> On 21 Jun 2019, at 18:18, PGC <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 12:56:59 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 20 Jun 2019, at 17:20, PGC <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 3:58:17 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> Now that does not make sense to me, but this is because your ontology is >> unclear for me. Your text is not quite helpful, and I might ask you to >> formalise your ontology and perhaps the phenomenology too, to make precise >> sense on this. It is unclear how you would test experimentally such >> statements. >> >> You "might" ask him. I would advise against such a move as he may reverse >> the question and ask you something equivalent. E.g. he may ask: Can you show >> me Bell's theorem in the combinator thread or using any equivalent universal >> machinery? Just to make precise sense of things? To see in action how to >> test such statements, ontologies, phenomenologies experimentally, in a >> formal setting of your choice, beyond retrodiction on others' work? PGC > > This is done in detail in my papers (and longer test). > > If you are interested, I can expand this here. > > You demand formal precision from other's claims and you "read my papers" me > without titles, pages, or exact references? > > Nobody has to give you permission to expand, you do so or you don't. Let's > see Bell in combinators then and as many longer tests as you like. Since it's > all done and obvious, it's a simple copy and paste matter. PGC
As I have explained in some posts, we can start from any universal machinery, be them given by the natural numbers with addition and multiplication, or by the combinators with applications. Then we extend this with classical logical induction axioms. For example, for the numbers: P(0) & [For all n (P(n) -> P(s(n)))] ->. For all n P(n), Or for the combinators: P(K) & P(S) & [For all x y ((P(x) & P(y)) -> P(xy)) -> For all x P(x). P is for any first order formula in the language. That leads to the Löbian machine, who provability predicate obeys to the “theology” G*. The material modes are given by the first person modes ([]p & p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p). Incompleteness imposes that those modes obeys very different logics, despite G* show them extensional equivalent: it is the same part of the arithmetical reality (the sigma_1 one) seen in very different perspective. A simple Bell’s inequality is (A & B) => (A & C) v (B & ~C). Using the inverse Goldblatt representation of quantum logic in the modal logic B, the arithmetical rendering of that inequality is []<>A & []<>B => []([]<>A & []<>B) v [([]<>B & []~[]<>C) With the box and the diamond being the modal boxes of the logic of the martial modes described above. There are very few reason that this inequality is obeyed, and it is expected that the material modes do violate Bel’s inequality, but unfortunately, the nesting of boxes when tested on a G* theorem prover makes this not yet solved. It is intractable on today’s computer. This is not a bad sign, actually, in the sense that the quantum tautologies *should* be only tractable on a quantum computer, if the material modes would really be the one of nature, assuming quantum mechanics correct. See for example, for more details: (or my long French text “Conscience et Mécanisme). Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 Eric Vandenbussche has solved some open problems when working toward that solution. Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/aea32e3c-111f-4820-ae85-5d0b1d419e06%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/aea32e3c-111f-4820-ae85-5d0b1d419e06%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/45610823-D386-4F15-9987-9239C6B6A58E%40ulb.ac.be.
