Dave CROCKER [mailto:d...@dcrocker.net] said on Sunday, 30 October, 2011 22:41
> On 10/30/2011 8:36 PM, Brian Johnson wrote:
>> So you support filtering end-user outbound SMTP sessions as this is a
>> means to prevent misuse of the Commons*. Correct?
> If it is acceptable to have the receiving
If your grandmother were running her own recursive DNS resolver, I expect she
would have no difficulty understanding the message.
It is the young-uns that have difficulty comprehending (and using) the English
language.
Sent from Samsung Mobile
Original message
From: bmann...@
Concomittant wirh reduced risk assessment capability?
Sent from Samsung Mobile
Original message
From: Randy Bush
Date:
To: Lynda
Cc: North American Network Operators' Group
Subject: Re: Advisory — D-root is changing its IPv4 address on the 3rd of
January.
Your assertion that using "bought" certificates provides any security benefit
whatsoever assumes facts not in evidence.
Given recent failures in this space I would posit that the requirement to use
certificates purchased from entities "under the thumb" of government control,
clearly motivated o
While i will agree that the client being able to validate the certificate
directly is the best place to be, I do not see any advantage of requiring
purchased certificates over self-signed certificates. IMO it provides no
realistic security benefit at all.
Then again I don't award points for
c
Perhaps Googles other "harvesters" and the government agents they sell or give
user credentials to, don't work against privately (not under the goverment
thumb) encryption keys without the surveillance state expending significantly
more resources.
Perhaps the cheapest way to solve this is to ap
Non prime number store certificates are acceptd for SMTP (25) both to and from
google.
Perhaps this is CYA to prevent compromised gmail accounts from giving
credentials from hijacked accounts to unknown servers.
I have no idea how credentials for gmails pop pickup work but perhaps having
hijac
No more difficult at all. A MITM is a MITM. The atack is the same and
intteger-store-bought certificates make the process neither more nor less
complicated.
Sent from Samsung Mobile
Original message
From: William Herrin
Date:
To: George Herbert
Cc: John Levine ,nanog
> > Don't most browsers accept all cookies by default without asking the
> > user?
> no idea, but i think most browsers today block at least third party
> cookies by default.
Most browsers accept any and all cookies by default.
Many browsers can be configured into three states (1) accept anythi
> Just an FYI...
>
> Every version of Windows since Windows 2000 (sans Windows Me) has had
> the DNS Client service which maintained this caching function. This was
> by design due to the massive dependency on DNS resolution which Active
> Directory has had since its creation. It greatly reduced t
If this gets delivered please delete me. Somehow I seem to have MX requests
for nanog.org failing ...
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We can call them "rooted" domain names and "pwned" domain names...
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> -Original Message-
> From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:asulli...@dyn.com]
> Sent: Saturday, 23 February, 2013 15:15
> To: nanog@nanog.org
> Subject:
The "default" mtu of 576 is because, well, 2400 baud signaling is pretty
darn slow and interactive performance (or any kind of multileaving of more
than a single connection packet stream) is, what do we call it, laggy.
Sort of like trying to telnet while doing a bulk transfer if you have
bloa
And only the telco approved web sites are accessible, and the only protocol
supported is the telco approved http and then only to port 80 ...
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> -Original Message-
> From: Niels Bakker [mailto:niels=na...@bakker.
> icmp redirect from 192.168.140.36: 192.168.179.80 => 192.168.140.254
The host attempted to send a packet to 192.168.179.80 via 192.168.140.36.
192.168.140.36 forwarded the packet to 192.168.140.254 according to its routing
table, but is advising you (and the kernel has added to the routing t
http://email-guru.com/ ?
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> -Original Message-
> From: Warren Bailey [mailto:wbai...@satelliteintelligencegroup.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, 01 May, 2013 10:12
> To: JoeSox; nanog@nanog.org
> Subject: Re: Could not send
There is video hosting web sites on the intertubes?
Now where would those be found, I wonder. All I have ever seen is
macro-streaming that is fraudulently labeled and advertised as video -- the
worst being something called FlashVirus, which was written by a company called
MacroVirus Media or
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> On Thursday, 05 January, 2012 08:30, Marshall Eubanks said:
> > On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 4:51 AM, Keith Medcalf wrote:
> > > There is video hosting web sites on the intertubes?
