On 6/9/2020 4:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 09:15, Jason Resch <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Tue, Jun 9, 2020 at 6:03 PM Stathis Papaioannou
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 03:08, Jason Resch
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the
testable implications of computationalism on physical law,
and instead focus on the following idea:
"How can we know if a robot is conscious?"
Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an
exact computational emulation, meaning exact functional
equivalence. Then let's say we can exactly control sensory
input and perfectly monitor motor control outputs between
the two brains.
Given that computationalism implies functional
equivalence, then identical inputs yield identical
internal behavior (nerve activations, etc.) and outputs,
in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, and speech.
If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain,
and ask them both to describe the pain, both will speak
identical sentences. Both will say it hurts when asked,
and if asked to write a paragraph describing the pain,
will provide identical accounts.
Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that
any scientific objective third-person analysis or test is
doomed to fail to find any distinction in behaviors, and
thus necessarily fails in its ability to disprove
consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind?
Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory
of mind before it reaches this testing roadblock?
We can’t know if a particular entity is conscious, but we can
know that if it is conscious, then a functional equivalent, as
you describe, is also conscious. This is the subject of David
Chalmers’ paper:
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html
Chalmers' argument is that if a different brain is not conscious,
then somewhere along the way we get either suddenly disappearing
or fading qualia, which I agree are philosophically distasteful.
But what if someone is fine with philosophical zombies and
suddenly disappearing qualia? Is there any impossibility proof for
such things?
Philosophical zombies are less problematic than partial philosophical
zombies. Partial philosophical zombies would render the idea of qualia
absurd, because it would mean that we might be blind completely blind,
for example, without realising it.
Isn't this what blindsight exemplifies?
As an absolute minimum, although we may not be able to test for or
define qualia, we should know if we have them. Take this requirement
away, and there is nothing left.
Suddenly disappearing qualia are logically possible but it is
difficult to imagine how it could work. We would be normally conscious
while our neurons were being replaced, but when one special glutamate
receptor in a special neuron in the left parietal lobe was replaced,
or when exactly 35.54876% replacement of all neurons was reached, the
internal lights would suddenly go out.
I think this all-or-nothing is misconceived. It's not internal
cognition that might vanish suddenly, it's some specific aspect of
experience: There are people who, thru brain injury, lose the ability to
recognize faces...recognition is a qualia. Of course people's
frequency range of hearing fades (don't ask me how I know). My mother,
when she was 95 lost color vision in one eye, but not the other. Some
people, it seems cannot do higher mathematics. So how would you know if
you lost the qualia of empathy for example? Could it not just
fade...i.e. become evoked less and less?
Brent
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Stathis Papaioannou
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