On 09 Feb 2014, at 10:27, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>
wrote:
On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:47:26 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you
consider
the idea of zombies contradictory (which maybe it is).
I bet you are not a zombie. But you seem to illustrate my point, if
epiphenomenalism is true, despite you are not a zombie, you could
be
one,
and that is a step toward the elimination of the person.
I know I'm not a zombie, but you don't know that.
You might know it intuitively, but not be able to justify it
logically.
If part of the defiinition of consciousness is that I know I am
conscious if I am conscious, then it's perfectly logical.
It is 1p-logical. But not 3p-logical. Consciousness is 1p.
In fact I do have a definition of consciousness, but we need to
proceed a bit more in the logic of self-reference.
That definition is very useful to clarify many points, but I would no
pretend it is the best one.
Let us define "I know p" by []p = []p & p (Theaetetus).
Then the "simple" definition of consciousness of p is <>p.
That is <>p = ~[]~p = ~([]~p & ~p) = ~[]~p V ~~p = <>p V p.
(i.e., the dual of []p & p, is <>p V p)
Then non transitive consciousness is just <>t V t.
It makes consciousness trivial, which it is from the 1p perspective.
It entails also your law: "if I am conscious then I know that I am
conscious: <>t -> []<>t (but that can become false for the non
transitive consciousness, which is nice actually).
Yet, neither [] nor <> can be defined by the machine, and they
are 1p notion not truly communicable without further theorizing by he
machine (like using comp, and defining consciousness in this way).
I do not believe in that definition of consciousness (nor do I
disbelieve it). But it can be used to clarify or invalidate some
reasoning. You were valid, but Craig was too!
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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