I don’t think that’s the position I am taking.  I am not saying that the head 
isn’t made of matter.  And Descartes and David Chalmers don’t make any sense to 
me at all.  I most certainly am not in the tribe of revelatory truth.  

But if somebody told me he would shoot me if I didn’t announce some 
philosophical position for myself, I would say I am a fallibilist, as 
thoroughly as I can remember to be.  Each of these constructs as we currently 
have it is some bounded thing.  We try to expand them.  The big MLs clearly are 
a large expansion into, if not “new” dimensions beyond the theory of 
algorithms, apparently the realm of “more is different”.  All to the good.

But to suppose they _already_ contain everything there is to be understood is 
not a position I would take w.r.t. anything else we have anywhere in science.  
They contain or represent whatever they do.  I don’t know how much that is, and 
what more it leaves to be found.  I would be amazed if it were “everything”, 
since nothing else in science ever has been before. 

> On Jan 27, 2025, at 14:56, Marcus Daniels <mar...@snoutfarm.com> wrote:
> 
> It's fine if people want to imagine other metaphysics for what goes on with 
> consciousness, but it is a pointless violation of Occam's razor until they 
> show that consciousness can do things that matter cannot.  As LLMs begin to 
> surpass human intelligence, there's really no leg for them to stand on, other 
> than to appeal to faith and chauvinism.    
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of Santafe
> Sent: Monday, January 27, 2025 11:40 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] "I hope I'm wrong. But that text reads like it was 
> generated by an LLM"
> 
> 
>> On Jan 27, 2025, at 10:35, Marcus Daniels <mar...@snoutfarm.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Eric writes:
>> 
>> "He is arguing against the computation framing of consciousness.  Searle’s 
>> device is to say that my brain is like my stomach, and that the computation 
>> framing doesn’t do its complexity justice."
>> 
>> Can say the same thing about quantum mechanics.   
> 
> It’s an interesting response, because answering it requires deciding what 
> role a law has in our understanding of the world.
> 
> It happens (as these accidents do) that I was at a conference maybe 3 months 
> ago with at least one philosopher who writes on this, so I know it is a 
> field.  (Actually, got a dosing from other sources over the weekend, so I 
> know more than that….)
> 
> Somehow, each thing we create as a formalism is bounded.  I don’t want to say 
> finite in its instantiations, because those could be infinite in various 
> cardinalities.  But finite in the premises that generate it as a formal 
> system.  QM as much as anything else.
> 
> So we say that the best guess right now is that there is no type of matter 
> (and should be no type of spacetime) that isn’t borne on by, or limited by 
> the constraints of, the generating premises of QM.  We would like laws to 
> have universality of that kind, and if they don’t, we look for ways to 
> improve them to others that will get closer.
> 
> But if we think “the universe” refers to something about which there could be 
> indefinitely much to be known or understood, and somehow a much bigger 
> infinity than that of any formalisms that, once we create them, are just more 
> “things in the world”, so just parts of that universe.  It doesn’t seem like 
> we want to say there is a containment relation whereby the one finite thing 
> “contains” everything — in the sense of “everything there is that makes up an 
> understanding”.
> 
> All the ways I know to imagine this, since it refers to things I don’t know 
> yet, are metaphors.  I can think about “projections” in the sense of 
> dimension reduction, and a universe-of-everything that can have infinitely 
> many dimensions projected out of it, with the remainder being _exactly_ the 
> premises of QM.  Others seem to like to think of it in some kind of 
> set-containment metaphor, where QM “handles” some “subset of phenomena” “in” 
> the universe.  (The latter doesn’t appeal to me as much.)  
> 
> Does the “projection” metaphor of how QM constrains all else that we will say 
> about matter seem equally apt, for what one or another computational model 
> says about what-all goes on in heads (and where relevant, bodies)?  Seems 
> mismatched.  The set-containment metaphor seems better for computation-like 
> events in heads.
> 
> At the end, though, they are all metaphors, pretty clearly adopted out of 
> desperation to have some mental image.  If we let go of the mental image, 
> then what we seem to be left with is just a list of cases.  Here is QM; there 
> is geometry; this is some algebra; here’s a formal declaration of 
> computability; and here are various hooks and interfaces at which they seem 
> to make some kind of contact with one another that we also write down 
> explicitly.  Maybe that’s all there is; or all that we have any justification 
> to speak as if there is.  Poor FRIAM: so far from DaveW, so close to Nick.  
> 
> Dunno.
> 
> Eric
> 
> 
> 
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