> > > Now
As port 137 is the Netbios Name Service port are you *sure* this is a port scan
and not a windows box (or other OS running NetBIOS crud) that simply has
fat-fingered addresses configured?
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> -Original Message-
>
> Unfortunately that's not under control of those businesses. This plain text
> email you sent comes across with clickable mailto and http links in your
> signature in most modern email clients despite you having sent it in plain
> text. "Helpful" email program defaults won't force people to copy a
Is it April already? I though April Fools Day wasn't until next month.
I did, I did. I did see a snake-oil salesman!
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> -Original Message-
> From: Guru NANOG [mailto:nanog.g...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Saturday, 03 M
> > http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17576745
> > It's sad when you just can't tell with things like this..
> I was hoping for something good, like maybe an extension of RFC 1149
> implementing ECN (aka SQUAWK) in avian carriers. I'm disappointed.
ECN doesn't help if the Hunting Season bit
> This may result in mixed signals if a site on a SLD under .SECURE
> is actually compromised, which is more harmful than having no UI
> declaration.
The greatest advantage of .SECURE is that it will help ensure that all the
high-value targets are easy to find.
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On Thursday, 07 June, 2012 12:52, Owen DeLong observed:
> This is a hard problem to solve. Not the least of the difficulties is
> the fact that if you ask 50 engineers to define "Cloud", you will get
> at least 100 definitions many of which are incompatible to the point
> of mutually exclusive.
Security Settings in the Trust Center:
"Read as Plain Text"
"Even Signed Messages as Plain Text"
"Never Download Images"
"Require Confirmation when Forwarding or Replying will Download
Anything at all"
Disable the AutoInfect options:
"Turn off the Preview"
> Windows security sucks.
The real problem with Windows is that there exist folks who believe that it is,
or can be, secured. They believe the six-colour glossy, the Gartner Reports,
and other (manufacturers') propaganda. As a consequence they do not act in a
fashion which will keep them saf
> The problem at this point is that even with improvements in newer
> Windows systems there are probably on the order of a billion systems
> out there, attached to the net, and still running these deeply flawed
> OS's which can be taken over by just clicking on the wrong mail
> message.
There hav
Leo,
This will never work. The "vested profiteers" will all get together and make
it a condition that in order to use this method the user has to have
"purchased" a "verified" key from them. Every site will use different
profiteers (probably whoever gives them the biggest kickback). You will
> 2. Pre-compromised-at-the-factory smartphones and similar. There's
> no reason why these can't be preloaded with spyware similar to CarrierIQ
> and directed to upload all newly-created private keys to a central
> collection point. This can be done, therefore it will be done, and when
> some se
> those. The beauty of most appliances is that they're easy to manage. If it
> fails, download the latest ISO from company, burn it, boot appliance,
> restore it and you're back in business in an hour or so. Keep in mind a
> linux kernel running just ntpd and some management necessities like ss
> Or you can ask the it guys to use a windows server... Eg:
>
> http://support.microsoft.com/kb/816042
That is a joke Jared? You left off the smiley.
Windows doesn't do NTP out-of-the-box (Microsoft assertions to the contrary
notwithstanding). You can build a reasonably working standard daemo
God damn that's a horrid piece of shit web site. You have to disable security
and permit remote code execution or it does not work.
What a crock!
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> -Original Message-
> From: Nick Hilliard [mailto:n...@foobar.
> > The system clock needs to be UTC, not UTC ± some offset stuck
> > somewhere that keeps some form of running tally of the current leap
> > second offset since the epoch.
> Nope. UTC *includes* leap seconds already. It's UT1 that does not.
> Are you suggesting that NTP timekeeping should be
> Leap seconds are to align the artificial and very stable atomic timescale
> with the irregular and slowing rotation of the earth.
You are assuming facts not in evidence. The rotation is merely irregular
within the capabilities of our scheme of measurement, calculation, and
observation. Once
Tony Finch wrote:
> Keith Medcalf wrote:
> > You are assuming facts not in evidence. The rotation is merely
> > irregular within the capabilities of our scheme of measurement,
> > calculation, and observation.
> There is LOTS of evidence that the earth's rotatio
I see.
