On Thu, 20 Nov 2008, Alex Smith wrote: > "I just can't find that concept in the rules in a way that would > overrule R754. Further actions have a lower precedence than > definitions" seems to be the core of your whole argument. To me, though, > nowhere does R754 say that definitions take precedence over actions. > Definitions define things; words in the rules. "Voting limit" is just > words in the rules, whose meaning can be expanded.
There's a precedent back in the caselog somewhere (would take a while to find it because I don't remember the context) that further refining of definitions constitute new/distinct definitions. In other words, "voting limit" is one definition, "Voting Limit on Ordinary Proposals" is a distinct definition (though it may inherit terms in the parent as guidance) and "voting limit on this particular ordinary proposal" is yet an additional definition---if the rules define on each level, which in this case they do. > In this case its > meaning expands into something that references all other rules, in no > particular order. If a rule says that it's modified where rules say > otherwise, and two rules modify it in contradictory ways, what happens? You haven't changed my mind, sorry. Fundamentally, you keep comparing definitions of actions with definitions of state. I can't do much by repeat myself. A definition may conflict with another definition and precedence between those rules governs the result. A CAN can conflict with a CANNOT and precedence between those rules governs the result. But when a definition conflicts with an action, it's not an apple-to apple comparison. *Either* we must accept that the action implicitly extends the definition, or we must accept that the definition implicitly limits the action. Both are implicit. I am arguing that R754 quite simply prioritizes the definition over Mother-May-I actions, and this overarching precedence in the high-powered rule supersedes the precedence between the specific rules, otherwise we'd have values getting stuck in all kinds of undefined and frankly nonsensical states (tired of green cheese now, I'll go to blue poodles). This goes along with our documented custom of allowing definitional rules to define "physical reality" that's scattered through the precedents (e.g. you can' decrease something by a negative number to get an increase). > Intuitively, say that by > itself, the action actually takes precedence over the definition pretty > obviously as a case of specific clauses taking precedence over general > ones in the same rule; but there isn't a rule to back that up. Not intuitive at all. I don't agree, any more than I agree (yet again) that if something is fundamentally and basically defined as a Number, an action can make it into an impossible state (like a blue poodle) is (by R754) itself impossible. > (BTW, if > R2156 had said "A player's VLOD is their caste; a player's VL on one OD > can be increased by spending a Note", would you think that makes a > difference?) There's two separate questions. The first is the question you're asking here, on whether, for a giving "is", you read "VL is [initially] caste" or VL is [limited to] caste." With the "is" on its own, closeness of context matters considerably. In the case you quote above, the closeness of context supports [initially]. If the clauses are sufficiently separate, I would go with [limited to]. I'd say that, unless context is extremely close and direct, [limited to] should be the default assumption as it goes along intuitively with the definition of a "regulated" quantity. Once/if you go with [limited to], then the *second* issue is realizing there's a conflict between "limited to X" in one place and "CAN be set to Y" in another place, figuring out how to resolve that conflict. That's the long discussion we're wrapping up now or with your response. Well, I can't see answering back again as we're repeating ourselves; the one thing we might agree on is a REMAND is appropriate with some digest of this discussion for the judge to explicitly consider. -Goethe
