> On 10 Jun 2020, at 01:02, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 03:08, Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable > implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on the > following idea: > > "How can we know if a robot is conscious?" > > Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact computational > emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then let's say we can > exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor motor control outputs > between the two brains. > > Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then identical > inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, etc.) and > outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, and speech. > > If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask them both > to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. Both will say it > hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph describing the pain, will > provide identical accounts. > > Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific > objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any > distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to > disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? > > Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind before it > reaches this testing roadblock? > > We can’t know if a particular entity is conscious, but we can know that if it > is conscious, then a functional equivalent,
… at some level of description. A dreaming human is functionally equivalent with a stone. The first is conscious, the other is not. To avoid this, you need to make precise the level for which you define the functional equivalence. Bruno > as you describe, is also conscious. This is the subject of David Chalmers’ > paper: > > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html <http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html> > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXRHEW6PSnb2Bj2vf1RbQ6CoLFzCoKAHxgJkXTsfg%3DWyw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXRHEW6PSnb2Bj2vf1RbQ6CoLFzCoKAHxgJkXTsfg%3DWyw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/146FE5AB-0FBE-4F16-B95B-F7BE527DAF16%40ulb.ac.be.