Replace "local access" control with "let anyone on the internet reconfigure the
thing". Whoever's idea it was should be p*ssed on, keelhauled, drawn and
quartered, then burned at the stake.
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> -Original Messa
Significantly faster and with far fewer bugs than the Cisco/Linksys as well.
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> -Original Message-
> From: David Hubbard [mailto:dhubb...@dino.hostasaurus.com]
> Sent: Thursday, 05 July, 2012 10:56
> To: nanog@nano
My response would be "insufficient information provided for meaningful
diagnosis".
The following could be issues:
... the user does not have a computer
... the computer is not turned on
... the keyboard is not plugged in
... the user is a quadraplegic and cannot use the mouse or keyboard
... the
> "A client cannot access the website "http://xyz.com";
>> How does the user know that it cannot access the web site?
> When did users become things?
> Probably a candidate that made this mistake should be dismissed from
> consideration on that basis alone.
How do you know that the client is a
> > "A client cannot access the website "http://xyz.com";
>
> >> How does the user know that it cannot access the web site?
>
> > When did users become things?
>
> > Probably a candidate that made this mistake should be dismissed from
> > consideration on that basis alone.
>
> How do you know that
>"What's the problem with using 255.255.255.247 as a subnet mask if you
>want to make a LAN subnet with 12 hosts?"
> (5 word answer)
Unemployment Office Is That Way ->
Is the only 5 word answer I could come up with. The correct answer "invalid
netmask", is only two words.
> "What TCP destina
> > "What's the problem with using 255.255.255.247 as a subnet
> > mask if you want to make a LAN subnet with 12 hosts?"
> > (5 word answer)
> My response would be: Discontiguous subnet masks were allowed in the pre-CIDR
> era. If you so desire, give me about 2 hours since I do not have a scien
(now copied to list as well)
On Sat 07 July, 2012 at 20:32, Owen DeLong wrote:
>>> "What TCP destination port numbers should be allowed through the
>>> perimeter stateful firewall device to and from a mail server whose
>>> only purpose is to proxy SMTP mail from internal sources?"
>>> (one number
Ifconfig does not work on Windows.
Are you saying that there are other operating systems brain-dead enough to just
run any old arbitrary code from untrusted media?
Sent from my Android phone using TouchDown (www.nitrodesk.com)
-Original Message-
From: [valdis.kletni...@vt.edu]
Receiv
Works fine in Firefox for me, and always has (within the limits of the shoddily
designed website that is). Nonetheless, I'd never buy anything from them since
they are an anti-security organization. Their Web site uses so much gratuitous
javascript crap and hard-coded assumptions about charac
Ugly bags of mostly water?
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> -Original Message-
> From: Otis L. Surratt, Jr. [mailto:o...@ocosa.com]
> Sent: Friday, 28 September, 2012 05:33
> To: nanog@nanog.org
> Subject: RE: guys != gender neutral
>
> Maybe
> As an aside, you may want to fix your DNS, as some mail receivers don't
> like this:
> $ dig -x 72.249.91.101 +short
> static.serversandhosting.com.
> $ dig a static.serversandhosting.com +short
> 72.249.3.27
What is really meant to be said is that MTA's which require RFC compliance
won't talk
And don't forget about the NSA's "Operation Backhoe". What more convenient way
of installing a tap than cutting the fibre, then installing a passive tap while
repairs are in progress ...
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> -Original Message-
>
That would be the CSE, not CSIS ...
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> -Original Message-
> From: Erik Soosalu [mailto:erik.soos...@calyxinc.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, 31 October, 2012 12:53
> To: jim deleskie; andy lam
> Cc: nanog@nanog.org
> Subje
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:38 PM, Kevin L. Karch
> wrote:
> > Andrew
> >
> > We offer several solutions that meet your initial requirements. Can you
> tell me if this is a multi rack deployment and a few more details?
> >
> > If you would like we could have a call with one of our applications
> en
Of couse such applications will be accepted. However, applicants are warned
that failure to include a donation will require alternate verification of the
requisite lack of morals and ethics.
>Will applications without a cancelled check for at least 100k in
>"donations" be considered?
>
>On Mon
>sc is Seychelles. Available s* include sf, sp, sq, su and sw. They should
>pick .sf, use .scot for in-country domains and sell all .sf domains to
>San Francisco residents.
