On Sunday, February 9, 2014 4:27:57 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Weinberg <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > > > On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:47:26 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > >> > >> On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > >> >> Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you consider > >> >> the idea of zombies contradictory (which maybe it is). > >> > > >> > > >> > I bet you are not a zombie. But you seem to illustrate my point, if > >> > epiphenomenalism is true, despite you are not a zombie, you could be > >> > one, > >> > and that is a step toward the elimination of the person. > >> > >> I know I'm not a zombie, but you don't know that. > > > > > > You might know it intuitively, but not be able to justify it logically. > > If part of the defiinition of consciousness is that I know I am > conscious if I am conscious, then it's perfectly logical. >
I meant to say "I might know it intuitively, but not be able to justify it logically". i.e., maybe part of the definition of being conscious is to know who else is conscious (with some dynamic margin of error greater than our self knowledge). Craig > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
