For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on the following idea:
"How can we know if a robot is conscious?" Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor motor control outputs between the two brains. Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, and speech. If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph describing the pain, will provide identical accounts. Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind before it reaches this testing roadblock? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhpWiuoSoOyeW2DS3%2BqEaahequxkDcGK-bF2qjgiuqrAg%40mail.gmail.com.