Or Science Fiction productions. Lots more money there.
On Tuesday, 16 September, 2014, 19:28, Roland Dobbins said:
>On Sep 17, 2014, at 8:06 AM, Larry Sheldon wrote:
>> I think of this "paperless" idiocy every time I write "20 reams of
>>rinter paper" on the grocery list.
>While it should be mandatory that things like operational
>plans/procedures
And what, exactly, is it vulnerable to?
>-Original Message-
>From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of Daniel Sterling
>Sent: Saturday, 20 September, 2014 12:06
>To: Bacon Zombie
>Cc: nanog@nanog.org
>Subject: Re: Saying goodnight to my GSR
>
>Again, you're focusing resent
gmail.com]
>Sent: Saturday, 20 September, 2014 14:57
>To: Keith Medcalf
>Cc: Daniel Sterling; Bacon Zombie; nanog@nanog.org
>Subject: Re: Saying goodnight to my GSR
>
>> And what, exactly, is it vulnerable to?
>
>Most of these, I'd imagine:
>http://www.cisco.com/c/
On Friday, 26 September, 2014 08:37,Jim Gettys said:
>For those of you who want to understand more about the situation we're
>all in, go look at my talk at the Berkman Center, and read the articles
>linked from there by Bruce Schneier and Dan Geer.
>http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/
>> Unfortunately, that page contains near the top the ludicrous and
>> impossible assertion:
>> ""Familiarity Breeds Contempt: The Honeymoon Effect and the Role of
>> Legacy Code in Zero-Day Vulnerabilities", by Clark, Fry, Blaze and
>> Smith makes clear that ignoring these devices is foolhardy;
>
On Saturday, 27 September, 2014 20:49, Jimmy Hess said:
>On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 8:10 PM, Jay Ashworth wrote:
>> I haven't an example case, but it is theoretically possible.
>Qmail-smtpd has a buffer overflow vulnerability related to integer
>overflow which can only be reached when compiled on
This is another case where a change was made.
If the change had not been made (implement the new kernel) then the
vulnerability would not have been introduced.
The more examples people think they find, the more it proves my proposition.
Vulnerabilities can only be introduced or removed throug
On Saturday, 27 September, 2014 23:29, Kenneth Finnegan
said:
>> My original proposition still holds perfectly:
>>
>> (1) The vulnerability profile of a system is fixed at system
>> commissioning.
>> (2) Vulnerabilities do not get created nor destroyed except through
>> implementation o
On Sunday, 28 September, 2014 00:39, William Herrin said:
>On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 11:11 PM, Keith Medcalf
>wrote:
>> On Friday, 26 September, 2014 08:37,Jim Gettys
>>said:
>>>http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2014/06/gettys
>> ""Familiarit
On Sunday, 28 September, 2014 06:39, Jimmy Hess said:
>On Sat, Sep 27, 2014 at 11:57 PM, Keith Medcalf
>wrote:> This is another case where a change was made.
>> If the change had not been made (implement the new kernel) then the
>vulnerability would not have been introd
On Sunday, 28 September, 2014 14:47, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu said:
>On Sun, 28 Sep 2014 02:39:15 -0400, William Herrin said:
>> The vulnerabilities were there the whole time, but the progression of
>> discovery and dissemination of knowledge about those vulnerabilities
>> makes the systems more
>> What would be the point in blocking them? They don't even have
>> electricity in the country, what would I worry about coming out
>> of their IP block that wouldn't be more interesting than dangerous.
>> Pretty obvious if it was really them behind the Sony hack, it
>> was outsourced.
>For the f
How is that a problem?
---
Theory is when you know everything but nothing works. Practice is when
everything works but no one knows why. Sometimes theory and practice are
combined: nothing works and no one knows why.
>-Original Message-
>From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org]
German Shepherd Dogs are wonderful intrusion detection devices. In a lot of
cases they also server as excellent intrusion prevention devices as well.
(Must be Friday night)
:-)
---
Theory is when you know everything but nothing works. Practice is when
everything works but no one knows why.
> "Email Disclaimers: Legal Effect in American Courts"
> - http://www.rhlaw.com/blog/legal-effect-of-boilerplate-email-disclaimers/
Dark grey text on a black background is unreadable.
