> On 23 Jun 2019, at 19:17, PGC <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 12:15:15 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 21 Jun 2019, at 18:18, PGC <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 12:56:59 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 17:20, PGC <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 3:58:17 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> Now that does not make sense to me, but this is because your ontology is >>> unclear for me. Your text is not quite helpful, and I might ask you to >>> formalise your ontology and perhaps the phenomenology too, to make precise >>> sense on this. It is unclear how you would test experimentally such >>> statements. >>> >>> You "might" ask him. I would advise against such a move as he may reverse >>> the question and ask you something equivalent. E.g. he may ask: Can you >>> show me Bell's theorem in the combinator thread or using any equivalent >>> universal machinery? Just to make precise sense of things? To see in action >>> how to test such statements, ontologies, phenomenologies experimentally, in >>> a formal setting of your choice, beyond retrodiction on others' work? PGC >> >> This is done in detail in my papers (and longer test). >> >> If you are interested, I can expand this here. >> >> You demand formal precision from other's claims and you "read my papers" me >> without titles, pages, or exact references? >> >> Nobody has to give you permission to expand, you do so or you don't. Let's >> see Bell in combinators then and as many longer tests as you like. Since >> it's all done and obvious, it's a simple copy and paste matter. PGC > > > As I have explained in some posts, we can start from any universal machinery, > be them given by the natural numbers with addition and multiplication, or by > the combinators with applications. Then we extend this with classical logical > induction axioms. For example, for the numbers: > > P(0) & [For all n (P(n) -> P(s(n)))] ->. For all n P(n), > > Or for the combinators: > > P(K) & P(S) & [For all x y ((P(x) & P(y)) -> P(xy)) -> For all x P(x). > > P is for any first order formula in the language. > > That leads to the Löbian machine, who provability predicate obeys to the > “theology” G*. > > The material modes are given by the first person modes ([]p & p, []p & <>t, > []p & <>t & p). Incompleteness imposes that those modes obeys very different > logics, despite G* show them extensional equivalent: it is the same part of > the arithmetical reality (the sigma_1 one) seen in very different perspective. > > A simple Bell’s inequality is (A & B) => (A & C) v (B & ~C). > > Using the inverse Goldblatt representation of quantum logic in the modal > logic B, the arithmetical rendering of that inequality is > > []<>A & []<>B => []([]<>A & []<>B) v [([]<>B & []~[]<>C) > > With the box and the diamond being the modal boxes of the logic of the > martial modes described above. > > There are very few reason that this inequality is obeyed, and it is expected > that the material modes do violate Bel’s inequality, but unfortunately, the > nesting of boxes when tested on a G* theorem prover makes this not yet > solved. It is intractable on today’s computer. This is not a bad sign, > actually, in the sense that the quantum tautologies *should* be only > tractable on a quantum computer, if the material modes would really be the > one of nature, assuming quantum mechanics correct. > > See for example, for more details: (or my long French text “Conscience et > Mécanisme). > > Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in > Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. > https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 > <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993> > Eric Vandenbussche has solved some open problems when working toward that > solution. > > As stated previously, tractability is not clear. And while your account may > suffice to you: There is no global conspiracy of physicalists that is holding > platonists hostage, the jury is still out - even by your own measure, in > domains of description of your personal choosing - as the notions in your > thought experiments along with the testability implied by your reasoning, in > particular duplicating machines and ideally working quantum computers, do not > exist at present. They may exist at some point, but even if progress in those > domains seems plausible, everybody with a bit of experience under the sun > knows what happens when wishes get fulfilled.
