> On 24 Jun 2019, at 13:15, PGC <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 11:02:36 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 23 Jun 2019, at 19:17, PGC <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 12:15:15 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 21 Jun 2019, at 18:18, PGC <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 12:56:59 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 17:20, PGC <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 3:58:17 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Now that does not make sense to me, but this is because your ontology is >>>> unclear for me. Your text is not quite helpful, and I might ask you to >>>> formalise your ontology and perhaps the phenomenology too, to make precise >>>> sense on this. It is unclear how you would test experimentally such >>>> statements. >>>> >>>> You "might" ask him. I would advise against such a move as he may reverse >>>> the question and ask you something equivalent. E.g. he may ask: Can you >>>> show me Bell's theorem in the combinator thread or using any equivalent >>>> universal machinery? Just to make precise sense of things? To see in >>>> action how to test such statements, ontologies, phenomenologies >>>> experimentally, in a formal setting of your choice, beyond retrodiction on >>>> others' work? PGC >>> >>> This is done in detail in my papers (and longer test). >>> >>> If you are interested, I can expand this here. >>> >>> You demand formal precision from other's claims and you "read my papers" me >>> without titles, pages, or exact references? >>> >>> Nobody has to give you permission to expand, you do so or you don't. Let's >>> see Bell in combinators then and as many longer tests as you like. Since >>> it's all done and obvious, it's a simple copy and paste matter. PGC >> >> >> As I have explained in some posts, we can start from any universal >> machinery, be them given by the natural numbers with addition and >> multiplication, or by the combinators with applications. Then we extend this >> with classical logical induction axioms. For example, for the numbers: >> >> P(0) & [For all n (P(n) -> P(s(n)))] ->. For all n P(n), >> >> Or for the combinators: >> >> P(K) & P(S) & [For all x y ((P(x) & P(y)) -> P(xy)) -> For all x P(x). >> >> P is for any first order formula in the language. >> >> That leads to the Löbian machine, who provability predicate obeys to the >> “theology” G*. >> >> The material modes are given by the first person modes ([]p & p, []p & <>t, >> []p & <>t & p). Incompleteness imposes that those modes obeys very different >> logics, despite G* show them extensional equivalent: it is the same part of >> the arithmetical reality (the sigma_1 one) seen in very different >> perspective. >> >> A simple Bell’s inequality is (A & B) => (A & C) v (B & ~C). >> >> Using the inverse Goldblatt representation of quantum logic in the modal >> logic B, the arithmetical rendering of that inequality is >> >> []<>A & []<>B => []([]<>A & []<>B) v [([]<>B & []~[]<>C) >> >> With the box and the diamond being the modal boxes of the logic of the >> martial modes described above. >> >> There are very few reason that this inequality is obeyed, and it is expected >> that the material modes do violate Bel’s inequality, but unfortunately, the >> nesting of boxes when tested on a G* theorem prover makes this not yet >> solved. It is intractable on today’s computer. This is not a bad sign, >> actually, in the sense that the quantum tautologies *should* be only >> tractable on a quantum computer, if the material modes would really be the >> one of nature, assuming quantum mechanics correct. >> >> See for example, for more details: (or my long French text “Conscience et >> Mécanisme). >> >> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in >> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 >> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993> >> Eric Vandenbussche has solved some open problems when working toward that >> solution. >> >> As stated previously, tractability is not clear. And while your account may >> suffice to you: There is no global conspiracy of physicalists that is >> holding platonists hostage, the jury is still out - even by your own >> measure, in domains of description of your personal choosing - as the >> notions in your thought experiments along with the testability implied by >> your reasoning, in particular duplicating machines and ideally working >> quantum computers, do not exist at present. They may exist at some point, >> but even if progress in those domains seems plausible, everybody with a bit >> of experience under the sun knows what happens when wishes get fulfilled. > > Maybe. This gives the impression that someday we might know that Mechanism is > true, but that will never been rationally proved, only rationally inferred. > Like with any other theory, we must be open to change our mind. If Z1* (a > material mode) depart too much from quantum logic, that would raise a sane > doubt toward computationalism. > > The burden of proof always falls to those with extraordinary claims. No other > scientists lay claim to the origins of reality.
