On 6/10/2020 9:00 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wednesday, June 10, 2020, smitra <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 09-06-2020 19:08, Jason Resch wrote:
For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable
implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead
focus on
the following idea:
"How can we know if a robot is conscious?"
Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact
computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence.
Then
let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly
monitor
motor control outputs between the two brains.
Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then
identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve
activations,
etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial
expressions,
and speech.
If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask
them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical
sentences.
Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a
paragraph
describing the pain, will provide identical accounts.
Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any
scientific
objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to
find any
distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its
ability to
disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind?
Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind
before it reaches this testing roadblock?
I think it can be tested indirectly, because generic computational
theories of consciousness imply a multiverse. If my consciousness
is the result if a computation then because on the one hand any
such computation necessarily involves a vast number of elementary
bits and on he other hand whatever I'm conscious of is describable
using only a handful of bits, the mapping between computational
states and states of consciousness is N to 1 where N is
astronomically large. So, the laws of physics we already know
about must be effective laws where the statistical effects due to
a self-localization uncertainty is already build into it.
That doesn't follow. You've implicitly assumed that all those excess
computational states exist...which is then begging the question of other
worlds.
Brent
Bruno has argued on the basis of this to motivate his theory, but
this is a generic feature of any theory that assumes computational
theory of consciousness. In particular, computational theory of
consciousness is incompatible with a single universe theory. So,
if you prove that only a single universe exists, then that
disproves the computational theory of consciousness. The details
here then involve that computations are not well defined if you
refer to a single instant of time, you need to at least appeal to
a sequence of states the system over through. Consciousness cannot
then be located at a single instant, in violating with our own
experience. Therefore either single World theories are false or
computational theory of consciousness is false.
Saibal
Hi Saibal,
I agree indirect mechanisms like looking at the resulting physics may
be the best way to test it. I was curious if there any direct ways to
test it. It seems not, given the lack of any direct tests of
consciousness.
Though most people admit other humans are conscious, many would reject
the idea of a conscious computer.
Computationalism seems right, but it also seems like something that by
definition can't result in a failed test. So it has the appearance of
not being falsifiable.
A single universe, or digital physics would be evidence that either
computationalism is false or the ontology is sufficiently small, but a
finite/small ontology is doubtful for many reasons.
Jason
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