On 10 February 2014 22:30, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> I can't know that either. If you are conscious, you might well become a >>> zombie after the substitution, if comp is false for example. I cannot >>> know >>> for sure that comp is true. I can know it in the Theatetus' way, but this >>> means only that I believe in comp, and that God knows that it is true. >> >> >> But you can know that a particular type of substitution that preserves >> the 3p functional organisation of my brain will also preserve its >> consciousness (if it had it to begin with), otherwise we could make >> partial zombies, which are absurd. This is an important result. It is >> a proof of comp. > > > I might still die in the process. The other can be an "impostor" instead of > a zombie. > Partial zombie does not make sense, but partial impostor might make sense. > (I must think more about that). > > We cannot prove comp, in the same sense that we cannot prove that we survive > any instant in life. It is "trivial", but that plays some role. > > The argument of partial zombie makes non-comp non-plausible, but it cannot > be said to prove that comp is true. It is easy to build artificial (ad hoc) > non comp theories to refute the "provability" of comp. Some people agree > that they will survive if you replace their brain neuron by neuron, but that > they would die if you copy them and destroy them, and with non comp, this > might be possible. This does not make sense, IF we assume comp at the start.
I don't agree. I think it *can* be proved that replacing the brain neuron by neuron will preserve consciousness with the only assumption being that the observable behaviour of the neuron is preserved. This holds whatever theory of consciousness you have; for example, it holds even if you believe that the brain is animated by God. Think about what it would mean if, say, the neural pathways responsible for pain were replaced but the replacement parts were zombified, dead or impostors. We can imagine that God, who is omnipotent, creates these parts. If you were subjected to a painful stimulus you would also honestly believe that you felt the pain, you would experience anxiety associated with pain, you would yell out and try to withdraw from the source of the pain, and so on. However, you would not actually feel any pain! >> It's interesting that you think quantum suicide effects are an example >> of downward causation. It would, in fact, look like magic to a >> scientist who observed it. The problem is, there aren't any scientists >> who have observed it and reported it. > > > Some believe that the origin of life is so improbable, that it comes from > some "quantum suicide", or analog post-selection effect. > > > > >> So it remains true that there is >> no downward causation in science. > > > You mean "in reality"? Which reality? Even arithmetic is full of downward > causation, like "Deep blue lost the game because it never studied Nimzovitch > entries". > > At some level, there is no downward causation (it is just addition and > multiplication, or just particles and force), but it is false that we live > at such level. At the level where we live there are downward causation. The > physical laws only support my wanting to send you this post. I don't send > this post due to physical or arithmetical laws, in any genuine sense. When a > machine is as complex as a Löbian one, their laws of behavior have nothing > to do with the laws used for their implementation, that would be, I think, a > confusion of level. With comp, if we reiterate a similar confusion of level, > you can say that there is no physical causation at all. The reason why an > apple falls is no more that it obeys gravitation laws, but only that > addition and multiplication makes some number in some relative state to > believe (correctly) that some computation is more frequent than others. > Emerging things, even 1p, can be as real, and partially autonomous with > proper higher level laws, as what they emerge from. In: > > "Why did Lola cries this night?" ---"because she made a nightmare" > "Why did Lola cries this night?" ---"because she obeys QM". > > The first explanation can make genuine sense. The second is true (say) but > is true also for "Why did Lola not cry?", and is spurious at the level where > the crying make sense. > The use of the second explanation to make the first one illusory is the main > error of the reductionist. But I wouldn't say the first explanation is illusory, I would say that it describes a supervenient relationship. If you arrange the matter just so, Lola will have nightmares and cry. > Let me try to put this in an another way. All universal machine can imitate > all universal machine. A root or bottom universal machine cannot have a > downward causation on herself. But she can imitate another universal system > having downward causation, even complete in the sense that the second > machine can be allowed to modify itself completely. > > Brain are like that: it cannot modify itself by its own will, but the mind > can do that to some extent (nature put obvious barriers, but then we do > modify the brain in some downward way, by taking an aspirin, for example). > To say that consciousness is epiphenomenal is like to say that someone took > an aspirin because of QM, but this explains nothing (even if true): the > genuine reason is that the guy has an unpleasant conscious experience that > he want to ease. > The laws of physics or arithmetic makes it possible for you to express your > point, but the content of your post is explained by your awareness of the > questions, your taste for the field, your pleasure to argue rationally, your > personality, etc. It is not explained by QM, as this explains all posts on > all lists in all forums in an empty way. Your answer can be supported by the > laws, but the laws does not explain your answer at the level where your > answer can make sense to me. I guess I will stubbornly stick to the idea that if the laws of physics are sufficient for me to explain my point then my mind is reducible to the laws of physics or arithmetic; and if they are not sufficient then there is something missing. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
