> On 12 Jun 2020, at 20:52, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/12/2020 11:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Thu, Jun 11, 2020 at 1:34 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> >> >> On 6/10/2020 8:50 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> > Thought perhaps there's an argument to be made from the church Turing >> > theses, which pertains to possible states of knowledge accessible to a >> > computer program/software. If consciousness is viewed as software then >> > Church-Turing thesis implies that software could never know/realize if >> > it's ultimate computing substrate changed. >> >> I don't understand the import of this. The very concept of software >> mean "independent of hardware" by definition. It is not affected by >> whether CT is true or not, whether the computation is finite or not. >> >> You're right. The only relevance of CT is it means any software can be run >> by any universal hardware. There's not some software that requires special >> hardware of a certain kind. >> >> If >> you think that consciousness evolved then it is an obvious inference >> that consciousness would not include consciousness of it's hardware >> implementation. >> >> If consciousness is software, it can't know its hardware. But some like >> Searle or Penrose think the hardware is important. > > I think the hardware is important when you're talking about a computer that > is emerged in some environment.
That is right, but if you assume mechanism, that hardware comes from a (non computable) statistics on all software run in arithmetic. > The hardware can define the the interaction with that environment. The environment is "made of” all computations getting at our relative computational states. > We idealize the brain as a computer independent of it's physical > instantiation...but that's just a theoretical simplification. Not when you assume mechanism, in which case it is the idea of "physical universe” which becomes the theoretical simplifications. Bruno > > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5125d2b1-71c1-1d42-f1eb-cc152971b237%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5125d2b1-71c1-1d42-f1eb-cc152971b237%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5BDA0715-ADDC-4467-AB71-F87F32C01177%40ulb.ac.be.