That was the subject debate by Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle made the extraordinary claim: there is a physical universe made of primary matter, which was the false obvious fact precisely doubted by Plato. There are never been any proof of this, nor even evidence. We, 20th century human tends to take Aristotle theology for granted, but that is only an habit, I would say. > The default position is that it is unclear or that we haven't advanced far > enough. I would say that we have regressed a lot on this domain, since theology has been separated from science. > So that extraordinary claim calls for extraordinary - even immaculate - sort > of evidence. Who knows how the problem could be posed and what powerful > machines or new mathematics we could invent? That's being open to change our > mind... keep working at it. The best way to be able to change our mind, is by making theory precise enough so that we can test it, and up to now, the evidences back up Mechanism. Without Descartes proposing Mechanism, there would not have been Darwin. I make two point: the incompatibility of mechanism and (weak) materialism, which leads to the reduction of physics to arithmetic. The proof is constructive, and explains how to derive physics from arithmetic, and the propositional logic of the observable have been deduced, and the comparison with nature sides with mechanism, and refute Materialism, if we don’t consider that its failure to attach consciousness to the prediction is not already a refutation. This is not a critics of physics, of course, but on metaphysical naturalism or physicalisme. The problem is that since we have separated theology/metaphysics from science, many people confuse the notion of matter and primary matter. > > It is one of the reason to call it theology: we need some amount of fait to > say “yes” to the doctor, and we cannot impose the Mechanist practice to > others (with the inevitable complex question of how to decide for kids, etc.). > > > > Expressing something linguistically - all intentions aside - always > "imposes". That's the nature of language and discourse. It's up to folks to > use this power responsibly or fail at survival at some point. That is why I insist so much that Mechanism is an hypothesis (aka belief, axioms, postulate). That is why I am almost boring by repeating all the time: If mechanism is true then … > > >> Having clarity with ourselves, respecting ourselves even with a negative >> result is more scientific than infinities of pipe dreams, no matter how well >> argued and how seductive a unified ensemble theory, some purist arithmetical >> dream of body and mind feels to us. For even if our wishful thinking got >> everything right on some intuitive level, it would still be disingenuous to >> assume "we got it" before we had the quality of evidence that satisfies our >> peers and ourselves. > > My work is recognise by those who read it. My opponents are non scientist, > and do philosophy in the non greek sense: they claim to know that a > (primitive) material world exists. My work renew with Plato’s skepticism, and > illustrate that we have not yet solve the mind-body problem. It suggest also > a new theory (quantum mechanics without collapse and without wave, just > partially computable arithmetical sentences. > > Ok but if it remains intractable then why all the quantum ambition? Is it > like a Freudian quantum envy? Like my quantum and proofs are longer, more > elaborate, and precise than yours? ;-) It is because physics is reduced into a statistics on all computation (which are arithmetical objects) and that if I did not get quantum mechanics, I would have concluded that either mechanism is wrong, or we must look closer at nature and find the quantum parallel histories. (Or we are in a malevolent simulation). That could have happened if Planck constant would be much smaller, and we would not have detected the quantum logical “weirdness”. Then, quantum mechanics illustrate also the difficulties to interpret the fact in a Aristotelian framework. Mechanism is not the only idea that threatened Aristotelism. The conceptual difficulties in interpreting the physical facts illustrates this also. > > > > > >> >> And while I may have been critical and harsh these past years, I have no >> issue with your person and/or your work. Your discourse assumes notions >> who's existential status/tractability remains unclear at this time. > > > I assume Digital Mechanism. Then I prove that physics has to be like QM has > already illustrated. QM is basically incomprehensible today, and the fault is > the Aristotelian belief in (boolean or not) independent substances. > > > I'm not sure for above reasons: extraordinary claims demand extraordinary > evidence But