On 6/14/2020 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jun 2020, at 05:43, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 6/10/2020 9:00 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wednesday, June 10, 2020, smitra <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 09-06-2020 19:08, Jason Resch wrote:
For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the
testable
implications of computationalism on physical law, and
instead focus on
the following idea:
"How can we know if a robot is conscious?"
Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact
computational emulation, meaning exact functional
equivalence. Then
let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly
monitor
motor control outputs between the two brains.
Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then
identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve
activations,
etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial
expressions,
and speech.
If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain,
and ask
them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical
sentences.
Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a
paragraph
describing the pain, will provide identical accounts.
Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any
scientific
objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to
find any
distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its
ability to
disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot
mind?
Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind
before it reaches this testing roadblock?
I think it can be tested indirectly, because generic
computational theories of consciousness imply a multiverse. If
my consciousness is the result if a computation then because on
the one hand any such computation necessarily involves a vast
number of elementary bits and on he other hand whatever I'm
conscious of is describable using only a handful of bits, the
mapping between computational states and states of consciousness
is N to 1 where N is astronomically large. So, the laws of
physics we already know about must be effective laws where the
statistical effects due to a self-localization uncertainty is
already build into it.
That doesn't follow. You've implicitly assumed that all those excess
computational states exist…
They exist in elementary arithmetic. If you believe in theorem like
“there is no biggest prime”, then you have to believe in all
computations, or you need to reject Church’s thesis, and to abandon
the computationalist hypothesis. The notion of digital machine does
not make sense if you believe that elementary arithmetic is wrong.
As I've written many times. The arithmetic is true if it's axioms are.
But true=/=real.
I hear you! You are saying that the existence of number is like the
existence of Sherlock Holmes, but that leads to a gigantic multiverse,
Only via your assumption that arithmetic constitutes universes. I take
it as a reductio.
with infinitely many Brent having the same conversation with me, here
and now, and they all become zombie, except one, because some Reality
want it that way?
which is then begging the question of other worlds.
You are the one adding a metaphysical assumption, to make some people
whose existence in arithmetic follows from digital mechanism into zombie.
You're the one asserting that people "exist in arithmetic" whatever that
may mean.
Brent
That is not different than invoking a personal god to claim that
someone else has no soul, and can be enslaved … perhaps?
That the physical universe is not a “personal god” does not make its
existence less absurd than to use a personal god to explain everything.
In fact, the very existence of the appearance of a physical universe,
obeying some mathematics, is a confirmation of Mechanism, which
predicts that *all* universal machine get that
illusion/dream/experience. This includes the facts that by looking
closely (below the substitution level), we find the many "apparent
parallel computations" and that the laws of physics, which looks
computable above that level, looks not entirely computable below it.
So, I think that you might be the one begging the question by invoking
your own ontological commitment, without any evidences I’m afraid.
Bruno
Brent
Bruno has argued on the basis of this to motivate his theory,
but this is a generic feature of any theory that assumes
computational theory of consciousness. In particular,
computational theory of consciousness is incompatible with a
single universe theory. So, if you prove that only a single
universe exists, then that disproves the computational theory of
consciousness. The details here then involve that computations
are not well defined if you refer to a single instant of time,
you need to at least appeal to a sequence of states the system
over through. Consciousness cannot then be located at a single
instant, in violating with our own experience. Therefore either
single World theories are false or computational theory of
consciousness is false.
Saibal
Hi Saibal,
I agree indirect mechanisms like looking at the resulting physics
may be the best way to test it. I was curious if there any direct
ways to test it. It seems not, given the lack of any direct tests of
consciousness.
Though most people admit other humans are conscious, many would
reject the idea of a conscious computer.
Computationalism seems right, but it also seems like something that
by definition can't result in a failed test. So it has the
appearance of not being falsifiable.
A single universe, or digital physics would be evidence that either
computationalism is false or the ontology is sufficiently small, but
a finite/small ontology is doubtful for many reasons.
Jason
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