Plonk goes the website.
> On Thursday, 17 September, 2015 11:22, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu said:
> On Thu, 17 Sep 2015 13:14:21 -0400, Josh Luthman said:
> > Well it's not a form and it redirects you to the support home page...
> > https://support.microsoft.com/en-us
> You didn't have NoScript or similar in effect at
> Myth: blah blah blah social media is a bad way to get ahold of
> netops/abuse.
> Fact: Social media is an acceptable way to report abuse. My marketing
> department certainly knows how to get ahold of me when such an issue
> occurs. It's 2015, and if you and everyone you know isn't watching twit
Obviously this is designed so that the carrier knows what traffic to
"disregard" in their feed to the NSA ... That is the sole purpose of it.
> -Original Message-
> From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of Owen DeLong
> Sent: Friday, 20 November, 2015 14:50
> To: Steve M
Why uncomfortable? How do you know this is not how the company executive that
came up with the idea did so? (So that he or she could watch unlimited
bestiality videos).
> -Original Message-
> From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of nanog-
> i...@mail.com
> Sent: Sun
> I agree that a /48 or /56 being reserved for business
> customers/sites is reasonable. But for residential use, I'm having a hard
> time believing multi-subnet home networks are even remotely common outside
> of networking folk such as the NANOG members. A lot of recent IPv4
> devices
> s
You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink. If people choose
to be the authors of their own misfortunes, that is their choice. I know a
good many folks who are not members of NANOG yet have multiple separate L2 and
L3 networks to keep the "crap" isolated.
> -Original Mes
> to take you seriously. Also who here can honestly say you never pretended
> to power cycle your Windows 95 when asked by the support bot on the phone,
> while actually running Linux, because that is the only way to get passed
> on to second tier support?
I can honestly say that I have told suppo
On Sunday, 27 December, 2015 17:58, Larry Sheldon said:
> On 12/26/2015 23:49, Mike wrote:
>
> [snip]
>
> > Firstly, they are all junk. Every last one of them. Period. Broadband
> > routers are designed to be cheap and to appeal to people who don't know
> > any better, and who respond well (eg: m
On Sunday, 27 December, 2015 19:46, James Downs said:
> > On Dec 27, 2015, at 09:43, Hugo Slabbert wrote:
> > Hence: https://on.google.com/hub/
> The device looks cool, and sounds cool, but what data does google end up
> with, and what remote management can they do? Their policy pages aren’t
WHo cares? TOG (your third party shooting what you loosly call un-authorized
video) is not a party to the contract and therefore does not give a flying fuck
what it says. Nor do the parties to the contract have anything to say about
the matter.
So in other words, TOG is free to do whatever h
ISP's should block nothing, to or from the customer, unless they make it clear
*before* selling the service (and include it in the Terms and Conditions of
Service Contract), that they are not selling an Internet connection but are
selling a partially functional Internet connection (or a limited
> We are in the process of considering adding some new ports to this block
> list right now, and one big suggestion is SSDP. If you have any others you
> wish to suggest please send them to me and the guy on the cc line (Nirmal
> Mody).
> On 2/26/16, 9:31 AM, "NANOG on behalf of
Hammett
> Intelligent Computing Solutions
> http://www.ics-il.com
>
> Midwest-IX
> http://www.midwest-ix.com
>
> - Original Message -
>
> From: "Keith Medcalf"
> To: "NANOG list"
> Cc: "Nirmal Mody"
> Sent: Friday, February 26, 20
Really? Consumer Narrowband Access Networks use these protocols all the time.
(I call them narrowband since that is what they are -- even though the common
euphamism is broadband, "broad" it certainly is not).
> -Original Message-
> From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behal
mpletely work in
> lynx.
>
>
>
>
> -
> Mike Hammett
> Intelligent Computing Solutions
> http://www.ics-il.com
>
> Midwest-IX
> http://www.midwest-ix.com
>
> - Original Message -
>
> From: "Keith Medcalf"
> To: "NANOG lis
Except for the fact that the FCC decided that they wanted to give up Title II
regulation of the internet because they were paid to do so by the telephants,
they would have alwAYS had this power.