extraordinary is subjective. The most extraordinary claim is that a physical universe exist primitively. There are zero reason to believe this. No one doubt that there is a physical reality, but why should it be primitive? In science, we simply try to avoid committing oneself ontologically. No physicists do that. But physicalist do it, and they use often Mechanism implicitly, to avoid the mind-body problem. But once you grasp that 2+2=4 entails the existence of all computations, even without mechanism, that gives a reason to doubt the necessity of assuming a primitively physical universe. > and since that isn't obtainable now believing in independent substances > cannot be considered a crime or sin against science. Of course. It is only an inconsistent belief for those who are willing to say “yes” to a digitalist brain surgeon. > > > > >> Therefore assuming "comp" or "mechanism" to be absolutely clear and >> established beyond doubt is premature. > > That will never happen. Xe cannot prove anything about “reality”, not even > that there is one. > > We can know consciousness, but still not prove it. > > Many people believe that mechanism and materialism go hand in hand, where I > show them incompatible, and then, thanks to QM, the experimental facts sides > with mechanism, against materialism. But that can change tomorrow, or in > billions years. > > This is where your discourse has merit: where, how, why those facts > side/support mechanism and our ability or lack thereof to test the thing. The > nested boxes of Bell you came up with with Eric Vandenbussche: are we sure > that Telmo or Russell can't get their hands on a machine powerful enough to > muscle. Why not try? Telmo's Biceps are most certainly huge by now, right? > Perhaps with a powerful enough machines today and Goldblatt tattooed on his > biceps, the world or the machine will see the light! lol Eric Vandenbuscche was indeed working on how to optimise G*. But it is advanced mathematical logic, computer science, etc. Not that easy. Eric died and was unable to accomplish this work. > > > I do not defend the idea that Mechanism is true, only that it is incompatible > with (Weak) Materialism, and that the empirical facts side with Mechanism, > until now. > > Again: that burden of proof has to be extraordinary or the metaphysics has to > be extraordinary. Before that happens, we're speculating in mathematical or > philosophy of science realms. I don’t speculate. Most people believe in mechanism today (even some who claim the contrary. I use Mechanism in the weaker sense that most of its use.And many people are just wrong on this, as they believe that mechanism is compatible with materialism. That has been proved impossible, which makes some dogmatic materialist angry. > >> >> If people want to tarnish themselves, their histories, their work, their >> reputations in this world with certainties, nobody in their right mind >> should stop them. But peer systems, and yeah I may naively kid myself that >> this list constitutes some loose peer discussion system, don't exist >> exclusively to control and bust the chops of messiahs with the truth: > > When doing science, we never claim truth. We provide theories, and means to > refute them. If confirmed, we can still not conclude that it is true. > > > Reasonable confidence, pinning down what that is, finding consensus, would > already get this discussion out of the realm of speculation. What counts are the scientist who read the works. The rest are rumours. Consider the cannabis domain. The lies are no older than a century. The scientific consensus has been clear since the begging: no evidence at all of the danger. Then we got eventually the original paper used to make it illegal, and they were shown to be gross fraud … despite all this, cannabis is still schedule one. Just to show that lies can last. Then take into account that in theology, the lies are 1500 years old, and if we don’t do something now, we might as well prolongated the obscurantism one millenium more. Bad faith fear Reason. > And a negative result, that there is no silver bullet up to some point in > time is a valuable contribution too. But I will keep my practical belief in > water as a magical primitive resource that replenishes me with elan vital > life force. Same for good food. And if you don't believe it's ontologically > primitive, then that just means you lack evidence of how well I cook. Proof? > Nobody I've cooked for has denied this fundamental metaphysical proof, > including myself, which is why I have to follow Telmo on the pursuit for > magical biceps, abs, etc. otherwise my expansion just progresses > horizontally. And that is incompatible with platonism. PGC Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/026b3ff4-ba24-4d2b-83e8-de25a489b5cf%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/026b3ff4-ba24-4d2b-83e8-de25a489b5cf%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/E80F1783-8F59-48A6-8837-20A24F9FE9C7%40ulb.ac.be.
