On 11 February 2014 01:39, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Monday, February 10, 2014 12:48:31 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> On 9 February 2014 22:40, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Sunday, February 9, 2014 4:27:57 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> On 9 February 2014 15:11, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On Saturday, February 8, 2014 8:47:26 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you >> >> >> >> consider >> >> >> >> the idea of zombies contradictory (which maybe it is). >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > I bet you are not a zombie. But you seem to illustrate my point, >> >> >> > if >> >> >> > epiphenomenalism is true, despite you are not a zombie, you could >> >> >> > be >> >> >> > one, >> >> >> > and that is a step toward the elimination of the person. >> >> >> >> >> >> I know I'm not a zombie, but you don't know that. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > You might know it intuitively, but not be able to justify it >> >> > logically. >> >> >> >> If part of the defiinition of consciousness is that I know I am >> >> conscious if I am conscious, then it's perfectly logical. >> > >> > >> > I meant to say "I might know it intuitively, but not be able to justify >> > it >> > logically". >> > >> > i.e., maybe part of the definition of being conscious is to know who >> > else is >> > conscious (with some dynamic margin of error greater than our self >> > knowledge). >> >> What if I tell you I am actually a computer program? What if we have >> this conversation in 30 years time, when computer programs have got >> much better at mimicking humans and no-one can consistently tell them >> apart? > > > Then you would be begging the question. I am saying that in my > understanding, there will never be computer programs that no-one can tell > apart (though at some point they may find it easier if they have other > computer programs to help them do that). All that people need do is to meet > each other in person - shake their hands, look them in the eye, spend some > time together. The fact that someone can be fooled by a recording or a > mannequin does not mean that inimitable nature consciousness is in doubt.
Then you believe in a version of the Turing test, which you don't believe a computer will ever be able to pass. This means you can be proved wrong in a straightforward way, if robots in future are able to mix with with humans and not be detectable. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