The people who were bribed are simply dead and the current crop of "officials"
(they are not repres
You are forgetting that the Internet and ISPs where originally common carriers
and the FCC at the behest of the government decided to de-regulate so that they
could raid, arrest, charge, fine and torture ISPs if their customers visited
websites the governement did not like, sent email the gover
Robustness is desirable from a security perspective. Failure to be liberal in
what you accept and not being prepared to deal with malformed input leads to
such wonders as the Microsoft bug that led to unexpected/malformed IP datagrams
mishandled as "execute payload with system authority". Rat
>> It's reported by different customers in different locations so I don't
>> think it's password compromised
>Have you checked? If the routers had vty access open (ssh or telnet) and
>the passwords were easy to guess, then it's more likely that this was a
>password compromise. You can test this
It is called the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture ...
> -Original Message-
> From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-boun...@nanog.org] On Behalf Of
> nan...@roadrunner.com
> Sent: Monday, 4 May, 2015 20:56
> To: nanog@nanog.org
> Subject: Network Segmentation Approaches
>
> Possibly a bit off-
Ah. Security hole as designed. inline dispositions should be ignored unless
the recipient specifically "requests" to see them after viewing the text/plain
part. In fact, I would vote for ignoring *everything* except the text/plain
part unless the recipient specifically requests it after view
> On Saturday, 9 May, 2015, at 10:59 John Levine said:
> >> No test/plain? Delete without further ado.
> Sadly, it is no longer 1998.
No kidding. Web-Page e-mail. Lots of proprietary executable-embedded-in-data
file formats used for e-mail, and worst, gratuitous JavaScript everywhere
maki
Without a concomitant increase in "trustworthy", assigning greater levels of
trust is fools endeavour. Whatever this trusted network initiative is, I take
that it was designed by fools or government (the two are usually
indistinguishable) for the purpose of creating utterly untrustworthy netw
Have they asked No-Such-Agency?
No-Such-Agency typically taps communication lines by "back-hoe accident" of
some sort on the path they are interested in tapping. That way they can
install a tap "over yonder" while the victim telecom is attempting to repair
the original damage. I guess this t
Internet in a box.
Wasn't that the Japanese thing with the Woody Woodpecker logo and the
(translated) English text: "Touch Woody, the Internet pecker"?
Didn't go over to well in English speaking parts as I recall ...
> Good to know.
>
> I was one of those insiders, And it's running on my laptop currently. It
> got the 10240 build a bit ago. Which removed the "insider preview" water
> marks, And appears to be the full release version.. So it would appear the
> "insiders" already have it. Or the ability to get
It takes no effort at all. You just do the same thing as has been done with
every previous version of windows:
When it asks for a LOCAL account and password, give it one. When it asks if
you want to do a Microsoft Account", say no thank-you. Mind you, it does ask
you about 8 times if you ar
lliard [mailto:n...@foobar.org]
> Sent: Saturday, 1 August, 2015 06:05
> To: Keith Medcalf; nanog@nanog.org
> Subject: Re: Windows 10 Release
>
> On 01/08/2015 03:27, Keith Medcalf wrote:
> > It just means that you cannot use the crappy apps or the crappy app
> store.
>
>
> "Yahoo does not provide the government with
> direct access to its servers, systems, or network."
Ah, so you admit that you provide "indirect" access by interposing a firewall
and router between your datacenter network and the transport link to the NSA.
That is just normal sound security pra
Of course the access isn't direct -- there is a firewall and a router in
between. The access is indirect.
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> -Original Message-
> From: Jason L. Sparks [mailto:jlspa...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Sunday, 09 June, 2013 04:
There is more than just y'all's in North America .
---
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Original message
From: Jeroen Massar
Date:
To: david peahi
Cc: NANOG list
Subject: Re: huawei (ZTE too)
> Maybe people will now start turning on their encryption functions on
> any device capable of doing it :)
Those that care did that many moons ago. The rest don't care.
Of course, if you do not have control of the endpoints doing the encryption
(ie, the untrustworthy sucker is in the middle som
> > There's still the much more minor point that when I tried to "self
> > serve" I ended up at a blank page on the Yahoo! web site, hopefully
> > they will figure that out as well.
> I'm continually amazed at the number of web designers that don't test
> their pages with NoScript enabled. Just s
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