> On 18 Aug 2020, at 08:07, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Concerning the Turing test, It makes no theoretical sense, but it can make > some local practical sense. > > I am not conversant with your system or definitions. All I am asserting is > that we believe we are conscious, or shall we say we have a property called > "consciousness", but are unable to define exactly (or even approximately?) > what it is.
OK. But we can make approximation, like “knowledge” or “knowledge of oneself”. Knowledge can be defined axiomatically, but the personal knowledge attached to consciousness, or even just the knowledge of a machine or of any third-person definable entity is not definable by that entity, without invoking a Truth operator (itself not definable by that entity, by Traski theorem). > Hence, if we encounter a humanoid-type robot that can verbally respond or > interact with us, even in the form of a black box, we lack any criteria for > determining IF it is conscious. But the movie offers a hint of what to look > for. At first I thought it was the concept of time, but that's wrong. The > entity in question could have been supplied with a clock and thus could > respond as if the concept of time exists; present, past and future. But > that's insufficient to qualify for being "conscious". You should view the > movie and see what it suggests to you. AG Consciousness attribution is always a sort of projection of oneself to the other(s). We attribute consciousness to an entity when we can recognise oneself in that entity. We could be wrong, of course, like a kid attributing a soul to its Teddy Bear. You might tell what the movie suggests. (Just put a spoiler alert in the title of the post) Bruno > > >> I think Ex Machina provides an answer of what we need to look for. Please >> view it and report back. But do NOT read the plot, say in Wiki. It's a >> spoiler. AG > > Can we find it on Youtube or similar? > > Bruno > > > > >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6c3c8eba-542c-45a6-a79f-ca54202fdcc8o%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6c3c8eba-542c-45a6-a79f-ca54202fdcc8o%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1bcf344b-250f-4ced-a69b-57d14d1c46cdo%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1bcf344b-250f-4ced-a69b-57d14d1c46cdo%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3BE11A1A-C5D3-4767-BB6A-7D1284A2D12C%40ulb.ac.be.
