of the negation >>> of those modes, and things get subtle and counter-intuitive. >>> >>> >>> >>>> The first five are related to our physical world: sight, hearing, smell, >>>> taste, touch. >>> >>> Of course, those should be obtained by the particularisation of some of the >>> modes above, if we want to make this coherent with some school go Buddhism. >>> The Hinayana, the Mahayana, the tantric, zen have many school, and >>> variants. Some Buddhists have develop school on logics. It is rather >>> complex. The Plato/Aristotle divide divides also Buddhism. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Then there are three related to our spiritual world. >>>> >>>> The sixth cognition is our thinking and emotions. This is where our >>>> repository of knowledge is located. All the human knowledge of philosophy, >>>> science, technology, arts belongs to the sixth cognition. This includes >>>> mental consciousness, sub-consciousness and these related concepts. >>> >>> Looks like []p, intellect, mind, ... >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Then the seventh and eighth senses are uniquely oriental and are near the >>>> core theory of Buddhism. The eighth sense is easier to explain than the >>>> seventh. >>>> >>>> The eighth sense is the “real-self”, or an inaccurate equivalent of >>>> “soul”, that’s the constant between incarnations, regardless one’s life >>>> takes the form of this human or that life being on earth. >>> >>> That becomes close to the simplest mode (conceptually), but that the >>> machine can not defined the “p” mode. That’s Plotinus One :) >>> >>> But it might be []p & p (it depends of before or after illumination (“p <-> >>> []p”). >>> >>> You need to take this with some grain of salt (but not the whole salt >>> shaker!). >>> >>> >>>> >>>> The seven sense can be roughly said as something between the sixth >>>> cognition - our day-to-day thinking - and the eighth cognition. The >>>> seventh cognition enables us to perform all the deep and thorough thinking >>>> at the sixth cognition level. >>> >>> Maybe []p & <>t? It is unclear. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Therefore, according to Buddhism teachings, AI may venture into the realm >>>> of the mental consciousness, but will never be able to reach the seventh >>>> and eighth cognition. >>> >>> Really? >>> >>> >>> >>>> And that seventh and eight cognition is what distinguishes a life being >>>> from a non life being. >>> >>> The universal machine is born illuminated, in the eight cognition mode, p. >>> But then attached itself to some universal body/representation/number []p, >>> and the laws of arithmetic are such that this one put an infinite mess in >>> Arithmetic, and that is nothing compared to the mess when they met and >>> multiply. >>> >>> I explain elsewhere why, if we assume the minimal amount of mechanism >>> (Descartes) to make sense of Darwin, and a notion of finite information, + >>> the Church Turing thesis, the mind body problem becomes a problem of >>> reducing the “hallucination of matter” from the logic of self-reference. It >>> works. It is not well known, and it is normal, given that behind the modes, >>> you have the mood, and the mood today is almost everywhere Aristotelian, >>> with few exception, since about 1500 years in Occident, 800 years in the >>> Middle-East, and it is more complex to figure out in India and China. >>> >>> Thanks to Gödel and the logicians, the theology of machine is taught to >>> logicians, but, not many realise, or appreciate, that as a platonic >>> Pythagorean theory, it is testable (as it contains physics, or its >>> invariant (for all universal machine) core). >>> >>> If interested I give you references, including good books on the >>> mathematics of self-reference. The mode “[]p & p” is a standard variant of >>> []p in the literature. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Sent from my iPad >>>> >>>>>> On Aug 16, 2020, at 5:02 AM, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Saturday, August 15, 2020 at 10:36:40 PM UTC-6, Beixiao Robert Liu >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> Well, if the inquiry here concerns consciousness, then the question of >>>>>> whether a human should trust the AI, or whether the AI has the capacity >>>>>> to be trusted by a human, ought to be part of the inquiry, right? The >>>>>> movie listed others elements: compassion, sympathy, etc. I guess I was >>>>>> just using my wife’s off-the-cuff comment as a convenient way to suggest >>>>>> that Caleb might set the wrong threshold in his Turing test; and as a >>>>>> result, he gave a pass to the AI too easily, which later proved fatally >>>>>> wrong. >>>>> >>>>> Sorry. Maybe my comment was too flippant. I just don't think Caleb's >>>>> mistake in trusting the AI relates to whether the AI is conscious. AG >>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Aug 15, 2020, at 23:29, Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Saturday, August 15, 2020 at 7:54:35 PM UTC-6, Beixiao Robert Liu >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> It’s available on YouTube. You could rent it for as little as $4, as >>>>>>>> long as you finish viewing it within 2 days once your start playing. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks for recommending it. I just viewed it. My wife said that it’s >>>>>>>> stupid for the boy to trust the AI girl, Ava, so he got what he >>>>>>>> deserved. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Too funny! That's hardly the point. AG >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> > On Aug 15, 2020, at 21:26, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> >>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > Alas not available on Netflix Australia. It'll have to wait until >>>>>>>> > if/when I subscribe to Amazon Prime briefly. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > I'm also not really prepared to purchase a VPN just to watch other >>>>>>>> > countries' Netflix connections, for much the same reason as I only >>>>>>>> > subscribe to one streamer - so it might have to wait until if/when I >>>>>>>> > do live in a country that has it in the Netflix catalogue. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > The tangled web of movie copyright arrangements... Bah! >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> >> On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 02:23:52PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>>>>> >> If you haven't viewed it, please do so. It's about the Turing Test, >>>>>>>> >> science >>>>>>>> >> fiction, but the "special effects" aren't primarily photographic >>>>>>>> >> bells and >>>>>>>> >> whistles, but the dialogue. the text, the logic of the script. >>>>>>>> >> Recently, we >>>>>>>> >> have argued about consciousness, what it is, and how we can test >>>>>>>> >> for it in the >>>>>>>> >> context of AI. I claimed that we could do some superficial surgery >>>>>>>> >> to determine >>>>>>>> >> whether the subject of the test was a robot or a conscious entity. >>>>>>>> >> But this is >>>>>>>> >> completely mistaken. All that that would reveal is whether the >>>>>>>> >> subject was >>>>>>>> >> artificial, not whether it was "conscious". The subject could have >>>>>>>> >> been a black >>>>>>>> >> box, and still showing signs of what we can't really define; >>>>>>>> >> consciousness. I >>>>>>>> >> think Ex Machina provides an answer of what we need to look for. >>>>>>>> >> Please view it >>>>>>>> >> and report back. But do NOT read the plot, say in Wiki. It's a >>>>>>>> >> spoiler. AG >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> -- >>>>>>>> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> >> Groups >>>>>>>> >> "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>> >> send an email >>>>>>>> >> to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>> >> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>> >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ >>>>>>>> >> everything-list/6c3c8eba-542c-45a6-a79f-ca54202fdcc8o%40googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > -- >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>>>>>>> > Principal, High Performance Coders hpc...@hpcoders.com.au >>>>>>>> > http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>>>>>>> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > -- >>>>>>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>>> > Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>>> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>>>> > send an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>>> > To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>>> > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200816012618.GA5850%40zen. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>>>> an email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d59348ac-d359-4164-a7e8-45c78bb0e6bbo%40googlegroups.com. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/272bb0f5-9c93-4666-86bc-6c0f5ee0977bo%40googlegroups.com. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8AE61BB8-2895-4E8D-AB93-34B96FD33F41%40gmail.com. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/DF4BFB30-ECC5-46ED-A229-8961AB3BAB37%40ulb.ac.be. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/554BACE2-F489-43EF-B68B-3583C9AD2503%40gmail.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/E3498B3D-93CF-40A0-89C3-733F019899E7%40ulb.ac.be. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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