On 9 February 2014 22:40, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Sunday, February 9, 2014 4:27:57 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:47:26 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you consider >> >> >> the idea of zombies contradictory (which maybe it is). >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > I bet you are not a zombie. But you seem to illustrate my point, if >> >> > epiphenomenalism is true, despite you are not a zombie, you could be >> >> > one, >> >> > and that is a step toward the elimination of the person. >> >> >> >> I know I'm not a zombie, but you don't know that. >> > >> > >> > You might know it intuitively, but not be able to justify it logically. >> >> If part of the defiinition of consciousness is that I know I am >> conscious if I am conscious, then it's perfectly logical. > > > I meant to say "I might know it intuitively, but not be able to justify it > logically". > > i.e., maybe part of the definition of being conscious is to know who else is > conscious (with some dynamic margin of error greater than our self > knowledge).
What if I tell you I am actually a computer program? What if we have this conversation in 30 years time, when computer programs have got much better at mimicking humans and no-one can consistently tell them apart? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
