On 6/9/2020 4:02 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jun 2020 at 03:08, Jason Resch <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable
implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead
focus on the following idea:
"How can we know if a robot is conscious?"
Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact
computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence.
Then let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly
monitor motor control outputs between the two brains.
Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then
identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve
activations, etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement,
facial expressions, and speech.
If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask
them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical
sentences. Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to
write a paragraph describing the pain, will provide identical
accounts.
Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any
scientific objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to
fail to find any distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily
fails in its ability to disprove consciousness in the functionally
equivalent robot mind?
Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind
before it reaches this testing roadblock?
We can’t know if a particular entity is conscious,
If the term means anything, you can know one particular entity is conscious.
but we can know that if it is conscious, then a functional equivalent,
as you describe, is also conscious.
So any entity functionally equivalent to yourself, you must know is
conscious. But "functionally equivalent" is vague, ambiguous, and
certainly needs qualifying by environment and other factors. Is a
dolphin functionally equivalent to me. Not in swimming.
Brent
This is the subject of David Chalmers’ paper:
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html
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Stathis Papaioannou
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