Maybe. This gives the impression that someday we might know that Mechanism is true, but that will never been rationally proved, only rationally inferred. Like with any other theory, we must be open to change our mind. If Z1* (a material mode) depart too much from quantum logic, that would raise a sane doubt toward computationalism. It is one of the reason to call it theology: we need some amount of fait to say “yes” to the doctor, and we cannot impose the Mechanist practice to others (with the inevitable complex question of how to decide for kids, etc.). > > It's not simple to convince stakeholders like universities, governments, > public institutions, scientists, and private companies to divert resources > towards what is still on the philosophical drawing board, if it is even > tractable at all. Everybody is risk averse, we all appear to die, and the > notion that some ideological conspiracy is preventing a more genuine ideal > fundamental mathematicalism from establishing itself is just, as Russell > would say "rather baroque". Like the AGI guys, I hope they make progress > towards some benevolent general artificial intelligence, but do I understand > why folks wouldn't bet their futures/resources on success? I do: we're not > sure about feasibility/evidence. A chess player will always hope for the > infinite win continuations but the best of them are who they are because they > prepare for the worst outcomes. With Mechanism, all universal machine is conscious, and maximally so when not programmed. The singularity belongs to the past, unless we meant the moment where the machines will be as stupid as the human, which can still take some time. > > And as long as this ambiguity exists, we have the usual two options: abandon > what appears to be not solvable or come up with feasibility and testability > criteria that are accessible with technology/mathematics/physics/philosophy > available today. Mechanism can be tested by using also the current theories of physics. It fits already, although he would have been judged quite implausible if we were still at Newton’s physics time. Without Quantum Mechanics, I am not sure I would have thought Mechanism plausible. > Having clarity with ourselves, respecting ourselves even with a negative > result is more scientific than infinities of pipe dreams, no matter how well > argued and how seductive a unified ensemble theory, some purist arithmetical > dream of body and mind feels to us. For even if our wishful thinking got > everything right on some intuitive level, it would still be disingenuous to > assume "we got it" before we had the quality of evidence that satisfies our > peers and ourselves. My work is recognise by those who read it. My opponents are non scientist, and do philosophy in the non greek sense: they claim to know that a (primitive) material world exists. My work renew with Plato’s skepticism, and illustrate that we have not yet solve the mind-body problem. It suggest also a new theory (quantum mechanics without collapse and without wave, just partially computable arithmetical sentences. > > And while I may have been critical and harsh these past years, I have no > issue with your person and/or your work. Your discourse assumes notions who's > existential status/tractability remains unclear at this time. I assume Digital Mechanism. Then I prove that physics has to be like QM has already illustrated. QM is basically incomprehensible today, and the fault is the Aristotelian belief in (boolean or not) independent substances. > Therefore assuming "comp" or "mechanism" to be absolutely clear and > established beyond doubt is premature. That will never happen. Xe cannot prove anything about “reality”, not even that there is one. We can know consciousness, but still not prove it. Many people believe that mechanism and materialism go hand in hand, where I show them incompatible, and then, thanks to QM, the experimental facts sides with mechanism, against materialism. But that can change tomorrow, or in billions years. I do not defend the idea that Mechanism is true, only that it is incompatible with (Weak) Materialism, and that the empirical facts side with Mechanism, until now. > That tendency... that kind of discourse is most certainly premature, even if > we applaud the passion and enthusiasm behind it, as are all the discursive > attempts to ensnare folks disagreeing with such world views while posing as > professors of the new most advanced fundamental science. That's almost odious > (language and discourse is thankfully a bit too ambiguous), particularly when > arguing to folks outside their domains of expertise, invoking arithmetic as > the generous über-soul that grants certain immortality that folks are > programmed since childhood to believe in. Arithmetic or anything Turing equivalent, and not too much rich (no induction axiom, no axiom of infinity). > > If people want to tarnish themselves, their histories, their work, their > reputations in this world with certainties, nobody in their right mind should > stop them. But peer systems, and yeah I may naively kid myself that this list > constitutes some loose peer discussion system, don't exist exclusively to > control and bust the chops of messiahs with the truth: When doing science, we never claim truth. We provide theories, and means to refute them. If confirmed, we can still not conclude that it is true. > they guard us from self-delusion as much as they are abused. And sometimes > this is irritating and sometimes it hurts because we can't always run from > what is unpleasant. Contrary to some folks however, I do not tarnish folks > with "Liar, manipulator" just because I see them printing unsupported things, > things I may not understand, or things that irritate me. There is enough > ambiguity to say that such discourses may not always happen intentionally for > various reasons, from various sides, and that they may fuel creativity, > imagination, and different perspectives, being the unavoidable result of > liberality in exchange and expression, if we're not as literal as fanatics > pretending to themselves to be the ultimate arbiters of truth, right? > > Evidence aside, idealistic dreams are beautiful and working to make them > tractable in scientific sense is important. OK. > And for that, I would always support team Plato. Just the beauty. Fuck the > evidence. PGC Well, we cannot be sad when the evidences sides with the beauty. What mechanism explains, is that it is up to the believer in primitive matter to show evidences, and there are none, until now. If Z1* depart from quantum logic, that would give a first evidence that we might be non Turing emulable. Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5adce293-2125-4fa0-9e7f-5e430be49303%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5adce293-2125-4fa0-9e7f-5e430be49303%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BAAFD11A-0D42-48E6-B360-2BCA6CB13F3D%40ulb.ac.be.
