On Thu, 20 Nov 2008, Alex Smith wrote: > There isn't a problem here: R1586 isn't triggered at all. It's to do > with things such as Contracts, which are rules-defined and exist outside > the rules somehow, and which can continue to exist when the contract > rules are amended.
As I said, I apologize for invoking R1586. Please look at Rule 754. I say that VL for a particular OD is a R754(1) Rules-defined term and that R2156 clearly defines VLOD. It doesn't say "is set to" or "is initially" but it is a Rules-based term definition "VLOD *is* (caste at time X)". This is its whole Rules-defined range. Therefore the R2156 definition is protected by R754, in that an *action* that would set VLOD otherwise conflicts with a R754(1) Rules definition. (Note that R754(1) was re-written recently to change precedence for lower-powered definitions, this is not an issue as the potential conflicting rules are both the same power). You are saying that the R2126 action permission indirectly "adds to" to the definition/defined range (embraces and extends it?) but I firmly disagree that an action can indirectly and implicitly extend a definition. I just can't find that concept in the rules in a way that would overrule R754. Further actions have a lower precedence than definitions---If you try to say that a CAN overrules a definition, I'll point out the relative precedence of R754 versus R2152 (Mother, May I?). Remember that the various R754-scams revolved around inserting a lower-powered definition of a term and having that term take precedence over the actions surrounding it? The idea of definitional precedence that I am espousing is why these sacams worked (and they were generally accepted to work), hence the new power deference in R754(1) to protect against such scams. -Goethe
