using an alternative metaphor as a starting point does not mandate using an alternative metaphysics. Pribram's holographic metaphor involves matter, as do all of the other theories of mind of which I am aware. Nevertheless, the models of "computation" that arise in such theories are quite different, and, to me, pretty interesting.
davew On Mon, Jan 27, 2025, at 1:56 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote: > It's fine if people want to imagine other metaphysics for what goes on > with consciousness, but it is a pointless violation of Occam's razor > until they show that consciousness can do things that matter cannot. > As LLMs begin to surpass human intelligence, there's really no leg for > them to stand on, other than to appeal to faith and chauvinism. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of Santafe > Sent: Monday, January 27, 2025 11:40 AM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > <friam@redfish.com> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] "I hope I'm wrong. But that text reads like it was > generated by an LLM" > > >> On Jan 27, 2025, at 10:35, Marcus Daniels <mar...@snoutfarm.com> wrote: >> >> Eric writes: >> >> "He is arguing against the computation framing of consciousness. Searle’s >> device is to say that my brain is like my stomach, and that the computation >> framing doesn’t do its complexity justice." >> >> Can say the same thing about quantum mechanics. > > It’s an interesting response, because answering it requires deciding > what role a law has in our understanding of the world. > > It happens (as these accidents do) that I was at a conference maybe 3 > months ago with at least one philosopher who writes on this, so I know > it is a field. (Actually, got a dosing from other sources over the > weekend, so I know more than that….) > > Somehow, each thing we create as a formalism is bounded. I don’t want > to say finite in its instantiations, because those could be infinite in > various cardinalities. But finite in the premises that generate it as > a formal system. QM as much as anything else. > > So we say that the best guess right now is that there is no type of > matter (and should be no type of spacetime) that isn’t borne on by, or > limited by the constraints of, the generating premises of QM. We would > like laws to have universality of that kind, and if they don’t, we look > for ways to improve them to others that will get closer. > > But if we think “the universe” refers to something about which there > could be indefinitely much to be known or understood, and somehow a > much bigger infinity than that of any formalisms that, once we create > them, are just more “things in the world”, so just parts of that > universe. It doesn’t seem like we want to say there is a containment > relation whereby the one finite thing “contains” everything — in the > sense of “everything there is that makes up an understanding”. > > All the ways I know to imagine this, since it refers to things I don’t > know yet, are metaphors. I can think about “projections” in the sense > of dimension reduction, and a universe-of-everything that can have > infinitely many dimensions projected out of it, with the remainder > being _exactly_ the premises of QM. Others seem to like to think of it > in some kind of set-containment metaphor, where QM “handles” some > “subset of phenomena” “in” the universe. (The latter doesn’t appeal to > me as much.) > > Does the “projection” metaphor of how QM constrains all else that we > will say about matter seem equally apt, for what one or another > computational model says about what-all goes on in heads (and where > relevant, bodies)? Seems mismatched. The set-containment metaphor > seems better for computation-like events in heads. > > At the end, though, they are all metaphors, pretty clearly adopted out > of desperation to have some mental image. If we let go of the mental > image, then what we seem to be left with is just a list of cases. Here > is QM; there is geometry; this is some algebra; here’s a formal > declaration of computability; and here are various hooks and interfaces > at which they seem to make some kind of contact with one another that > we also write down explicitly. Maybe that’s all there is; or all that > we have any justification to speak as if there is. Poor FRIAM: so far > from DaveW, so close to Nick. > > Dunno. > > Eric > > > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. > / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. > / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > Attachments: > * smime.p7s .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. 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