On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 11:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 6/9/2020 4:58 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 09:32, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 6/9/2020 4:02 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 03:08, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable >>> implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on the >>> following idea: >>> >>> "How can we know if a robot is conscious?" >>> >>> Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact >>> computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then let's >>> say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor motor >>> control outputs between the two brains. >>> >>> Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then >>> identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, >>> etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, and >>> speech. >>> >>> If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask them >>> both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. Both will >>> say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph describing the >>> pain, will provide identical accounts. >>> >>> Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific >>> objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any >>> distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to >>> disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? >>> >>> Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind before >>> it reaches this testing roadblock? >>> >> >> We can’t know if a particular entity is conscious, >> >> >> If the term means anything, you can know one particular entity is >> conscious. >> > > Yes, I should have added we can’t know know that a particular entity other > than oneself is conscious. > >> but we can know that if it is conscious, then a functional equivalent, as >> you describe, is also conscious. >> >> >> So any entity functionally equivalent to yourself, you must know is >> conscious. But "functionally equivalent" is vague, ambiguous, and >> certainly needs qualifying by environment and other factors. Is a dolphin >> functionally equivalent to me. Not in swimming. >> > > Functional equivalence here means that you replace a part with a new part > that behaves in the same way. So if you replaced the copper wires in a > computer with silver wires, the silver wires would be functionally > equivalent, and you would notice no change in using the computer. Copper > and silver have different physical properties such as conductivity, but the > replacement would be chosen so that this is not functionally relevant. > > > But that functional equivalence at a microscopic level is worthless in > judging what entities are conscious. The whole reason for bringing it up > is that it provides a criterion for recognizing consciousness at the entity > level. > The thought experiment involves removing a part of the brain that would normally result in an obvious deficit in qualia and replacing it with a non-biological component that replicates its interactions with the rest of the brain. Remove the visual cortex, and the subject becomes blind, staggering around walking into things, saying "I'm blind, I can't see anything, why have you done this to me?" But if you replace it with an implant that processes input and sends output to the remaining neural tissue, the subject will have normal input to his leg muscles and his vocal cords, so he will be able to navigate his way around a room and will say "I can see everything normally, I feel just the same as before". This follows necessarily from the assumptions. But does it also follow that the subject will have normal visual qualia? If not, something very strange would be happening: he would be blind, but would behave normally, including his behaviour in communicating that everything feels normal. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypURPo0rGULM0e3wBJC392G0xe1G57dsQW-0i2PuYPMxfA%40mail.gmail.com.
