On Tue, Jun 9, 2020 at 2:15 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 6/9/2020 10:08 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > For the present discussion/question, I want to ignore the testable > > implications of computationalism on physical law, and instead focus on > > the following idea: > > > > "How can we know if a robot is conscious?" > > > > Let's say there are two brains, one biological and one an exact > > computational emulation, meaning exact functional equivalence. Then > > let's say we can exactly control sensory input and perfectly monitor > > motor control outputs between the two brains. > > > > Given that computationalism implies functional equivalence, then > > identical inputs yield identical internal behavior (nerve activations, > > etc.) and outputs, in terms of muscle movement, facial expressions, > > and speech. > > > > If we stimulate nerves in the person's back to cause pain, and ask > > them both to describe the pain, both will speak identical sentences. > > Both will say it hurts when asked, and if asked to write a paragraph > > describing the pain, will provide identical accounts. > > > > Does the definition of functional equivalence mean that any scientific > > objective third-person analysis or test is doomed to fail to find any > > distinction in behaviors, and thus necessarily fails in its ability to > > disprove consciousness in the functionally equivalent robot mind? > > > > Is computationalism as far as science can go on a theory of mind > > before it reaches this testing roadblock? > > If it acts conscious, then it is conscious. > That is the assumption I and most others operate under. But every now and then you encounter a biological naturalist or something that says a brain must be made of brain cells to actually be conscious. The real point of my e-mail is to ask the question: can any test in principle disprove computationalism as a philosophy of mind, given it's defined as functionally identical? > > But I think science/technology can go a lot further. I can look at the > information flow, where is memory and how is it formed and how is it > accessed and does this matter or not in the action of the entity. It > can look at the decision processes. Are there separate competing > modules (as Dennett hypothesizes) or is there a global workspace...and > again does it make a difference. What does it take to make the entity > act happy, sad, thoughtful, bored, etc. I agree we can look at more than just the outputs. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUg%2BEpMKfAdmFbwk_JTQS-XqZKCmi-U9D804HNQh2SgSkQ%40mail.gmail.com.
