On Thu, 11 Jun 2020 at 01:50, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Tuesday, June 9, 2020, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 13:25, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 6/9/2020 7:48 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 11:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 6/9/2020 4:58 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 09:32, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/9/2020 4:02 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 03:08, Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable >>>>>> implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on >>>>>> the >>>>>> following idea: >>>>>> >>>>>> "How can we know if a robot is conscious?" >>>>>> >>>>>> Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact >>>>>> computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then let's >>>>>> say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor motor >>>>>> control outputs between the two brains. >>>>>> >>>>>> Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then >>>>>> identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, >>>>>> etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, and >>>>>> speech. >>>>>> >>>>>> If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask >>>>>> them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. Both >>>>>> will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph >>>>>> describing the pain, will provide identical accounts. >>>>>> >>>>>> Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any >>>>>> scientific objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to >>>>>> find any distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its >>>>>> ability to disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot >>>>>> mind? >>>>>> >>>>>> Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind >>>>>> before it reaches this testing roadblock? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We can’t know if a particular entity is conscious, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If the term means anything, you can know one particular entity is >>>>> conscious. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, I should have added we can’t know know that a particular entity >>>> other than oneself is conscious. >>>> >>>>> but we can know that if it is conscious, then a functional equivalent, >>>>> as you describe, is also conscious. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So any entity functionally equivalent to yourself, you must know is >>>>> conscious. But "functionally equivalent" is vague, ambiguous, and >>>>> certainly needs qualifying by environment and other factors. Is a dolphin >>>>> functionally equivalent to me. Not in swimming. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Functional equivalence here means that you replace a part with a new >>>> part that behaves in the same way. So if you replaced the copper wires in a >>>> computer with silver wires, the silver wires would be functionally >>>> equivalent, and you would notice no change in using the computer. Copper >>>> and silver have different physical properties such as conductivity, but the >>>> replacement would be chosen so that this is not functionally relevant. >>>> >>>> >>>> But that functional equivalence at a microscopic level is worthless in >>>> judging what entities are conscious. The whole reason for bringing it up >>>> is that it provides a criterion for recognizing consciousness at the entity >>>> level. >>>> >>> >>> The thought experiment involves removing a part of the brain that would >>> normally result in an obvious deficit in qualia and replacing it with a >>> non-biological component that replicates its interactions with the rest of >>> the brain. Remove the visual cortex, and the subject becomes blind, >>> staggering around walking into things, saying "I'm blind, I can't see >>> anything, why have you done this to me?" But if you replace it with an >>> implant that processes input and sends output to the remaining neural >>> tissue, the subject will have normal input to his leg muscles and his vocal >>> cords, so he will be able to navigate his way around a room and will say "I >>> can see everything normally, I feel just the same as before". This follows >>> necessarily from the assumptions. But does it also follow that the subject >>> will have normal visual qualia? If not, something very strange would be >>> happening: he would be blind, but would behave normally, including his >>> behaviour in communicating that everything feels normal. >>> >>> >>> I understand the "Yes doctor" experiment. But Jason was asking about >>> being able to recognize consciousness by function of the entity, and I >>> think that is a different problem that needs to into account the >>> possibility of different kinds and degrees of consciousness. The YD >>> question makes it binary by equating consciousness with exactly the same as >>> pre-doctor. Applying that to Jason's question you would conclude that you >>> cannot infer that other people are conscious because, while they are >>> functionally equivalent is a loose sense, they are not exactly the same as >>> you. They don't give exactly the same answers to questions. They may not >>> even be able to see or hear things you do. >>> >> >> My answer to Jason's question was that it is not possible to know that >> another entity is conscious, but it is possible to know that if it is >> conscious, replicating its behaviour would replicate its consciousness. >> > > I think this is right if you add the following assumptions: > 1. Fading qualia are impossible > 2. Suddenly disappearing qualia are impossible > Not logically impossible, but absurd. Though it is hard to pin down absurdity. Otherwise I think rather than say "it is possible to know if it is > consciousness", we need to amend to "it is impossible to disprove that it > is conscious". > > Thought perhaps there's an argument to be made from the church Turing > theses, which pertains to possible states of knowledge accessible to a > computer program/software. If consciousness is viewed as software then > Church-Turing thesis implies that software could never know/realize if it's > ultimate computing substrate changed. > > But this is assuming the thing we're trying to prove, so I'm not sure it > helps establish computationalism definitively. > > Jason > > >> >> >>> I think what refer to as "very strange" is possible given a little >>> fuzziness about being functionally identical. Suppose his vision was >>> replaced by some combination of sonar and radar. He could be as close to >>> you as a color blind person in his answers. >>> >> >> If the subject suddenly became colour blind or his vision were replaced >> by a combination of sonar and radar, while he may be able to navigate his >> way around normally there would be a test that could distinguish the >> change, like trying to pick a number in a coloured pattern, or simply >> asking him if he feels the same. Otherwise, in what sense is it meaningful >> to say there has been a change in qualia? >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXqFpOu-4qCxeXWXs34-TAbsB70hX_N4cmLfsJeGWitKw%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXqFpOu-4qCxeXWXs34-TAbsB70hX_N4cmLfsJeGWitKw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhjT3LF3M-%2BdFgP6x%3DNMMSDS3xd7Oy%3DgNqxCGDKcSu66w%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhjT3LF3M-%2BdFgP6x%3DNMMSDS3xd7Oy%3DgNqxCGDKcSu66w%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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